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General Introduction
1
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The economic literature emphasizes the manifold benefits of education both from
a microeconomic and from a macroeconomic perspective. Education is crucial to help
eradicate poverty, counter the transmission of inequalities between generations and drive
sustainable growth. This clear review of the situation convinced policymakers to make
education a high priority and to achieve Universal Primary Education (UPE) by 2015.1
With the joint efforts made by government and non-government organizations, sub-
Saharan Africa has made great progress in providing access to school and in increasing
the number of completed years of education. From 1999 to 2009, the primary Gross
Enrolment Rate (GER) steadily increased by an average of 3.1 % per year2 and almost
reached 100% in 2014 (World Bank, 2015).
Figure 1: Evolution of Enrollment Rates in sub-Saharan Africa
(a) Primary Enrollment Rate (b) Enrollment Rate by Schooling Cycle
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank data.
Figure 1 shows that in sub-Saharan Africa, the Gross Enrolment Rate in primary has
doubled from 1970 to date. Despite this great progress, the dropout rate before completion
of primary education is still high (primary education completion was less than 66 % in
2014), and relatively few children continue on to secondary and postsecondary education.
In addition, the high enrollment rate is often offset by low attendance, which erodes the
benefits of education. Attendance, especially in rural areas, is erratic. As a result of
1Universal Primary education is the second goal of the United Nations Millennium Development
Goals.
2In comparison, the GER increased by 0.8% per year in the 1990s.
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this low completion rate and poor attendance, 48 million children aged 15 to 24 in sub-
Saharan Africa are still illiterate (UNESCO, 2013). This low educational achievement
reflects diverse causes and poses new challenges that deserve to be further explored.
In this thesis, I analyze how to improve educational achievement in an agricultural
environment. The analysis focuses on rural Tanzania. The thesis, composed of three
chapters, uses a microeconomic approach and investigates access to education from
different perspectives. The first chapter evaluates how child labor productivity in
agriculture enters households’ decisions, and how these decisions can hinder universal
education. The second chapter utilizes an education policy implemented in Tanzania in
the 1970’s to estimate the benefits of education, where the benefits are measured in income
and access to labor markets in a rural environment. Finally, the third chapter analyzes the
impact of productivity shocks (climate variations and fluctuations in prices of cash-crop
commodities) on child labor, education decisions, and children’s cognitive skills.
To contextualize these research questions, this introduction chapter provides an
overview of the specifics of the sub-Saharan African economy. In this context, I present the
vulnerabilities of households and the strategies available to them to protect against shocks
and insure their welfare. Then, I examine the consequences of such households’ decisions
on education outcomes. Finally, I present the outline of the thesis, the methodologies and
the data used in this analysis.
0.1 A particular feature of sub-Saharan African
countries: an economy highly dependent on
agriculture
The economy of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has to be assessed in the light of the territorial
organization, characterized by the strong predominance of rural areas. As shown in figure
2, the percentage of the rural population has declined over time in almost every African
country, but rural communities still constitute the largest share of the population. In 2015,
the percentage of people living in rural areas was more than 60 % in sub-Saharan Africa
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and was even higher in countries of the East African Community(79%).3 Individuals living
in rural areas can potentially work in various sectors, however, in practice, agriculture
is extensively developed and remains the principal source of activities in SSA.4 At the
microeconomic level, this high dependency on agriculture implies that every change in
agricultural productivity has an impact on the households’ welfare, can keep people in
poverty, and exacerbate their vulnerability (Baumeister and Kilian, 2014). Anderson and
Bru¨ckner (2012) compute the shares of the real gross domestic product (GDP) by sector
in SSA since 1950 and find that the agricultural sector accounts for more than a third of
the GDP. More recently, this share is about 21 % and varies from 10 to 70 %, depending
on the country (Sandri et al., 2007; Devereux et al., 2001). As a result, agricultural
productivity shocks (weather shocks, fluctuations in commodity prices, etc.) constitute
substantial factors of instability that can compromise food security, and have significant
impact on economic growth (Addison et al., 2016).
In this thesis, I focus on Tanzania, where the same stylized facts are observed.
Agriculture in Tanzania accounts for 30 % of GDP and employs the majority of population.
Most individuals involved in agriculture perform subsistence farming and cultivate small
plot of land for a living.5 Agricultural productivity is stalled by a limited access to
technology and low development of irrigation systems, which further expose individuals
to productivity shocks.
3The East African Community is located in the Great Lakes region and is comprised of Burundi, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.
4Sixty-two percent of the labor force performs agricultural activities (World Bank, 2015).
5The average plot size was about around 2.5 ha (World Bank report, 2011).
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Figure 2: Percentage of the population living in rural areas
(a) In 1980
(b) In 1990
(c) in 2015
Source: Author’s calculations based on
World Bank data.
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0.2 Shocks in agriculture
Agriculture is a risky business where farmers face positive and negative income shocks that
change their living standards. The literature commonly distinguishes two types of shocks,
idiosyncratic and aggregate income shocks (Ferreira and Schady, 2009). Idiosyncratic
shocks refer to individual variations of income, such as damage of crops, job loss, death
or illness of household members, while aggregate shocks refer to covariate shocks that
affect a broad community. The most widespread aggregate shocks are natural disasters
(drought, floods, landsides, etc.), economic shocks (inflation, fluctuations of agricultural
inputs and food prices), and civil conflicts.
Idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks differ from each other in their frequency and their
magnitude. Idiosyncratic shocks are more common and explain between 75 to 96 % of total
income variation (Morduch, 2005). However, as discussed in the next section, households
can fall back on insurance systems to protect themselves against idiosyncratic shocks.
It is worth underlining that some shocks can change the opportunity cost of time. For
instance, climate shocks, such as droughts, drastically reduce harvest and decrease labor
productivity. Similarly, by changing the value at which households sell their agricultural
outputs at the market, variations in commodity prices also change labor productivity.
These shocks are called productivity shocks.
A cross-country comparison based on the LSMS-ISA data (Nikoloski et al., 2018)
describes the more widespread shocks that households face in five sub-Saharan African
countries, including Tanzania.6 The authors find that in Tanzania, most households are
subject to frequent income shocks. About 60% of households have experienced sudden
losses in income or assets, while the average number of reported shocks per household
over the last five years reaches fourteen. The shocks that appear to be the most prevalent
are weather shocks and food price variations.
6The five countries are Ethiopia, Niger, Malawi, Uganda, and Tanzania.
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0.3 Which coping strategy to adopt?
In response to income shocks, households have access to several mechanisms. They can
use insurance programs such as savings and credit. Although financial services recently
expanded in sub-Saharan Africa, access to formal insurance systems remains limited and is
not inclusive. In 2015, the World Bank reported that only 16 % of adults use formal savings
and 6 % use formal borrowing systems in SSA countries, but these services are usually
used by the richest households. This lack of access to protection systems contributes to
inequalities and keeping people in poverty.
Alternatively, households may overcome these shocks by selling their assets and by
smoothing their consumption (Nikoloski et al., 2018). Although these decisions help
households to cope with income shocks in the short-run, they may have negative long-run
consequences. Indeed, selling off assets decreases households access to future resources
and thus reduces their opportunities to get out of poverty. In comparison, reductions
in consumption deprive individuals of nutrients they need which has adverse effects on
children’s health and cognitive development (Almond and Currie, 2011; Currie and Vogl,
2013).
Since markets are imperfect and uncompetitive in developing countries (Jacoby, 1993;
Skoufias, 1994; Chennareddy, 1967; Chavas et al., 2005; Le, 2009), poor households rely
on informal insurance from friends and family that tends to be inefficient when aggregated
shocks hit a whole community at once. Alternatively, households can call on the available
workforce and use marginal workers such as children to cope with shocks (Guarcello et al.,
2010; Dehejia and Gatti, 2005; Beegle et al., 2006a).
The report of Nikoloski et al. (2018) underlines that, empirically, savings is the
main coping strategy used by Tanzanian households. Formal insurance is limited to the
wealthiest 60 percent of population, while poorer households engage in informal insurance
systems, which are inefficient in case of aggregate shocks. Thus, adapting labor allocation
remains a widely used strategy to cope with income shocks. This result is in line with
the finding of Dumas (2015) showing that, in Tanzania, rainfall shocks affect child labor
when credit and labor markets are imperfect.
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0.4 Child labor, which consequences on education?
A number of international organizations such as Understanding Children’s Work (UCW)7
have been dedicating their attention to child labor, which has severe consequences on
development and children’s well-being. According to the ILO definition, child labor
includes three categories of children, according to their age and the intensity of their
activities.8 This current definition of child labor is used to target and fight against all
forms of child labor that may jeopardize education and children’s welfare. Indeed, an
extensive literature has claimed that child labor may interact with education decisions.
The recent cross-country study of nineteen developing countries (Guarcello et al., 2016)
highlights the negative correlation between work and school enrollment: working children
have lower school enrollment than non-working children, and this is true for all countries.
Figure 3: Enrollment in school, by work status and age
Source: UCW calculations based on LSMS-ISA data in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Tanzania.
Based on the LSMS-ISA data, figure 3 compares the percentage of children enrolled in
school by employment status and by age. In Tanzania, working children have lower school
7This is an inter-agency research institution created by ILO, UNICEF, and the World Bank.
8Children aged 5-11 years involved in any form of employment, children aged 12-14 years involved in
any form of employment, excepting legal light work, children aged 15-17 years involved in any form of
hazardous work.
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enrollment than non-working children and the gap widens as children grow older. Boozer
and Suri (2001) attempt to estimate the causal relationship of child labor on education
and find evidence that child labor decreases contemporaneous enrollment in Ghana.
Although there is a negative correlation between child labor and education, the large
majority of working children stay enrolled in school. Notwithstanding, working children
who combine different activities are necessarily less involved in their education, which is
probably harmful for their educational achievement. This big picture draws attention to
the effect of child labor on education outputs such as children’s performance at school.
Empirically, there are still some debates on this relationship. Some studies have found no
effect of child labor on schooling learning (Dumas, 2012), while others have found negative
correlation between child labor and children’s skills (Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos,
1999).
Despite these potential adverse effects on education, the frequency of child labor
has not been reduced in sub-Saharan Africa. On the contrary, from 2012 to 2016, the
percentage of children engaged in child labor has risen from 21,4 to 22,4% (ILO, 2016).
These recent figures suggest that structural factors are not sufficient to curb child labor
and that active public policies have to be implemented. However, banishing child labor can
be inappropriate especially for the poorest households whom child labor can help escape
poverty (Basu and Van, 1998). Thus, to be able to draw public policy recommendations
that insure education progress in developing countries, it is necessary to understand the
complexity of child labor and education decisions in rural sub-Saharan Africa.
0.5 Motivations and chapters’ summaries
In this thesis, I attempt to understand the demand for education in a rural risky
environment. The objective of this analysis is to identify vulnerable children who are
likely to drop out out from school, and to draw public recommendations to protect and
promote education. To do so, the three chapters of this thesis focus on factors that drive
the demand for education, the costs and the benefits of education, and on factors that
pull children out of school.
Direct and indirect costs of education are easily computed, but there remain
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opportunity costs of education that are not straightforward to observe . These costs
correspond to the additional income that children would have earned if they were not
enrolled to school. In other words, this cost is the amount of extra income that parents
have to give up if they send their children to school. Thus, these costs could explain why
education investment is low even when there are no tuition fees. The first chapter of this
thesis investigates children’s productivity on farming to estimate a range of the values of
one day of child labor and deduce the opportunity cost of children’s time in agriculture.
Among the factors that explain education decisions, the returns to education also
constitute a core determinant. To understand education investment in rural sub-Saharan
Africa, it is necessary to assess the different benefits of education in a rural environment
where the technology level is low and where the family farm is the dominant structure in
agriculture. In the second chapter, I investigate the returns to education and the effects
of education on access to the labor market in rural Tanzania.
To analyze factors that pull children out of school, the third chapter of this thesis
explores whether short-run and recurrent positive and negative productivity shocks are
detrimental to education attainment, and to educational achievement. To better assess
vulnerable children, the effect of these shocks is disaggregated by children’s age, from
birth to secondary school age.
These research questions of public interest should help for formulating effective policies
to protect children’s education against shocks and to encourage parents to keep their
children in school.
0.5.1 Chapter 1
The purpose of the first chapter9 is to study the opportunity costs of children’s time
that may significantly hinder universal education in developing countries. In this chapter,
we are interested in the children’s productivity in family farms, which represents the
most widespread form of child labor in sub-Saharan Africa. To do so, we estimate the
extent to which one additional day of child labor in the fields increases the households’
production. We find that one day of child work raises the household production by
US $1.43-2.45, depending on the specification. Some heterogeneities can be observed:
9This first chapter has been jointly written with Pierre Andre´ (Cergy-Pontoise University) and
Christelle Dumas (Fribourg University).
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children’s productivity increases with children’s age, and girls appear far less productive
than boys on the farm. This estimated range is also useful when calibrating the amount of
Conditional Cash Transfers programs that aim to compensate the financial loss generated
by schooling. Although children can combine education and work, we observe that on
average children enrolled in school work 26 days less per year than children not enrolled
in school. Thus, compensating children for the loss in income can be done by monthly
payments between US$3.1-5.3.
0.5.2 Chapter 2
Although there is an extensive body of literature on the returns to education, few studies
focus on sub-Saharan Africa. There are growing concerns about the quality of primary
education in Africa, and most countries in the region have implemented policies to make
primary education universal. The second chapter explores the impact of education on
labor market participation and on households’ consumption10 in rural Tanzania. To
address the endogeneity of education, I instrument the education of adults by exposure to
the Universal Primary Education (UPE) program implemented in Tanzania in the 1970s.
The exposure to this program is captured by variations across regions and over time. The
results show a positive impact of education on households’ consumption. This relationship
is observed in every sector, but is more pronounced in agriculture. I find that education
increases the probability of working in agriculture at the expense of non-agricultural self-
employed activities. These results, at first glance surprising, illustrate the specifics of
the schooling curriculum, which at the time of the program was composed of agricultural
classes. Therefore, I find that returns to education are positive in agriculture, provided
that skills taught at school are suitable for agriculture.
0.5.3 Chapter 3
The third chapter investigates the effects of productivity shocks on education decisions
and on human capital accumulation. This question lies at the crossroads between the
literature on the fetal origin hypothesis and the literature that examines the effects of
10Consumption has the advantage of being better measured than income in developing countries, and
is computable for every household.
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contemporaneous shocks on education. The common thread of these two branches of
literature is that, in developing countries, access to formal protection systems is imperfect
and households have to develop informal mechanisms to cope with productivity shocks.
In early life, productivity shocks change the available income, may affect the children’s
nutritional intakes, which could have long-lasting consequences on children’s health and
children’s cognitive skills. When children are of school age and can work, productivity
shocks still affect households’ income, but also generate a substitution effect by changing
the opportunity cost of children’s time. Thus, the total effect of productivity shocks
on education is ambiguous and depends on the relative sizes the income effect and the
substitution effect. In this paper, I address this question and examine two particular
aspects, the time at which these shocks occur and the length of these shocks. The first part
of this chapter provides a very basic model to understand the main mechanisms involved
in early life and in contemporaneous productivity shocks. Moving to the empirical part,
I analyze the effect of two exogenous productivity shocks, climate and cash-crop price
shocks. Results show that positive shocks in early childhood have persistent positive
consequences on test scores. This can be explained by good nutrition in early age being
favorable for the development of cognitive skills. In contrast, I find that contemporaneous
positive shocks increase child labor and decrease education investment, meaning that the
substitution effect is larger than the income effect. Finally, I show that cognitive skills
result from a cumulative process and are especially sensitive to long-lasting shocks.
0.6 The methodology and the data
The three chapters which compose this thesis examine the determinants of education
investments in order to understand how to protect education and avoid irregular
attendance, which could compromise the benefits of education. Answering these questions
requires solving identification issues that bias the results and lead to wrong interpretations.
Measurement of the relevant variables is the first challenge of this analysis. The
literature recognizes the difficulty to correctly measure households’ income11 and
11Since income in agriculture is subject to significant variations, income is highly sensitive to prior
events and may not be representative of the households’ long-run wealth (Meyer and Sullivan, 2003).
Another drawback is that income is not similarly measured between sectors of activity, which makes the
comparison tenuous .
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households’ labor in agriculture 12 in developing countries. The second concern that puts
into question the validity of the results is the difficulty of establishing a causal relationship
between two events which are potentially endogenous. Indeed, simple correlation does not
allow one to conclude a causal relationship and can simply be due to omitted variables. A
well-known example is the omission of individuals’ abilities when estimating the returns
to education. Individuals with high income are likely to be more educated and to have
higher abilities, while abilities are also likely to be positively correlated with education.
Thus, if abilities are not observed, the positive relationship between income and education
is not explained by education only. More generally, omitting variables that influence the
decision process of a household prevents one from inferring causal relationships.
To address these endogeneity issues, I combine different methodologies and use diverse
datasets which suit this analysis. In the first chapter, I estimate the productivity of one
day of child labor performed in the fields by using the LSMS-ISA data. These data are
particularly useful for this analysis and give a very accurate description of all agricultural
inputs used by farmers. Since allocation of child labor is likely to be correlated with
unobserved households’ preferences, we take advantage of the panel dimension of the
data and exploit variations over time. Instead of measuring the children’s productivity
by comparing production between households, we compare the households’ production
over time as child labor varies. If the unobserved households’ characteristics, such as
preference for labor, are time-invariant, this method would allow capturing the causal
impact. Then, I control for all observable time-varying variables, such as rainfall shocks
and pests, that could both influence child labor and households’ production. Finally, I use
an instrumental variable strategy to correct potential measurement error of child labor
and to control for unobserved time-varying households determinants.
In the second chapter, I study the benefits of education in a rural environment by
adopting a natural experiment approach. Generally, this empirical method exploits events
such as natural shocks or changes in law or policy to capture exogenous variations of
variables of interest. In this essay, I use variations in intensity of the Universal Primary
12As highlighted by Beegle et al., household labor in agriculture is largely misreported. Most farms
are small-holder family farms that in general do not keep records of their inputs. Thus, households have
to be reminded the quantity of labor they used during the recall period. On average, the hours of labor
per person per plot is largely over-estimated, while the number of workers is under-estimated. Since the
two biases are in the opposite directions, the labor aggregated at the household level does not suffer from
a large amount of bias.
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Education program to instrument education. Since this program was implemented during
a limited period of time and targeted mainly regions with a low level of education,
variations in intensity of this program are captured by a double difference, across locations
and over time. To predict the treatment intensity of the program, I measure the education
level before the program with two datasets. The first dataset is the 2002 Population
and Housing Census in Tanzania, which gives a comprehensive picture of education. The
second is administrative data that report the number of schools at the time of the program.
These data are unique because they report the number of schools before the program was
implemented and give an accurate measure of the school supply at this time.
Finally, in the third chapter I examine the effect of positive and negative productivity
shocks on various sets of education outcomes to identify the factors that undermine
educational achievement. To perform this analysis, I exploit variations across geographical
areas and over time of two common aggregate shocks, climate shocks and fluctuation in
commodity prices. The climate variable is constructed from standardized climate data
that account for rainfall and temperature (Vicente-Serrano et al., 2010), while the price
standardized variable is constructed from the World Bank Commodities Price data. I
also use the LSMS data that report detailed information of children’s activities, and the
Uwezo data that report test scores for children of school age. Contrary to most data on
test scores, the Uwezo data are particularly interesting because they include test scores
of children enrolled and not enrolled in school, which allow one to avoid sample selection
bias.
∗
In this thesis, I adopt a set of approaches to understand why, despite the numerous
investments that have been made in primary education in Sub-Saharan Africa, a significant
share of children drop out of school prior to completing primary education. From an
ethical point of view, this meaningful question suggests that children do not have equal
opportunities (Dreze et al., 1999) and do not necessarily acquire the basic reading and
writing skills. To address this issue, I try to identify the factors that contribute to
jeopardizing children’s education. More specifically, I investigate whether the returns
to education are positive in agriculture, whether children constitute a productive labor
force on the farm, and whether productivity shocks are detrimental for education. This
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subject is all the more relevant today when the number of productivity shocks, such as
climate and price shocks, is growing. Although it is important to reduce the occurrence
of shocks, it is also necessary to think about the ways of smoothing the effects of these
shocks. This thesis provides some insight into the role of national social protection systems
that could promote education.
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Chapter 1
Returns to farm child labor in
Tanzania
17
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1.1 Introduction
In 2012, 144 millions children aged 5 to 14 were economically active. Child labour is
primarily concentrated in agriculture (58.6%) and mostly performed within the household
(68.4% of child labourers are unpaid family workers).1 Unfortunately, we know very little
of child labourers economic contribution to the household, which is a key determinant
of household’s time allocation decision, and as a consequence, a key aspect of any fight
against child labor. Indeed, children who provide wage work are a minority of working
children and are a very selected sample of this population. We should not infer anything
from the wages they earn to the broader population. Our paper provides information on
the productivity of children in household farming in rural Tanzania. For most children,
this is a better estimate of the opportunity cost of children’s time than the average child
wage in the country.2 In order to do so, we estimate several production functions to
compute the productivity of children and exploit for identification the features of the
LSMS-ISA panel dataset.
Our paper contributes to two different strands of literature. The first is the estimation
of the opportunity cost of children, where the literature is scarce and mostly focuses
on paid employment. IPEC (2007) studies different sectors which employ children and
concludes to the diversity of situations in terms of children’s return to labor: it ranges
from children who are as productive as adults and are paid as such (in the Indian carpet
manufacturing sector, for instance) to children who have a significantly lower productivity,
or the same productivity but are paid much less (in the Indian garnment industry, children
are paid a sixth of their adult counterparts).3 To our knowledge, this is the only study
that evaluates the child productivity, and it does not cover on-farm labor supply. The
large literature on market imperfections in developing countries incidentally addresses this
1Diallo et al. (2013).
2Indeed, in our sample, 80.65% of child workers are employed on the household farm.
3Children exhibit a productivity similar to the one of adults in carpet manufacturing in India but are
paid less (Levison et al., 1998; Anker et al., 1998). In the fishing sector in Ghana and the construction
sector in Uganda, adults and children receive a similar pay. However, in most other sectors considered
in the study (chop bars in Ghana, pyrotechnics industry in the Philippines and vehicle repair in Delhi),
children are paid less than adults and this reduction in pay is larger than the difference in productivity.
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question (Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994; Lambert and Magnac, 1997) since they provide
estimations of agricultural production functions. The opportunity cost of individuals who
do not participate in the market is called the shadow wage and is equal to the marginal
productivity of their on-farm labour. The papers by Jacoby (1993) (for Peru) and Skoufias
(1994) (for India) do not compute the marginal productivity of children but the parameters
associated to child labor in the Cobb-Douglas production function are fairly low compared
to the ones for adult labour, indicating that children contribute only marginally.
The second strand of literature to which our article relates is the one on the effect of
conditional cash transfers on children’s time allocation. CCTs have been increasingly seen
as an efficient tool for fighting current and future poverty. They have been implemented
in almost all Latin American countries but are relatively rare in Africa. One notable
exception is Tanzania. The evaluation of these programmes leads to the conclusion that
child labor supply reacts very heterogenously to cash transfers. For instance, Edmonds
and Schady (2012) find that a transfer amounting to roughly 7% of the GNI per capita
leads to a sharp decline in paid employment by 10 percentage points, and in unpaid
economic activity by 19 percentage points, in Ecuador.4 Large effects relative to the
transfers (3% of the GNI per capita) are also found in the Food for Education programme
in Bangladesh (Ravallion and Wodon, 2000). By comparison, Attanasio et al. (2010) find
no effect of a CCT programme on child participation in economic activities in Colombia.5
Other Latin American programmes have intermediate results, sometimes with much larger
transfers.6 From these results, it is difficult to extrapolate the amount of transfer that
would lead to non negligible increases in schooling and reductions in child labor if one were
to implement a conditional cash transfer in Africa. For instance, Kakwani et al. (2005)
try to provide an ex-ante assessment of the implementation of a cash transfer programme
conditional on school attendance in 15 Sub-Saharan African countries. However, the
model fails to reproduce the conditionality for lack of data on the opportunity costs of
4This corresponds to a decline in paid employment by 41% and in unpaid employment by 34%.
5The transfer in Colombia is roughly 5% of the GNI per capita when a child is in secondary school.
6See for instance: Edmonds and Shrestha (2014); Bourguignon et al. (2003); Ravallion and Wodon
(2000); De Leon and Parker (2000); Skoufias et al. (2001); Carpio et al. (2016); Galiani and McEwan
(2013); Dammert (2009); Barrera-Osorio et al. (2011); Behrman et al. (2011); Schady and Araujo (2006).
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children.7 Since Bourguignon et al. (2003) have shown that ex-ante evaluations are useful
tools for designing programmes, it is tof interest to identify the key parameters of those
models ahead of the implementation of the economic policy.
This is the contribution of this paper. Provided that most of working (African) children
are unpaid family workers in the farm, we focus on them. This entails to identify their
shadow wage. The estimation of production functions is delicate since inputs are chosen so
as to maximize profit and might be plagued by endogeneity issues. In our case, we exploit
the panel dimension of the data to control for unobserved and permanent determinants of
household productivity and we instrument child labor by the number of children belonging
to the household. With an imperfect labor market, characteristics of the household affect
production choices such as labor demand (Singh et al., 1986). Provided that we control for
household fixed effects, the identification strategy relies on the aging of children between
rounds of the panel. We also provide robustness checks to confirm that the endogeneity
of other inputs does not plague our estimates. When allowing for different production
functions, we find consistent results for child productivity. One day of work performed
by a child between 10 to 15 years old leads to an increase in production value by US
$1.43-2.45, depending on specifications. Children enrolled in school work on average 26
days less in a year than non-enrolled children. Compensating them for the loss in income
can be done by monthly payments between US$ 3.1-5.3. We confirm that children 10
years old or younger are not productive and that children’s productivity increases with
age. We find that girls are far less productive than boys on the farm but this may be
explained by the fact that they divide their day between different activities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow: section 3.3 describes the dataset,
section 1.3 presents the specifications and the identification strategy, while section 2.4
provides the results. Section 1.5 computes the compensation that should be offered in a
CCT, and section 1.6 assesses the productivity heterogeneity by child age and gender.
7The model therefore provides an ex-ante evaluation of an unconditional cash transfer.
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1.2 Data
1.2.1 LSMS-ISA data
Our analysis is based on the Tanzanian LSMS-ISA (LSMS-Integrated Surveys on
Agriculture) panel data. The panel is constituted of three waves: 2008-2009, 2010-2011
and 2012-2013.8 The sample is representative at the national, the urban/rural and the
major agro-ecological zones level. The original sample size was 3,265 households, spread
over 409 enumeration areas across Tanzania and Zanzibar. Roughly two-thirds of these
households are located in a rural area. The subsequent rounds revisit all households and
includes potential split-offs. In the third round, all households previously interviewed are
visited again. Given the large rate of split-off and the extremely low attrition rate in the
panel (only 4.8% of households surveyed in 2008 are not observed in 2010 or in 2012), the
third round of the panel interviews 5,015 households. The panel dimension of the dataset
is crucial to our analysis and it is therefore extremely important to rely on a panel when
attrition bias is unlikely to be an issue.
In addition, the data are particularly relevant for our analysis because they gather
detailed information both on the production side and on the household side. All inputs
and outputs are reported for each plot. Most importantly, the household members who
have provided labor are recorded so that we are able to compute how many days of work
have been provided by each household member (and a general category for non household
members). The estimation of production functions is always delicate because it might
be difficult to observe all inputs, and failure to observe all inputs increases the risk of
biased estimates. In the case of LSMS-ISA, a large set of inputs is collected in addition
to labour days. Organic and inorganic fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation information
are collected at the plot level. Land area is measured with a GPS, which is considered as
much more accurate than estimations.9 Self-reported land quality as well as erosion of the
8From October 2008 to 2009 for the first wave, from October 2010 to December 2011 for the second
wave and from October 2012 to December 2013 for the last wave.
9In the first round, not all plots were measured with GPS. We use the GPS information when available
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plot are also collected. In addition, the LSMS-ISA data are matched with information on
rainfall, greenness and temperature, obtained from satellites measurements.10 Appendix
1.7.1 describes the variables in detail.
1.2.2 Production
Even though inputs and outputs are collected at the plot level, the panel does not allow
one to match plots from one date to the next and we aggregate the information of all
the plots at the household level. As a consequence, our unit of analysis is a household
observed in a given year. In order to obtain household farm output, we use the monetary
value of each crop (in T-shillings), as declared by the household. We do not include farm
outputs such as fruits growing and cattle herding in our analysis for the following reasons:
1) trees do not need much labor investment once they are planted, 2) in the data, it is
not posible to compute the value of households’ cattle, and 3) in both cases, labor time
allocated to these activities are not collected. Neglecting cattle might be an issue when
it comes to the analysis of child labor since this is one of the predominant activities of
children. However, assuming that households behace efficiently, they should equalize the
marginal productivity of child labor across the various possible farm activities, and thus
focusing on activities in the field should not bias our estimates of child productivity.
Tanzania has two types of agriculture: in the North-North East, there is only one
cropping season, that lasts roughly from November to May; the rest of the country has
two cropping seasons, the short one taking place in October-February and the long one in
February-July. In the LSMS-ISA data, households were retrospectively interviewed about
working time, inputs and production during the long and short rainy seasons separately.
They all answer for the same long-rainy season, but the month of interview (partly)
determines which short season they provide information for. We follow the information
provided by the LSMS by using rainfall data that correspond to the last long- and short-
and use the respondents’ estimation when not.
10 http://iridl.ldeo.columbia.edu/SOURCES/.NOAA/.NCEP/.CPC/.FEWS/.Africa/.DAILY/
.ARC2/.daily/.est_prcp/datafiles.html
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rainy seasons for most of households. In practice, for the third round of the panel, collected
between October 2012 and December 2013, we use the rainfall data between July 2012
and June 2013. This is the variable we call ”Rainfall”.
1.2.3 Child labor in the data
We have various sources of information in the data about child labor: whether the child
has worked in the week before the survey (and how many hours), hours of domestic work
in the day before the survey and, as previously described, days of agricultural work over
the previous agricultural season. The data confirm the importance of the agricultural
work for children living in rural areas of Tanzania. Among the 5 to 15 years old children
who live in a rural area, 24 % have worked the last 7 days. Only 2% of children of
this age range worked for a wage. The few who did so earned an average daily wage
of 5,316TSh (equivalent to 2016 US$5.1).11 Two-thirds of children did not perform any
domestic work during the day before the interview. Among those who provided domestic
work, the median duration is only half an hour. As expected, girls are more likely to
perform domestic chores (41% of them participate, compared to 25% for boys) but when
they do so, they do not spend more hours than boys. Among children aged 5 to 15 and
who belong to a land-endowed household, 22.4% have participated to the farming in the
previous year. Here, there is no difference by gender: 22.7% of boys have participated, as
have 22.1% of girls.
The ILO definition of child labor includes all economically active children aged from 5
to 15. However, children from 5 to 9 years old work only marginally: Table 1.1 shows that
the share of children working significantly rises with age and that older children also devote
more time to agricultural work.1213 Estimating the labor productivity of young children
111,000TSh in 2008 = US$ 0.95 in 2016, authors’ computation based on World Bank series of
inflation rates in consumer price index and official average exchange rates. Sources: http://donnees.
banquemondiale.org/indicateur/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=TZ&name_desc=true.
12Very few children are economically active in other sectors than the agriculture: among the 5 to 9
years old, 0.10% earn a wage and 0.06% work as self-employed.
13This is also consistent with the fact that 99% of 5 to 9 years old children are enrolled in school, while
87% of 10-15 years old are enrolled.
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is difficult because few of them do work. We will therefore focus on the productivity of
children older than 10 and younger than 15. However, we will provide estimates of the
productivity differential by child age.
Table 1.1 : Agricultural child labor by age
Age Share of working children
Number of days
Obs.
(of working children)
5 1.09 % 22.04 483
6 2.59% 31.39 522
7 4.12% 24.92 462
8 5.36% 38.61 546
9 13.89% 41.88 500
10 20.79% 50.99 566
11 22.98% 59.38 478
12 32.59% 46.35 552
13 36.51% 50.29 587
14 46.15% 51.69 658
15 48.82% 61.17 610
In addition, we will restrict our analysis to farm labour because it encompasses the
main activity of children and because this is the only activity for which the output is
measurable. Our definition of child labor is therefore the number of farming days in
the last year performed by children aged 10 to 15 years old. When aggregating at the
household level, we observe on average 16 days of child labor, while there are 185 days
of adult labor. Child labor therefore constitutes 8% of the total farm labor, but they
contribute as much labor (in days) than non-household workers.14 Roughly a third of
child farm labor is devoted to preparing and planting; a third to weeding and a third
to harvesting. Adults from the surveyed households have a fairly similar work allocation
than them; if anything, adults spend slightly more time on the preparation of the field
and less on harvesting (Figure A3.6 in the Appendix).15 Last, children mostly allocate
their farm work to the same crops as their parents (see Figure A1.6 in the Appendix)
except for cassava: 34% of their working days are allocated to cassava, against only 20%
14Table A1.10 , in the Appendix, shows that these number of days are quite stable across years.
15Non-household members spend significantly more time on weeding (almost 40%) and significantly
less on harvesting (22%).
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for the adults. 16 Cassava is known to be an easy crop to cultivate and might be an “easy”
task to give to a child.
1.2.4 Sample
Our sample consists of households who farm land and where at least one adult member
participates to the farming. Because we implement a household fixed-effect strategy, we
only keep households surveyed at least twice. Households who are re-surveyed but who
have moved in a new location are discarded since, essentially, our fixed-effect strategy
is also implemented to control for unobserved soil characteristics. Our total sample is
constituted of 4996 household-year observations(1703 surveyed in 2008, 1711 in 2010 and
1582 in 2012). Special attention must be paid to households who split during the panel
(20% of households at each wave). We treat differently the household who is considered
as the original household and the split-off. In practice, the “original” household after
the split is mostly constituted of members from the original household (85%) while the
split-off has as 35% of original members, i.e. on average less than 2 members from the
original household. Very often the split-off household declares himself as living in a new
location, while the original household is in the same location. As a consequence, we treat
the split-off as a totally new household entering the panel.
1.3 Production functions and identification
Estimating the productivity of children on the farm entails to estimate a production
function, which leads to a series of choices. First, different functional forms are available,
with different properties, and sometimes different ways of estimating these functional
forms. Second, one has to choose the set of inputs; third, one has to deal with null values
of inputs and output; fourth, one should choose what type of productivity is reported.
Last but not least, inputs on the farm are the result of a choice made by households and
16This is not driven by a gender allocation of tasks since women allocate as many of their days (23%)
to cassava as do men.
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could therefore be endogenous. In this section, we describe our set of choices and explain
how we deal with the question of identification.
Before turning to this set of choices, let us clarify also why we have made the choice to
estimate production functions rather than profit functions. Indeed, profit functions can be
expressed as functions of (some) input prices rather than input levels. This is convenient
because prices are more naturally assumed exogenous to the household, while input levels
are the result of precisely the profit maximization and should therefore considered as
endogenous. However, estimating profit functions runs into two additional issues. First,
collected prices must reflect relevant prices for the households, which is not necessarily
the case if markets are imperfect and in particular for some inputs that the household
can acquire without the market (seeds, for instance). Second, some households end up
with negative profits. While this may be due to shocks to production, it could also be
due to a wrong estimation of the production costs, and it is therefore difficult to properly
address this situation.17 Dealing with production functions will allow us to avoid these
difficulties.
1.3.1 Production function
There is a large choice set when it comes to specifying a production functions. Insofar
as we are interested in estimating child labor productivity, in particular by comparison
with adult labor productivity, we have allowed for specifications that varied the degree
of substitutability between both types of labor. Much less emphasis has been put on the
analysis of the link between labor as a whole and the other inputs. As a consequence,
we posit a Cobb-Douglas relationship between (total) labor and the other inputs. The
elasticities of substitution between labor and other inputs are therefore assumed constant
equal to one.
We focus our attention on the possible substitution between child and adult labor. A
17Bos and Koetter (2011) study three imperfect solutions to deal with negative profits: (1) censoring
observations with negative profits, (2) using log(pi−min pi+ 1) instead of log pi and (3) replacing log pi by
log(max(1, pi)) on the left hand side and controlling for |min(pi, 1)| on the right hand side.
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Cobb-Douglas specification for different types of labor does not seem attractive to us since
it entails an infinite marginal productivity of child labor in zero, which is not supported
by the data: a large share of households do not use child labor. A quite flexible functional
form would be a CES function:
Y = A[L−ρa + γcL−ρc ]−α/ρXβ (1.1)
where La and Lc are respectively adult and child labor, X are the other inputs (land,
fertilizers...) and A is a productivity factor. Turning to the parameters, ρ ∈ [−1,+∞[
is the substitution parameter between both types of labor, γc ∈ [0, 1] is the relative
productivity of child labor compared to adult labor and α, β < 1. Eq. (1.1) can be
log-linearized:
log Y = logA− α
ρ
log(L−ρa + γcL−ρc ) + (logX)β (1.2)
but cannot be linearly estimated and often leads to very unstable results (Henningsen and
Henningsen, 2012).
Based on this general specification, we offer three different specifications and
linearizations.
1.3.1.0.1 Perfect substitutes The first assumes that child and adult labor are
perfect substitutes (ρ = −1). In that case, the total amount of efficient labor is La+γcLc.
The corresponding production function is:
log Y = logA+ α log(La + γcLc) + (logX)β (1.3)
When γcLc  La, this can be linearly approximated by:
log Y ≈ logA+ α logLa + αγcLc
La
+ (logX)β (1.4)
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1.3.1.0.2 Imperfect substitutes The second venue consists in departing from the
perfect substitution approach (ρ > −1). Assuming that γc
(
Lc
La
)−ρ  1 and that ρ remains
close to -1, equation (1.2) can be approximated by a Taylor development as:
log Y ≈ logA+ α logLa + αγcLc
La
+ α(1 + ρ)γc
Lc
La
(
1− log Lc
La
)
+ (logX)β (1.5)
If the fourth term is equal to 0 (but αγc 6= 0), then both types of labor are perfect
substitutes.
1.3.1.0.3 Translog Finally, we can simply use a translog function.18 This is useful
because the translog function is very flexible and allow us to avoid any assumption on the
parameters. The translog function has also been demonstrated to approximate the CES
function when ρ ≈ 0 (Kmenta, 1967).
log Y ≈ logA+ αa logLa + αc logLc + αaa(logLa)2 + αcc(logLc)2
+ αac logLa logLc + (logX)β (1.6)
Obviously, the translog specification is the most flexible one among the three offered
specifications, but the coefficients cannot be interpreted as structural parameters. This
will determine how we compare the results of the three specifications.
1.3.2 Child labor productivity
Our ultimate goal is to compute child productivity per day of farm labor. There are
different ways to do this. First, in the specification where child and adult labor are
perfect substitutes (eq. 1.4), γc is a measure of the productivity rate of children compared
to adults. If we know the adult wage rate and assuming that the labor market equates the
marginal productivity to the wage, then we can compute the child marginal productivity
18In this specification, we adjust the translog function to impose our hypothesis that the substitution
between labor and other inputs is constant equal to 1. We provide robustness tests for that assumption.
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by: wc = γcwa where wa is the adult wage. However, this series of assumptions (perfect
substitutes and perfect labor market) is doubtful.
In addition, we may not be interested in the marginal productivity but rather on the
average productivity. Indeed, if marginal returns are decreasing, marginal productivity
informs us on the production obtained with the last day of work. A cash transfer would
aim to reduce substantially, and maybe even suppress, child labor. In order to achieve
this, families would have to be compensated for a larger number of days and average
productivity on those days is the relevant concept.
As a consequence, we will provide for each specification the average semi-elasticity of
output with respect to days of child labor. More precisely, our estimates of equations (1.4),
(1.5) and (1.6) allow us to compute the expected production in absence of child labor,
using the actual number of days of child labor for each farm, based on the households’
use of the other inputs. We then compute for each household:
EY cit =
log Ŷit(Lc = Locit)− log Ŷit(Lc = 0)
Locit
(1.7)
where Locit is the number of days of child labor observed in household i at date t. The
numerator is therefore the predicted difference in the production (expressed in logs)
between the situation where the child does not work and the situation where he works the
actual number of days. EY cit is the average labor productivity of children in household
i at date t, provided that all other inputs remain the same. Obviously, this can only be
estimated for households that use child labor, but this is our sample of interest (in spite
of the fact that we use all farming households for the estimation).
We then weight households by amount of child labor and average the individual semi-
elasticities to obtain an aggregate measure of child labor productivity:
EY c =
1∑
i,t L
o
cit
∑
i,t
Locit · EY cit (1.8)
Because adult productivity is a benchmark against which child productivity should be
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evaluated, we compute that as well. Adult on-farm labor is rarely null, so to compute
the average productivity on a meaningful margin, we take as a base the 10th percentile of
adult labor that is observed in our sample.19 The adult semi-elasticity EY a is computed
as:
EY ait =
log Ŷit(La = Loait)− log Ŷit(La = La)
Loait − La
(1.9)
EY a =
1∑
i,t L
o
ait
∑
i,t
Loait · EY ait (1.10)
where La is the the 10th percentile of adult labor (38 labor days per year for a farm).
20
1.3.3 Inputs
The inputs that are included in the estimation are the following ones: adult labor, child
labor, cultivated land size, use of organic and inorganic fertilizer, spending on pesticides,
erosion of the plot, irrigation of the plot and productive assets. Non-household labor days
are aggregated with household adult labor days (no non-household child labor is used on
the farms). Several inputs such as child labor, fertilizers and pesticides have frequently
null values, which raises a problem for our specifications in logs. In order not to restrict
the sample to the households who have positive values of all inputs, which would lead
to selection bias, we follow MacKinnon and Magee (1990); Burbidge et al. (1988); Pence
(2006) by using a modified function of the logarithm that is defined in 0:
logM(x) = log 12
(
x+
√
1 + x2
)
(1.11)
This function behaves similarly to the log function when x is large. As a consequence,
for all inputs that have large values, the estimated coefficient reflects the increase in the
production (expressed as a percentage) associated to an increase by 1% of the input. Given
that child labor is often equal to 0 in our data, we cannot use this approximation for the
19The estimated production function fits the data only for the range of adult labor that is observed.
We do not want to extrapolate outside of this range.
20More precisely, in this computation, we discard the observations with less than 38 adult labor days.
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interpretation of the coefficient. The same holds as well for the other inputs that tend to
be close to zero. The semi-elasticities of production with respect to labor are computed
taking into account that the logM function (instead of log) is used for the estimation. The
details for these computations are provided in Appendix 1.7.3.
In the data, we also have a non negligible number of households who declare a null
production, despite non-zero inputs. This is due to disasters such as droughts and pests.
We choose to keep these observations with null production in order to avoid a selection
bias. We therefore use the same modified function. Given that the expected value of
output is always large, we consider our function to be well approximated by the logarithm
function and interpret it accordingly (the effect of one additional unit of input is expressed
as a percentage increase in the production).
1.3.4 Identification and specifications
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of equations (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6) may suffer
from endogeneity bias for several reasons. First, unobserved household permanent
characteristics (wealth, abilities, education, network affiliations, etc) may influence both
household’s production and household’s labor allocation decisions. In addition, households
observe the circumstances of the production much better than econometricians and
therefore may adapt their farm allocation decisions to determinants of production that
are not observed (sunlight, rainfall, temperature, pests,etc).
Our solution to this endogeneity issue combines three techniques. First, we exploit the
panel dimension of our data and control for household fixed-effects. Second, we control
for observed household time-varying characteristics such as rainfall shocks, as well as
idiosyncratic and covariates shocks that the household has declared. We also controlled
for temperature and greenness (measured by satellites), but given that their coefficients
were not significantly different from zero, and that our estimates were unchanged, these
variables were removed from the list of covariates. We also control for village- year fixed
effects, which should capture common shocks. Third, because unobserved and individual
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time-varying determinants may still be correlated with labor decisions and productions,
we instrument child labor.
According to the standard agricultural household model (Singh et al., 1986; De Janvry
et al., 1991), when markets are complete and competitive households’ production decision
are separable from their consumption decisions, and labor demand only depends on
inputs and output prices. The literature that has tested whether markets are perfectly
competitive in developing countries almost unanimously reject the hypothesis (Jacoby,
1993; Skoufias, 1994; Chennareddy, 1967; Chavas et al., 2005; Le, 2009). In addition, they
use household composition as a determinant of farm labour supply. For instance, Benjamin
(1992) tests whether household labor demand is independent from family composition
in rural Java and rejects the separability assumption. We exploit the labor market
imperfections in rural Tanzania (?)21 and use the number of children aged 10 to 15
years old as an instrument for child labor. Given that we control for household fixed
effects, this approach amounts to predicting variations in farm labor based on variations
in the household of the age of household members.
More precisely, for each household, we build a pool of children which will be aged
10 to 15 years old at some point during the course of the panel. This pool of children
consists only of children who are offspring of at least one member of the household.
Fostered children are excluded for endogeneity reasons: it could be the case that they are
fostered in the household precisely because the household has a large land endowment
and needs manpower.22 Ideally, we would like to use all offspring of adult household
members. However, the dataset lacks information on those children: we do not know if
adults have children living elsewhere. The pool of children is therefore constitued of all
offspring of household members, who were recorded as belonging to the household for at
least one round of the panel.23 The underlying assumption is that this pool of children
21? shows that only 5 % of households hire external workforce. She also shows that positive rainfall
shocks increase child labor suggesting that the separability assumption does not hold.
22Indeed, Safir (2009) shows that the household composition (in Senegal) reacts to shocks.
23In the case of households who split during the course of the panel, we adjust the pool of children
accordingly. More precisely, we build the pool of children based on the years for which the household is
supposed to remain the same, as we did for the definition of the fixed effect. For instance, a household
observed in 2008 and that split by 2010 gives birth to two households in 2010 and 2012: the original
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constitutes all children who may belong to the household in case of shocks (offspring who
never belonged to the household during the six years of the panel are assumed not to be
available for help). This pool of children Nci for household i is then fixed for the entirety
of the panel and Ncit is the number of children k who belong to this pool and are aged 10
to 15 in year t:
Ncit =
∑
k∈Nci
1(10 ≤ age in year t of child k ≤ 15). (1.12)
This procedure is of interest to us because only the aging of children provides variation
in Ncit, not the actual presence of children in the household, which could be correlated to
the needs of the household. More precisely, for all the specifications where we do not allow
for heterogeneity in child productivity by age, only the entry/exit of children into/out of
the 10-15 age bracket provides the exogenous variation that is used in the estimation.
Children who provide time variation in a given household are children who are included
in the pool and who cross the age limit between two rounds. Since rounds are spaced by
two years, they are aged 10 or 11 when they enter the age bracket and they are aged 14
or 15 before exiting the age bracket. As a consequence, the productivity estimation relies
on a mixed composition of children aged 10, 11, 14 and 15 years old. Figure A1.1, in the
Appendix, provides the distribution of children belonging to the household by age, across
panel years. We see that no age pattern emerges and that the children are balanced with
respect to age. When no heterogeneity in productivity is allowed, we estimate the average
productivity on children of the previously mentioned ages, which should be close to the
average productivity of children between 10 and 15 years old. As a robustness check, we
also instrument child labor by the number of children by age, comprised between 10 and
15 year old N10it,...N15it.
24
However, in spite of the fact that our instrument is not manipulated by the household,
household and the split-off. The split-off is only observed in 2010 and 2012. The original is observed from
2008 to 2012. The pool of children for the split-off is based on offspring observed at least once in 2010
and 2012, while the pool of children for the original household is based on offspring observed at least once
in 2008, 2010 or 2012. Households not observed more than once are not used for the estimation.
24By doing so, the productivity estimation is computed from children aged 10 to 15.
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we still could face violations of the exclusion restriction if these entry/exit of children
into/out of the age range had other consequences in terms of production.25 Let us
start with entry into the 10-15 age range. One additional child in the 10-15 age range
is associated to one fewer child in the 5-9 age range. If children of this age range
actually work and are productive, then our production function is misspecified (because
labor performed by young children is not included) and this has consequences for the
identification. The increase in production associated with the entry is in fact only the
difference in productivity between young children and older children, instead of being
the whole productivity of older children. This is unlikely to be a serious problem since
young children provide little labor. Conversely, the exit out of the age range is in fact
associated with an increase in adult labor time. Here, the problem is slightly different
since we do control for adult labor. However, this control is imperfect if actually the
adult productivity is heterogenous by age. Allowing for heterogenous productivity by
child age will help us check whether the exclusion restriction is violated but we postpone
this analysis to section 1.6.
To summarize, our specifications will be the following, with i indexing households in
village v, and t indexing dates:
log Yit = α logLait + αγc
Lcit
Lait
+ (logXit)β + µi + ζvt + εit (Perfect)
log Yit = α logLait + αγc
Lcit
Lait
+ α(1 + ρ)γc
Lcit
Lait
(
1− log Lcit
Lait
)
+ (logXit)β + µi + ζvt + εit (Imperfect)
log Yit = αa logLait + αc logLcit + αaa(logLait)2 + αcc(logLcit)2
+ αac logLait logLcit + (logXit)β + µi + ζvt + εit (Translog)
with µi standing for household fixed-effects and ζvt for village-by-year fixed effects (not
25To test whether the arbitraty thresholds are not specific, we also provide estimates for children aged
11 to 16.
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systematically included). The instrumentation equations are the following in each case:
Lcit
Lait
= δ1
Ncit
Nait
+ δ2 logLait + (logXit)δ3 + νi + ξvt + ηit (Perfect and Imperfect)
logLcit = δ1Ncit + δ2 logLait + δ22 logL2ait + (logXit)δ3 + νi + ξvt + ηit (Translog)
with νi household fixed-effects and ξvt village-by-year fixed effects.
Ncit is called the number of children from 10 to 15 but is actually the variable defined
in equation (1.12). Nait is built similarly as Ncit: it is number of adults from 16 to 65 at
date t among the adults observed at least once in household i during the panel.
The demographic structure is a valid instrument if:
E
(
Nc
Na
· ε| log(X), log(La), log(La), µ, ζ
)
= 0 (Perfect and Imperfect)
E(Nc · ε| log(X), log(La), µ, ζ) = 0 (Translog)
A second issue to deal with in Imperfect and Translog specifications is that the term
to be instrumented appears more than once and with different interactions or functional
forms. If we instrument each of these terms, it would lead to extremely low partial R-
squared for each of the instrumented term. Instead, we follow Wooldridge (2015) and
implement a control function approach. This amounts to predicting η̂it in the first stage
equation and including it as a control in the main equation. The underlying idea is that
η̂it captures the endogeneity of the household behavior and then is controlled for, in the
same spirit as the inverse-Mills ratio in a selection equation. Wooldridge (2015) shows
that this parsimonious control function approach leads to more efficient estimates than
the IV estimates when the LHS variable is not linear in the endogenous variable.
So far, we have discussed only how to deal with the endogeneity of child labor.
However, the households are also expected to choose the other inputs. We should be
cautious in the interpretation the estimates of those other inputs. However, part of
the identification strategy for the child labor productivity already deals with similar
endogeneity concerns for other inputs. In particular, household and village-by-year fixed
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effects likely deal with a substantial amount of joint determination issues. In addition,
η̂ should also pick up unobserved and idiosyncratic shocks occurring to households, that
are also relevant for the determination of other inputs use, in particular adult labor.
In spite of this, it is worth discussing the consequences of possible violations of
exogeneity for the other inputs. Notably, it is important to recognize that adult
productivity is in itself a result of interest, to which child labor productivity will be
compared. If endogeneity issues remain for adult labor, then we should be cautious
in the comparison. However, we can provide additional tests to assess the extent of
this remaining endogeneity. First, we will test for child labor exogeneity, conditional on
household and village by year fixed effects. If exogeneity is not rejected for child labor,
then it is less likely that adult labor is endogenous, provided that we also condition on
the same fixed effects. Second, neglecting the endogeneity of other inputs could lead
to a bias in the child labor estimates under certain circumstances. Since we instrument
child labor by Z (Z = Nc or NcNa ) and using the Zellner property, the estimates on
child labor can be biased only if Z is correlated with the other inputs, conditional on
household and village-by-year fixed effects. This could be invalidated, for instance, if
households anticipate that their children get older and adjust for other inputs based on
the increased productivity of children. We return to this question in the next section,
providing additional evidence supporting the validity of our approach.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 OLS estimations
1.4.1.0.1 Perfect substitutes. We start with OLS estimations of the three
production functions. Table A1.4 provides estimates if child and adult labor are assumed
to be perfect substitutes. The α parameter estimate is 0.656 (coefficient of logLa) when
not controlling for household fixed effects and 0.795 with household fixed effects. This is
consistent with decreasing marginal returns to labor (as the coefficients are below 1). The
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Table 1.2 : Average semi-elasticities of labor: Perfect substitute
specfication (simulations from Table A1.4 ).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adult -0.000226 0.00269** 0.00283** 0.00285**
(0.000944) (0.00114) (0.00113) (0.00132)
Child 0.00446*** 0.00308*** 0.00287*** 0.00256**
(0.000686) (0.000865) (0.000853) (0.000997)
Households F.E × × ×
Climatic factors ×
Village*year F.E ×
Simulation sample 1,482 1,482 1,460 1,482
Note: The estimation sample includes all households with adult labor and cultivated
lands while the simulation sample is constrained to households with adult, child labor
and cultivated lands. Standard errors are clustered at the ward level and are reported in
parentheses. ***,**,* means, respectively, that the coefficient is significantly different
from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Climatic factors are the precipitation at date
t, the number of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks.
relative productivity of children γc compared to adults is estimated to 1.24 = 0.815/0.656
when we do not control for household fixed effects (column 1). However, once controlling
for household fixed effects, the relative productivity of children decreases: γc is estimated
at 0.71 = 0.564/0.795. This suggests that more productive households are the ones
who tend to make their children work. This is consistent with previous evidence that
households with more work opportunities are the ones employing children (Bhalotra and
Heady, 2003; Dumas, 2007). From a methodological point of view, it shows that using
panel data to estimate child productivity is crucial. When controlling for observable
shocks to production (column 3), the estimate remains the same, while and it decreases
somewhat when allowing for unobservable shocks at the village level. The other inputs
that display significant positive effects in the specification with household fixed effects are:
land area, inorganic fertilizer, and pesticides. Covariates shocks have a negative impact on
household production. In contrast, rainfall shocks do not, maybe because declared shocks
are more accurate. The estimated semi-elasticities, computed with formulas 1.8 and 1.10
are provided in Table 1.2 . They are precisely estimated but we find in this specification
that the average productivity of children is similar to the one of adults. On average, one
more day of child work is associated to an increase by 0.3% of the production.
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1.4.1.0.2 Imperfect substitutes. Table A1.5 provides estimates of production
function for which adult and child labor are imperfect substitutes. The adult productivity
is very close to the one estimated earlier and again, controlling for households fixed effects
lowers the estimate of child productivity. Looking at the upper panel of Table 1.3 , we find
that, on average, one day of adult work is associated with a 0.6% increase in production,
while one day of child work is associated with a 0.4% increase in production. The last
column, however, gives lower semi-elasticities of both adult and child work. The estimates
for the control variables are similar to the ones obtained in the previous sub-section.
Given that the Imperfect model is a more general model of the Perfect model, we can
test whether the Perfect model is rejected. The bottom part of Table A1.5 shows that in
all specifications but one we can reject the Perfect model (hypothesis that α(1+ρ)γc = 0).
Table A1.9 , in the Appendix, collects the estimates for ρ under different specifications but
these estimates vary widely and the confidence intervals are large. In addition, allowing
for the imperfect term does not improve the explanatory power of the estimation since
the R-squared coefficients are the same.
Table 1.3 : Average semi-elasticities of labor: Imperfect
substitutes specification (simulations from Table A1.5 ).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adult 0.00338** 0.00628*** 0.00654*** 0.00343
(0.00157) (0.00163) (0.00160) (0.00232)
Child 0.00575*** 0.00464*** 0.00439*** 0.00281*
(0.000960) (0.00125) (0.00124) (0.00150)
Test α(1 + ρ)γc = 0 6.130 5.888 5.487 0.0695
Prob>F 0.0138 0.0158 0.0198 0.792
Households F.E × × ×
Climatic factors ×
Village*year F.E ×
Simulation sample 1,482 1,482 1,460 1,482
Note: The estimation sample includes all households with adult labor and cultivated
lands while the simulation sample is constrained to households with adult, child labor
and cultivated lands. Standard errors are clustered at the ward level and are reported in
parentheses. ***,**,* means, respectively, that the coefficient is significantly different
from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Climatic factors are the precipitation at date
t, the number of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks.
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1.4.1.0.3 Translog. Lastly, Table A1.7 provides the estimates for the translog
specification and shows that the effects of covariates are the same in this new specification.
Table 1.4 shows that the child semi-elasticity obtained from the Translog is strikingly
similar to the one obtained from the Imperfect specification.
Based on this specification, we can test whether the Cobb-Douglas specification is
rejected. This amounts to testing the joint significance of the interacted terms between
lnLa and lnLc (αaa, αcc and αac in equation (1.6)), and the test is provided in the bottom
panel of Table 1.4 . We clearly reject the Cobb-Douglas specification, as expected.
Table 1.4 : Average semi-elasticities of labor: Translog
specification (simulations from Table A1.7 ).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adult 0.00248*** 0.00463*** 0.00476*** 0.00364***
(0.000820) (0.000983) (0.000988) (0.00116)
Child 0.00575*** 0.00463*** 0.00439*** 0.00268
(0.00102) (0.00146) (0.00146) (0.00171)
αaa = αcc = αac = 0 9.830 5.748 4.913 5.012
Prob>F 3.18e-06 0.000766 0.00237 0.00207
Households F.E × × ×
Climatic factors ×
Village*year F.E ×
Simulation sample 1,482 1,482 1,460 1,482
Note: The estimation sample includes all households with adult labor and cultivated
lands while the simulation sample is constrained to households with adult, child labor
and cultivated lands. Standard errors are clustered at the ward level and are reported
in parentheses. ***,**,* means, respectively, that the coefficient is significantly different
from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Climatic factors are the precipitation at date t,
the number of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks.
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1.4.2 First-stage of IV specifications
Table 1.5 : Effect of the number of children Nc on
child labor (first stage)
IV variables perfect and imperfect translog
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nc
Na
0.202*** 0.186***
(0.0293) (0.0334)
Nc 0.582*** 0.558***
(0.0606) (0.0619)
R-squared 0.075 0.266 0.081 0.296
F-test 47.47 30.99 92.05 81.25
HH F.E × × × ×
village-year F.E × ×
Observations 4,922 4,992 4,924 4,994
Note: The estimation sample includes all households with adult labor
while the simulation sample is constrained to households with adult and
child labor. Standard errors are clustered and are reported in parentheses.
***,**,* means respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from
0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Additional controls are pesticide and
inorganic fetilizer spending, the use of organic fertilizer, the precipitation
at date t, the number of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks, the erosion and
the irrigation status , the productive assets, the percentage of cultivated
lands allocated to maize, paddy, sorghum, cassava, sweet potatoes, beans,
cowpeas, sunflower,groundnuts and cotton, the gender of the household’s
head, the access to the plot GPS information, survey month dummies and
year dummies.
We now turn to the identification of the child labor productivity based on the
exogenous variation provided by children’s aging. The results are presented in Table
1.5 . We first explore whether the aging of children belonging to the household provides
sufficient explanatory power, in spite of the fact that we take into account all children
related to the household, and not just present children. There are only two different
specifications since the Perfect and Imperfect instrumentation equations are identical.
From now on, all estimates control for household fixed effects. In the even-numbered
columns of Table 1.5 , we control for village-by-year fixed effects, but not in the odd-
numbered columns. We find that household composition predicts well the supply of labor,
even conditional on household and village-by-year fixed effects. In particular, if adults
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have one more child of the age 10-15, it increases child labor days by 0.6. The F-statistics
are very high, ranging from 31 to 92 depending on the specification, which indicates no
problem of “weak” instrument.26
1.4.3 Validity tests for IV specifications
Before turning to the estimates of child labor productivity based on this strategy, we
assess the validity of our approach. One key aspect is whether the likely endogeneity of
the other inputs will bias the estimated child productivity. In an IV estimation, it would
be the case if an endogenous input is correlated with the instrumented child labor and if
it is correlated with the instrument. One of these likely endogenous inputs is adult labor
days, of course, which should be correlated with child labor days. It is therefore important
to evaluate whether our instruments are correlated with adult labor days. In Table 1.6 ,
we estimate the effect of labor on other inputs. For a given cell, the reported coefficient
is the estimate of the effect of the variable stipulated on the left on the input variable
stipulated at the top. Each of these correlations are conditional on household fixed effects
and village-by-year fixed effects (and 5 different equations are estimated in each column).
For instance, the upper cell provides the parameter θ from the following regression:
logLa = θlogLc + νi + ξvt + ηit (1.13)
The first two lines show that most inputs “react” to adult and child labor days, which is
consistent with households choosing simultaneously the level of all the inputs. However,
the correlations with Nc are mostly no significantly different from 0. The correlation
between Nc and productive assets is significant at the 5% level but as long as productive
assets do not have a significant effect on farm production (this is what OLS estimations
show, see Table A1.4 for instance), the correlation of our instruments with productive
assets does not threaten our identification. The correlation with logLa is significant at the
26As a robsutness check, we instrument child labor by the number of children by age, and we see that
child labor is mostly predicted by the number of children aged 13 to 15 (see Table A1.12 ). The F-statistics
are large for the perfect and imperfect specifications, but remain small for the translog function.
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5% level, but the relationship between Lc and logLa seems stronger than the relationship
between Nc and logLa. One cannot directly compare the size of the coefficient with the
one in the first line since the two variables (Lc and Nc) are scaled differently. In order
to make such a comparison, we express these “effects” in standard deviation of the RHS
variable (Lc and Nc). An increase by one standard deviation in Lc is associated to an
increase in La by 8.3%
27 while an increase by one standard deviation in Nc is associated
to a decrease in La by 3.5%. In our case, we do take into account La, but our estimation
requires the coefficient on La to be unbiased. However, failure to control appropriately
for La leads to a contamination of the endogeneity bias on the child labor parameter in
the OLS estimates. In our case, such a contamination via La could exist but should be
smaller when instrumenting than when not. 28
27The standard deviation in Lc is 50.89 and the standard deviation in Nc is 1.058.
28Overall, the picture is the same when using NcNa except for the very precisely estimated correlation
between NcNa and logLa. We are unable to explain this significant correlation, especially since Na is not
correlated with logLa, conditional on fixed effects.
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Table 1.6 : Effect of household labor and of household demograhic characteristics on the use of inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log log(cult. pesticide organic inoganic nbr. idio nbr. cov. Eroded Irrigated Productive
La land) fertilizer fertilizer prod. shocks prod. shocks land land assets
Household labor
logLc 0.00164*** 0.000838*** 0.00185 -1.49e-05 0.00101 -1.50e-05 0.000347 8.31e-05 -2.77e-05 0.000475**
(0.000255) (0.000226) (0.00122) (0.000148) (0.00117) (9.30e-05) (0.000222) (0.000129) (3.13e-05) (0.000209)
logLa - 0.251*** 0.480*** 0.0253*** 0.294*** 0.00229 0.0182 0.0113 0.00559* 0.0198
(0.0171) (0.0916) (0.00917) (0.0738) (0.00737) (0.0142) (0.00945) (0.00311) (0.0514)
Lc
La
-0.326*** 0.0509 0.345* -0.00487 -0.0515 0.0101 -0.0282 0.0225 -0.0141 0.0977**
(0.0605) (0.0432) (0.201) (0.0227) (0.160) (0.0233) (0.0389) (0.0300) (0.00932) (0.0417)
Household demographic characteristics
Nc -0.0338* -0.00938 -0.0970 -0.00780 0.117 0.00314 -0.00418 -0.00939 -0.00540 0.0424**
(0.0201) (0.0151) (0.103) (0.00948) (0.0773) (0.00764) (0.0170) (0.00990) (0.00389) (0.0202)
Na 0.0217 -0.00364 0.0231 -0.000103 0.142* -0.00126 0.000326 -0.0122* 0.00261 0.00782
(0.0141) (0.0113) (0.0840) (0.00718) (0.0770) (0.00533) (0.0113) (0.00655) (0.00196) (0.0164)
Nc
Na
-0.135*** 0.00638 -0.149 -0.0273 0.219 -0.00254 -0.0720* -0.00991 -0.00978 0.0471
(0.0502) (0.0338) (0.215) (0.0228) (0.167) (0.0198) (0.0411) (0.0239) (0.00780) (0.0388)
Households F.E × × × × × × × × × ×
village*year F.E × × × × × × × × × ×
Obs. 4,991 4,991 4,991 4,991 4,991 4,991 4,991 4,991 4,991 4,991
Number of households 1,838 1,838 1,838 1,838 1,838 1,838 1,838 1,838 1,838 1,838
Note: Sample: households with adult labor and with cultivated lands. Standard errors are clustered and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,* means respectively
that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Survey month dummies and year dummies are added.
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1.4.4 IV estimations
We now turn to the IV estimations, that are performed by the inclusion of the first-
stage residual. The full specifications are reported in the Appendix (Table A1.8 ). Table
1.7 reports tests on the specifications and the estimated labor semi-elasticities with IV
(but also reports OLS results for the ease of comparison). The test of exogeneity is
simply given by the significance of the coefficient of η̂. Quite surprisingly, we never
reject the exogeneity hypothesis of child labor. However, we lose substantial amount
of precision of the estimates and all estimates become insignificant, including in the
Translog specification where the F-statistic was particularly large and which was the least
questionable specification according to the previous section. In the specification without
village-by-year fixed effects, we find that the semi-elasticity of production with respect
to child labor is roughly divided by two when controlling for first-stage residuals. The
estimates are consistent across the various specifications: on average, one day of child
labor increases production by 0.2%. In the second part of the panel, the precision is again
an issue, but the estimates tend to move upwards. One interesting aspect is that the
IV estimates without controls for village-by-year fixed effects are strikingly close to the
OLS estimates with controls for village-by-year fixed effects. Controlling for village-by-
year effects absorbs a large share of unobserved shocks on households, that drive factors
allocation, and it might well be that this is sufficient to absorb unobserved heterogeneity.
These OLS semi-elasticities of production to child labor range from 0.26% to 0.28%, which
is a very small range.29 By comparison, the estimated adult labor semi-elasticities range
from 0.29% to 0.36%. We need to be more cautious about this last set of estimates, for
which we have not properly addressed the question of endogeneity. However, the ratio
between the two, ranging from 0.712 (Translog) to 0.82 (Perfect), is plausible and points
towards a high efficiency of child labor. This might be driven by the fact that children
29IV estimates are left unchanged when we instrument by the number of children of each age category
(see Table 1.7 ). Coefficients are imprecisely measured but remain close to the OLS estimates, especially
for the perfect and imperfect specifications. Since the reported residuals are not significant, we do not
reject the exogeneity of child labor.
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Table 1.7 : Average semi-elasticities of labor, Simulation from OLS
and IV estimations.
Variables Perfect Imperfect Translog
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Without village-year F.E
Adult 0.00283** 0.00393 0.00654*** 0.00814 0.00476*** 0.00472***
(0.00113) (0.00592) (0.00160) (0.00666) (0.000988) (0.000962)
Child 0.00287*** 0.00198 0.00439*** 0.00315 0.00439*** 0.00746
(0.000853) (0.00486) (0.00124) (0.00477) (0.00146) (0.00734)
η̂ 0.173 0.246 -0.0583
(0.958) (0.977) (0.136)
αaa = αcc = αac = 0 4.913 4.94
α(1 + ρ)γc = 0 5.49 21.79
Prob>F 0.0198 0.0000 0.00237 0.0024
Climatic factors × × × × × ×
Households F.E × × × × × ×
Simulation sample 1460 1460 1460 1460 1460 1460
With village-year F.E
Adult 0.00285** 0.00141 0.00343 0.00203 0.00364*** 0.00364***
(0.00132) (0.00769) (0.00232) (0.00910) (0.00116) (0.00109)
Child 0.00256*** 0.00377 0.00281* 0.00393 0.00268 0.00818
(0.000997) (0.00647) (0.00150) (0.00635) (0.00171) (0.00789)
η̂ -0.231 -0.218 -0.104
(1.274) (1.319) (0.152)
αaa = αcc = αac = 0 5.012 5.76
α(1 + ρ)γc = 0 0.0695 0.0794
Prob>F 0.792 0.294 0.0024 0.0008
Households F.E × × × × × ×
Simulation sample 1482 1482 1482 1482 1482 1482
Note: The estimation sample includes all households with adult labor and cultivated lands while the
simulation sample is constrained to households with adult, child labor and cultivated lands. Standard
errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the ward level and are bootstrapped for IV estimates.
***,**,* means respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5%
and 10%. For the perfect and the imperfect function, the IV is NcNa . For the translog function, the IV
is Nc.
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working on-farm are only household children while adult work encompasses a more diverse
category: household males, households females and non-household members. This last
category of workers may have a lower productivity due to lack of incentives. In addition,
adult labor includes all labor provided by individuals aged between 16 and 65. It could
well be that older individuals are much less productive than younger ones. Last, the tests
for comparing the different functional forms give the same results as previously: we reject
the Perfect substitutes production function in favor of the Imperfect one, and we cannot
reduce the Translog to a Cobb-Douglas. However, given the extreme proximity in the
estimates, we do not view this result as extremely important.
1.5 How much should children be compensated?
We are now equipped with estimates of different specifications. We can convert them in
Tanzanian Shillings (the unit in which the production is measured). Table 1.8 displays
the elasticities of production with respect to one day of labor, separately for children
and adults. These elasticities are expressed in 2008 TSh and we convert them into 2016
US$ for ease of comparison.30 Significant estimates of child productivity lie between
951TSh and 1645TSh (US$0.91-US$1.6). As Gertler and Glewwe (1992), we compute
the opportunity cost of eduation for children by comparing the number of days of labor
between enrolled and non-enrolled children. On average, non-enrolled children work 26
days more. Therefore, the opportunity costs for which children should be compensated lie
between 24,731TSh (US$23.6) and 42,770TSh (US$40.8). This is equivalent to monthly
payments between 2,061TSh (US $2) and 3,564TSh (US $3.4).
As previously discussed, using the child wage on the market to assess the child time
opportunity costs is difficult to defend. However, it is interesting to compare the adult
agricultural wage with our estimates of adult productivity. In our data, wages can be
reported per day or per month, up to the choice of the respondent.31 The average per
30See footnote 11 for the computation.
31Actually, the period for wage declaration can be reported per hour, day, week, fortnight, month,
quarter, half year or year, but most of people either report wage per day or per month, and agricultural
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Table 1.8 : Average value of semi-elasticities in Tanzanian Shillings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Perfect Imperfect Translog
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Without village-year F.E
Adult 2,360*** 2,151 -2.697e+07 -1.459e+11 1,777*** 2,062***
(179.8) (6.563e+11) (1.831e+29) (6.364e+18) (278.6) (186.6)
Child 1,020*** 732.5 1,645*** 1,278 1,113 -8,473
(309.8) (1,964) (456.5) (6,718) (1,098) (12,345)
Simulation Sample 1,460 1,460 1,460 1,460 1,460 1,460
With village-year F.E
Adult 2,297*** 2,212 2,259 2,035 2,011*** 1,837***
(205.1) (1.045e+25) (1.606e+25) (5.598e+33) (222.2) (265.9)
Child 951.2** 627.7 1,178 828.2 290.1 -14,999
(462.2) (3,141) (851.8) (3,688) (1,737) (41,766)
Households FE × × × × × ×
Simulation Sample 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482
Note: The estimation sample includes all households with adult labor while the simulation sample
is constrained to households with adult and child labor. Standard errors are clustered at the ward
level and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,* means respectively that the coefficient is significantly
different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Additional controls are pesticide and inorganic
fetilizer spending, the use of organic fertilizer, the precipitation at date t, the number of idiosyncratic
and covariate shocks, the erosion and the irrigation status , the productive assets, the percentage
of cultivated lands allocated to maize, paddy, sorghum, cassava, sweet potatoes, beans, cowpeas,
sunflower,groundnuts and cotton, the gender of the household’s head, the access to the plot GPS
information, survey month dummies and year dummies.
day wage among adults who are paid to the day is 4,818TSh (2016 US$4.6).32 This is
slightly higher than most of the adult elasticities obtained in Table 1.8 . This is expected
since the existence of labor market imperfections would lead to a discrepancy between
observed wages and shadow wages. In particular, household workers would presumably
have difficulties being hired full-time on the market and taking into account the likelihood
of remaining unemployed a given day reduces the opportunity cost of time, and increases
on-farm employment. This discrepancy confirms that we cannot completely rely on child
wages to calculate the opportunity costs of child time, but the difference between adult
wages and adults estimated productivity suggests that our estimates are meaningful.
wages are most of the time reported per day.
32When doing a similar computation for adults paid to the month, we obtain a monthly average
agricultural wage of 96,334TSh, which corresponds to 20 days of the day wage. Therefore, there does
not seem to be a striking difference between pay per day and pay per month since 20 days of work in a
month seems sensible.
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1.6 Heterogeneity in productivity
We now explore the heterogeneity in productivity by child characteristics.
1.6.1 Specification
We do so based on the Perfect specification. While we have shown that the data reject
the hypothesis that both types of labor are perfect substitutes, we have also seen that
the estimates are strikingly close from one functional form to the other. Testing for
heterogeneity by children’s characteristics is straightforward with the Perfect functional
form. We explore the productivity differences of children by gender and by age.
Starting with equation 1.3, but allowing for a different γc by child’s gender, and then
linearly approximating, we obtain:
log Y = logA+ α log(La + γbLb + γgLg) + (logX)β (1.14)
log Y ≈ logA+ α logLa + αγbLb
La
+ αγg
Lg
La
+ (logX)β (1.15)
≈ logA+ α logLa + αγbLc
La
+ α(γg − γb)
∑
k
1(k = girl)Lk
La
+ (logX)β (1.16)
where Lb stands for labor of boys (10-15 y.o.), Lg stands for labor of girls and Lk is the
amount of work done by child k. For identification, we have two options: first we can
instrument each type of child work separately, as suggested by equation 1.15. In this case
Nb/Na and Ng/Na, respectively the ratio of number of boys to adult members and the
ratio of number of girls to adult members, are good candidates. Alternatively, we may
simply instrument for Lc and assume that the allocation of work to children of different
genders is exogenous (equation 1.16).33
For the heterogeneity by age, we allow for a parsimonious specification where
productivity depends linearly in age. For limited variations in age, this should be a
33The two equations are strictly similar, but for the sake of simplicity we refer to them as two different
specifications in which the treatment of endogeneity is not the same.
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reasonable assumption.
log Y = logA+ α log
(
La +
o=15∑
o=10
(γc + γc′ · (o− 15))Lco
)
+ (logX)β (1.17)
log Y ≈ logA+ α logLa + α
o=15∑
o=10
(γc + γc′ · (o− 15)) Lco
La
+ (logX)β (1.18)
≈ logA+ α logLa + αγcLc
La
+ αγc′
o=15∑
o=10
(o− 15) · Lco
La
+ (logX)β (1.19)
where Lco stands for labor time provided by children of age o. In this specification, the
productivity of a 15-year old child relative to an adult is γc and this relative productivity
decreases by γc′ for each year below 15. From there, we can implement the same strategy
as before: control for household fixed effects, village-by-year fixed effects, other covariates,
as well as instrumentation of the RHS child labor variables. Given that the data do not
reject the hypothesis of exogeneity in the allocation of child labor, we simply assume that
the share of child work by age is also exogenous. We therefore simply implement the same
identification strategy as before except that we allow for a heterogeneity term by age.
1.6.2 Results
Table 1.9 provides the semi-elasticities of production to child days of work, depending on
their gender. The first panel is devoted to the specification with the two instruments (eq.
1.15), while the second panel is devoted to the specification where only Lc is instrumented
(eq. 1.16). The first-stages are provided in Table A1.11 , in the Appendix. The F-statistics
are above 40 but they are notably higher for boys than for girls. It might be that there
is more predetermination of the child activity when this child is male. From the IV
columns, it is clear that whether instrumenting the two variables or only the child labor
leads to exactly the same conclusion: the exogeneity is not rejected and the parameters
are strikingly close to each other. We do not reject the exogeneity assumption. When
relying on the semi-elasticities obtained from the OLS estimates, we find that boys are
markedly more productive than girls. This could be either due to differences in strength,
or to the fact that girls spend only a share of their day in the field (because they have
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Table 1.9 : Average semi-elasticities with gender heterogeneity
(Perfect substitutes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV for eq. (1.15) IV for eq. (1.16)
Girls 0.00169* 0.00124 0.00228 0.000415 0.000662 0.00241
(0.00101) (0.00138) (0.00538) (0.00680) (0.00478) (0.00644)
Boys 0.00479*** 0.00418*** 0.00246 0.00439 0.00365 0.00534
(0.00142) (0.00158) (0.00547) (0.00600) (0.00508) (0.00665)
η̂g -0.127 0.166
(1.060) (1.324)
η̂b 0.406 -0.0319
(1.058) (1.129)
η̂ 0.168 -0.224
(0.960) (1.274)
F-test girls 59.40 43.23
F-test boys 91.95 93.83
F-test 54.47 31.14
Households FE × × × × × ×
Climatic factors × × ×
Village*year F.E × × ×
Simulation sample 1460 1482 1460 1482 1460 1482
Note: The estimation sample includes all households with adult labor and cultivated lands while
the simulation sample is constrained to households with adult, child labor and cultivated lands.
Standard errors are clustered at the ward level and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,* means
respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Climatic factors are the precipitation at date t, the number of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks,
the mean temperature and the greenness increase in days.
In equation (1.15), LbLa and
Lg
La
are separately instrumented while in equation (1.16), LcLa is
instrumented.
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to also provide domestic work, for instance) while boys spend their full day on the plot.
We do not have the information on number of hours per day spent farming on an annual
basis. However, we know the number of hours devoted to each activity in the week before
the survey. Figure A1.3 shows that while boys spend more than 5 hours per week on
agricultural tasks, girls only spend less than 4 hours. We do not have the information of
the number of days spent farming in the previous week, so we cannot compute a number
of hours per day of work. However, recall that girls spend on average 54.3 days per year
conditional on participation against 48.9 days for boys. If we assume that past week
information is relevant for inferring children’s activities on an annual basis, then this
confirms that girls actually spend less time on the plots than boys for a given number of
days and explains the productivity differential.
Table 1.10 : Mean of semi-elasticities from perfect specification with age
heterogeneity (equation 1.19)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 10 11 12 13 14 15
Without village-year F.E
OLS 0.00197 0.00228** 0.00258*** 0.00288*** 0.00318*** 0.00349**
(0.00152) (0.00114) (0.000880) (0.000852) (0.00108) (0.00144)
IV: Nc
Na
0.00223 0.00264 0.00305 0.00345 0.00386 0.00427
(0.00656) (0.00643) (0.00638) (0.00642) (0.00655) (0.00677)
F-test 47.47
η̂ -0.169
( 1.259)
Simulation sample 1460 1460 1460 1460 1460 1460
With village-year F.E
OLS 0.00149 0.00185 0.00221** 0.00258*** 0.00294** 0.00331*
(0.00194) (0.00137) (0.000978) (0.001000) (0.00142) (0.00200)
IV: Nc
Na
0.00262 0.00298 0.00333 0.00369 0.00405 0.00440
(0.00672) (0.00654) (0.00645) (0.00645) (0.00654) (0.00671)
F-test 31.14
η̂ -0.115
(1.249)
Simulation sample 1482 1482 1482 1482 1482 1482
FE × × × × × ×
Note: The estimation sample includes all households with adult labor while the simulation sample is constrained
to households with adult and child labor. Standard errors are clustered and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,*
means respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Additional
controls are pesticide and inorganic fetilizer spending, the use of organic fertilizer, the precipitation at date t,
the number of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks, the erosion and the irrigation status , the productive assets,
the percentage of cultivated lands allocated to maize, paddy, sorghum, cassava, sweet potatoes, beans, cowpeas,
sunflower,groundnuts and cotton, the age of the household’s head, the access to the plot GPS information, survey
month dummies and year dummies.
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Table 1.10 provides the semi-elasticities by child age. We find again that the IV are
close to the OLS estimates and there is little change depending on whether we allow for
village-by-year fixed effects. We confirm that older children are more productive than
younger ones. Fifteen year old children are 63% more productive than 11 year old and
the semi-elasticity for 10 year old children is not significantly different from 0. This is
consistent with the fact that few children younger than 10 work on farm.
This also informs us of the validity of our instrumentation strategy. Indeed, entry
in and exit out of the age range is also associated to changes in the other inputs if a)
children younger than 10 actually contribute or b) children older than 15 have a different
productivity than adults. Given that children younger than 10 have been shown not to
be economically productive, a) is ruled out. We also provide in Table A1.13 , in the
Appendix, a more flexible specification that confirms the results. We also find that the
productivity of 15 years old children is not significantly different from adults productivity,
which rules out b). The instruments therefore seem to statisfy the exclusion restriction.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the economic contribution of children as unpaid family workers
on Tanzanian farms. Firstly, we exploit the panel dimension of the data to control
for unobserved permanent household and time-varying village characteristics. Then, we
instrument child labor by the variation in the number of child household members over
time.
To test whether these estimations are sensitive to the functional form, we provide three
specifications that assume different degrees of substitution between child labor and other
agricultural inputs. Results show that one day of labor performed by a child aged 10 to
15 increases the value of output between US $0.91 and US $1.6. This informs us about
the opportunity costs of children on the farms. To our knowledge, this paper is the first
to provide a daily estimate of the children’s shadow wage as unpaid family workers on the
farm which is the most common form of child labor in African countries. We also explore
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the heterogeneity of the children’s productivity by gender and by age. It appears that
children start being productive from 12 years old and reach an adult’s productivity by 15
years old. In addition, the fact that boys spend more time in the fields and contribute
less than girls to domestic activities may explain why their daily productivity is higher.
Finally, to compensate the additional days of labor that unenrolled children are able
to perform , we argue that the households should receive between US $2 and US $3.4 per
month. Our findings are especially relevant when assessing the value of conditional cash
transfer programs that aim at compensating the opportunity cost of education that can
hinder the demand for education.
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Appendix A1
1.7.1 Variables definition
Household’s production: This variable is the sum of the household’s production from
all the cultivated crops growing on different plots. Each crop’s production is the product
of the cultivated quantity and the median price. The median price is computed at the
district level. The value of this production is estimated in current Tanzanian shillings.
(TSH).
Cultivated area: Total surface area (in acres) of cultivated lands by household.
Adult labor: Number of farming days in the last year performed by adults aged 16 to
65 in the household.
Child labor: Number of farming days in the last year performed by children aged 10 to
15 in the household.
Rainfall t1: Refer to the datasets part.
Types of climat: This variable informs about the type of climat (1.Tropical-warm and
semiarid, 2.Tropical-warm and subhumid, 3.Tropical-warm and humid, 4.Tropical-cool
and semiarid, 25Tropical-cool and subhumid and 6.Tropical-cool and humid).
Temperature: This variable is the annual mean temperature in celsius times 10.
Greenness increase: This variable indicates the average change in greenness (integral
of daily EVI values) during growing season.
Quality of land: Dummy variables are introduced to precise if the quality of lands is
good, mix (depending on the plot), medium or bad.
Number of idiosyncratic productivity shocks: Number of productivity shocks
(drought or floods, crop disease or crop pests and severe water shortages) that severely
affected the household or few households in the village between 2007-2008.
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Number of covariate productivity shocks: Number of productivity shocks (drought
or floods, crop disease or crop pests and severe water shortages) that severely affected
most or all households in the community between 2007-2008.
Land erosion: Dummy variable informing if the household had an erosion issue for at
least one plot during the year of the survey.
Land irrigation: Dummy variable informing if the household has at least one irrigated
plot.
Organic fertilizer: Dummy variable informing if the household uses organic fertlilizer
for at least one plot.
Inorganic fertilizer: Variable indicating the total spending (in Tanzanian Shillings) for
inorganic fertilizer during the year of the survey.
Pesticide spending: Variable indicating the total spending (in Tanzanian Shillings) for
pesticide during the year of the survey.
Gender of the household’s head: Dummy variable indicating if the household’s head
is a woman.
Repartition of crops: Varaibles indicating the percentage of cultivated lands allocated
to maize, paddy, sorghum, cassave, sweet potatoes, beans, cowpeas, sunflower, groundnuts
and cotton (these crops constitute the ten main crops in Tanzania).
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1.7.2 Additional tables and figures
Table A1.1 : Descriptive statistics: characteristics of
agricultural households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
logM(cropproduction) 4993 11 .112 3 .698 0.693 18 .163
logM(cultivatearea) 4993 1.162 0.965 0.693 6 .405
logM(La) 4993 4 .881 0.958 0.750 7 .904
logM(Lc) 4993 0.517 1.984 0.693 6 .469
Nc 4993 1 .078 1.192 0 16
Na 4993 3 .588 2 .372 0 28
Organic fertilizer 4993 0.220 0.414 0 1
log( inorg. fertilizer) 4993 1.295 4 .389 0.693 16 .051
log( pesticide) 4993 0.866 3 .726 0.693 13 .764
precipitation t1 4993 0.017 0.809 2 .077 2 .663
NBR idio. shocks 4993 0.065 0.279 0 3
NBR covariate shocks 4993 0.270 0.514 0 3
Mean temperature 4922 227.388 26 .845 146 278
Greenness increase 4951 129.238 18 .758 12 .8 166.000
Productive assets 4993 0.077 1.838 -0.342 113.54
Percentage of eroded lands 4995 16.8 0.374 0 1
Percentage of irrigated lands 499 3.0 0.170 0 1
Age of the household head 4993 48.835 14 .449 19 107
Percentage of maize 4993 0.446 0.380 0 1
Percentage of paddy 4993 0.101 0.232 0 1
Percentage of sorghum 4993 0.050 0.173 0 1
Percentage of cassave 4993 0.019 0.110 0 1
Percentage of sweet potatoes 4993 0.030 0.119 0 1
Percentage of beans 4993 0.136 0.275 0 1
Percentage of cowpeas 4993 0.028 0.127 0 1
Percentage of sunflower 4993 0.030 0.133 0 1
Percentage of groundnuts 4993 0.053 0.159 0 1
Percentage of cotton 4993 0.016 0.101 0 1
Source: LSMS-ISA data and rainfall data.
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Table A1.2 : Number of days of farm labor per household, by category
Year 2008 2010 2012 3 waves
Number of days of child labor (10-15) 18.75 16.46 18.61 17.91
Number of days of total adult labor 215.90 184.58 197.71 199.41
Number of days of household adult labor 200.62 170.36 180.37 183.84
Number of days of non-household adult labor 15.27 14.22 17.35 15.57
Source: LSMS-ISA data. Sample: Households with at least adult labor and with cultivated plots.
Table A1.3 : Percentage of children without parent living in the
household.
Age 2008 2010 2012
10 12.0 18.4 13.6
11 10.6 11.1 12.2
12 9.8 11.1 16.1
13 11.7 0.9 14.3
14 9.6 11.1 11.8
15 10.0 13.1 12.1
Sample: households with adult
labor and with cultivated lands.
Figure A1.1: Distribution of children within the pool of children.
Source: LSMS-ISA data (2008, 2010, 2012).
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Table A1.4 : OLS estimations: perfect substitute specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log La 0.656*** 0.795*** 0.783*** 0.735***
(0.0712) (0.0933) (0.0903) (0.101)
Lc
La
0.815*** 0.564*** 0.527*** 0.469**
(0.125) (0.158) (0.156) (0.182)
log(cultivated area) 1.088*** 0.695*** 0.698*** 0.551***
(0.0729) (0.103) (0.104) (0.109)
org. fertilizer 0.425*** 0.116 0.122 0.250
(0.126) (0.140) (0.140) (0.170)
log (inorg) 0.109*** 0.0658*** 0.0660*** 0.0693***
(0.0112) (0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0202)
log (pesticide ) 0.0238 0.0292** 0.0287** 0.0157
(0.0162) (0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0168)
Land eroded 0.230* -0.0813 -0.0735 -0.0350
(0.118) (0.123) (0.124) (0.150)
Land irrigated 0.634** 0.506 0.520 0.345
(0.250) (0.391) (0.388) (0.408)
Productive assets 0.00328 -0.00534 0.0106 0.0350
(0.0113) (0.0117) (0.0124) (0.0603)
NBR idio. shocks -0.0174 0.00451 0.0453 -0.138
(0.162) (0.207) (0.205) (0.227)
NBR covariate shocks -0.136* -0.190** -0.198** -0.0108
(0.0793) (0.0879) (0.0887) (0.101)
Rainfall 0.0516
(0.0734)
mean temperature 0.0412
(0.0438)
Greenness increase 0.0149**
(0.00690)
R-squared 0.379
Within HH R-squared 0.233 0.232 0.456
Households F.E × × ×
Village*year F.E ×
Observations 4,994 4,994 4,924 4,994
Number of Households 1,837 1,832 1,837
Sample: households with adult labor and with cultivated lands. Standard
errors are clustered at the ward level and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,*
means respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the
level of 1%, 5% and 10%. We also control by the percentage of cultivated lands
allocated to maize, paddy, sorghum, cassava, sweet potatoes, beans, cowpeas,
sunflower,groundnuts and cotton, the gender of the household’s head, the access
to the plot GPS information, the age of the household head, survey month
dummies and year dummies.
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Table A1.5 : OLS estimations: imperfect substitute specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log La 0.652*** 0.793*** 0.781*** 0.735***
(0.0711) (0.0932) (0.0901) (0.101)
Lc
La
0.516*** 0.268* 0.242 0.425*
(0.145) (0.149) (0.148) (0.218)
Lc
La
∗ (1− log LcLa ) 0.512** 0.555** 0.537** 0.0846
(0.207) (0.229) (0.229) (0.321)
log(cultivated area) 1.084*** 0.691*** 0.694*** 0.550***
(0.0729) (0.103) (0.104) (0.109)
org. fertilizer 0.420*** 0.121 0.127 0.250
(0.126) (0.140) (0.139) (0.170)
log (inorg) 0.109*** 0.0656*** 0.0658*** 0.0693***
(0.0111) (0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0202)
log (pesticide) 0.0242 0.0290** 0.0287* 0.0157
(0.0162) (0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0168)
Land eroded 0.230* -0.0785 -0.0705 -0.0348
(0.117) (0.123) (0.124) (0.150)
Land irrigated 0.638** 0.515 0.529 0.347
(0.249) (0.388) (0.385) (0.406)
Productive assets 0.00336 -0.00547 0.0103 0.0349
(0.0113) (0.0117) (0.0124) (0.0605)
NBR idio. shocks -0.0174 0.00315 0.0438 -0.138
(0.161) (0.207) (0.205) (0.227)
NBR covariate shocks -0.140* -0.195** -0.203** -0.0117
(0.0793) (0.0881) (0.0889) (0.101)
Rainfall 0.0516
(0.0732)
mean temperature 0.0415
(0.0436)
Greenness increase 0.0147**
(0.00688)
R-squared 0.380
Within HH R-squared 0.233 0.232 0.456
Households F.E × × ×
Village*year F.E ×
Observations 4,994 4,994 4,922 4,994
Number of Households 1,837 1,832 1,837
Note: Sample: households with adult labor and with cultivated lands. Standard
errors are clustered at the ward level and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,*
means respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the
level of 1%, 5% and 10%. We also control by the percentage of cultivated lands
allocated to maize, paddy, sorghum, cassava, sweet potatoes, beans, cowpeas,
sunflower,groundnuts and cotton, the gender of the household’s head, the access
to the plot GPS information, the age of the household head, survey month
dummies and year dummies.
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Table A1.6 : OLS estimations: Translog specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log La 1.184*** 1.447*** 1.391*** 1.507***
(0.370) (0.502) (0.521) (0.528)
log Lc 0.646*** 0.562*** 0.524*** 0.552***
(0.120) (0.144) (0.144) (0.156)
log La*log La -0.0582 -0.0700 -0.0651 -0.0828
(0.0372) (0.0504) (0.0523) (0.0533)
log Lc*log Lc -0.00729 -0.0280 -0.0301 -0.0113
(0.0152) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0205)
log La*log Lc -0.0990*** -0.0714*** -0.0631** -0.0885***
(0.0243) (0.0272) (0.0265) (0.0304)
log(cultivated area) 1.084*** 0.684*** 0.685*** 0.540***
(0.0729) (0.103) (0.104) (0.110)
org. fertilizer 0.393*** 0.102 0.105 0.245
(0.127) (0.140) (0.139) (0.171)
log (inorg) 0.108*** 0.0664*** 0.0665*** 0.0699***
(0.0110) (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0202)
log (pesticide) 0.0265 0.0327** 0.0323** 0.0190
(0.0162) (0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0167)
Land eroded 0.231** -0.0917 -0.0840 -0.0419
(0.116) (0.123) (0.125) (0.150)
Land irrigated 0.625** 0.539 0.552 0.384
(0.251) (0.380) (0.378) (0.401)
Productive assets 0.00654 -0.00469 0.0102 0.0380
(0.0127) (0.0120) (0.0126) (0.0633)
NBR idio. shocks -0.0433 -0.0206 .0204 -0.1589
(0.160) (0.207) (0.2052) (0.2268)
NBR covariate shocks -0.129 -0.184**-0.1905 -0.0101
(0.0792) (0.0879) (0.0888) (0.1012)
Rainfall 0.0598
(0.0726)
Mean temperature 0.0466
(0.0447)
Greenness increase 0.0138**
(0.00686)
R-squared 0.383
Within HH R-squared 0.239 0.236 0.459
Households F.E × × ×
Village*year F.E ×
Observations 4,994 4,994 4,924 4,994
Number of Households 1,837 1,837 1,832 1,837
Note: Sample: households with adult labor and with cultivated lands. Standard errors are
clustered at the ward level and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,* means respectively
that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. We
also control by the percentage of cultivated lands allocated to maize, paddy, sorghum,
cassava, sweet potatoes, beans, cowpeas, sunflower,groundnuts and cotton, the gender of
the household’s head, the access to the plot GPS information, the age of the household
head, survey month dummies and year dummies.
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Table A1.7 : OLS estimations: Translog specification with interaction
terms between labor and other inputs
(1) (2) (3)
log La 1.102*** 1.399*** 1.451***
(0.366) (0.497) (0.519)
log Lc 0.677*** 0.583*** 0.550***
(0.119) (0.147) (0.160)
log La*log Lc -0.102*** -0.0728*** -0.0852***
(0.0236) (0.0279) (0.0310)
log La*log La -0.0454 -0.0617 -0.0719
(0.0364) (0.0498) (0.0523)
log Lc*log Lc -0.0108 -0.0299 -0.0141
(0.0152) (0.0182) (0.0205)
log La*Small Agricultural assets 0.00482 0.0254 -0.0386
(0.0280) (0.0364) (0.0564)
log La*Machine assets 0.0405** 0.0404*** 0.0451**
(0.0182) (0.0150) (0.0219)
log La*ln(pesticide) -0.0475*** -0.0330** -0.0160
(0.0178) (0.0159) (0.0178)
log La*ln(fertilizer) -0.00124 -0.00556 -0.0252
(0.0118) (0.0182) (0.0184)
log Lc**Small Agricultural assets -0.00442 0.00767 0.0125
(0.0137) (0.0164) (0.0205)
log Lc*Machine assets 0.00719 0.000248 -0.0113
(0.0107) (0.0129) (0.0159)
log Lc*ln(pesticide) 0.0125** 0.00453 0.00212
(0.00547) (0.00531) (0.00597)
log Lc*ln(fertilizer) -0.0120*** -0.00881** -0.00494
(0.00336) (0.00365) (0.00448)
Test interaction terms 6.225 3.987 2.457
Prob>F 2.56e-09 1.82e-05 0.00581
R-squared 0.386
Within HH R-squared 0.241 0.471
Households F.E × ×
Village*year F.E ×
Observations 4,990 4,990 4,990
Number of households 1,837 1,837 1,837
Note: Sample: households with adult labor and with cultivated lands. Standard
errors are clustered at the ward level and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,*
means respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the level
of 1%, 5% and 10%. We also control by the percentage of cultivated lands
allocated to maize, paddy, sorghum, cassava, sweet potatoes, beans, cowpeas,
sunflower,groundnuts and cotton, the gender of the household’s head, the access to
the plot GPS information, the age of the household head, survey month dummies
and year dummies.
62
Figure A1.2: Activities in agricultural work
(a) Children
(b) Household adults
(c) Non-household adults
Note: “Ridging and fertilizing” was not an available
category in 2008.
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Figure A1.3: Time spent at working by activities over the last weeek
Source: LSMS-ISA data (2008, 2010, 2012). Sample: Active children from households who farm lands.
Figure A1.4: Time spent at working (in hours)
(a) In the fields (b) Outside the fields
Source: LFS survey, 2014. Sample: Active children from households who farm lands.
64
Figure A1.5: Time spent in domestic tasks (in hours)
Source: LFS survey, 2014. Sample: Active children from households who farm lands.
Figure A1.6: Labor distribution among main crops
Source: LSMS-ISA data. Sample: Computation are made from plots without intercropping.
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Table A1.8 : IV estimations of the production function
VARIABLES Perfect Imperfect Translog
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log La 0.906*** 0.906*** 1.039*** 1.039*** 1.443** 1.443**
(0.113) (0.113) (0.132) (0.132) (0.566) (0.566)
Lc
La
0.259 0.259 0.151 0.151
(0.845) (0.845) (0.886) (0.886)
Lc
La
∗ (1− log Lc
La
) 0.243 0.243
(0.223) (0.223)
log Lc 0.735*** 0.735***
(0.208) (0.208)
log La*log La -0.0428 -0.0428
(0.0565) (0.0565)
log Lc*log Lc -0.0502*** -0.0502***
(0.0171) (0.0171)
log La*log Lc -0.0633*** -0.0633***
(0.0235) (0.0235)
log (cultivated area) 0.0694 0.0694 0.0847 0.0847 0.0539 0.0539
(0.150) (0.150) (0.139) (0.139) (0.125) (0.125)
org. fertilizer 0.0847 0.0847 -0.00127 -0.00127 -0.0374 -0.0374
(0.149) (0.149) (0.136) (0.136) (0.143) (0.143)
log (inorg) 0.0757*** 0.0757*** 0.0716*** 0.0716*** 0.0713*** 0.0713***
(0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0192) (0.0192)
log (pesticide) 0.0424** 0.0424** 0.0256* 0.0256* 0.0264 0.0264
(0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0184) (0.0184)
Land eroded -0.142 -0.142 -0.191 -0.191 -0.216 -0.216
(0.130) (0.130) (0.141) (0.141) (0.136) (0.136)
Land irrigated 0.372 0.372 0.388 0.388 0.449 0.449
(0.396) (0.396) (0.398) (0.398) (0.430) (0.430)
Productive assets 0.00759 0.00759 0.00623 0.00623 0.00151 0.00151
(0.0595) (0.0595) (0.0678) (0.0678) (0.0502) (0.0502)
NBR idio. shocks 0.0567 0.0567 -0.0210 -0.0210 -0.0700 -0.0700
(0.196) (0.196) (0.200) (0.200) (0.210) (0.210)
NBR covariate shocks -0.134 -0.134 -0.102 -0.102 -0.0844 -0.0844
(0.0950) (0.0950) (0.103) (0.103) (0.0954) (0.0954)
Rainfall 0.0475 0.0475 0.0794 0.0794 0.0886 0.0886
(0.0881) (0.0881) (0.0878) (0.0878) (0.0755) (0.0755)
mean temperature 0.0233 0.0233 0.0504 0.0504 0.0625 0.0625
(0.0472) (0.0472) (0.0476) (0.0476) (0.0476) (0.0476)
Greenness increase 0.00814 0.00814 -0.00523 -0.00523 -0.00780 -0.00780
(0.00782) (0.00782) (0.00955) (0.00955) (0.00779) (0.00779)
residual -0.0460 -0.0460 0.242 0.242 -0.141 -0.141
(0.843) (0.843) (0.939) (0.939) (0.156) (0.156)
Observations 5,147 5,147 5,147 5,147 5,070 5,070
Number of HH 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,761 1,761
Households F.E × × × × × ×
Village*year F.E × × ×
Note: The estimation sample includes all households with adult labor and cultivated lands while the simulation
sample is constrained to households with adult labor and cultivated lands. Standard errors are clustered at the ward
level and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,* means respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from
0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. We also control by the percentage of cultivated lands allocated to maize, paddy,
sorghum, cassava, sweet potatoes, beans, cowpeas, sunflower,groundnuts and cotton, the gender of the household’s
head, the access to the plot GPS information, the age of the household head, survey month dummies and year
dummies.
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Table A1.9 : Estimation of the substitution
parameter ρ
Imperfect Translog
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 1.069 -0.787 -0.0198 -0.0582
(1.680) (0.820) (0.0409) (0.0663)
IV 12.03 -0.83 -0.0189 -0.0571
(238.6) (0.796) (0.0412) (0.0661)
Households FE YES YES YES YES
Village*year FE NO YES NO YES
Observations 4,994 4,994 4,994 4,994
Note: Sample: households with adult labor and with cultivated
lands. Standard errors are clustered and are reported in parentheses.
***,**,* means respectively that the coefficient is significantly
different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Additional controls
are pesticide and inorganic fetilizer spending, the use of organic
fertilizer, the precipitation at date t, the number of idiosyncratic and
covariate shocks, the erosion and the irrigation status , the productive
assets, the gender of the HH head, the percentage of cultivated
lands allocated to maize, paddy, sorghum, cassava, sweet potatoes,
beans, cowpeas, sunflower,groundnuts and cotton, the gender of the
household’s head, the access to the plot GPS information, survey
month dummies and year dummies.
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Table A1.10 : OLS estimations of the production function for the
unrestricted sample (with households observed only at one wave).
(1) (2) (3)
log La 0.711*** 0.712*** 1.757***
(0.0634) (0.0636) (0.301)
log Lc 0.688*** 0.718***
(0.110) (0.183)
Lc
La
-0.0508
(0.228)
Lc
La
∗ (1− log Lc
La
) 0.422***
(0.104)
log La*log La -0.116***
(0.0301)
log Lc*log Lc 0.00425
(0.0142)
log La*log Lc -0.0698***
(0.0208)
log(cultivated area) 0.998*** 0.998*** 1.004***
(0.0611) (0.0611) (0.0607)
org. Fertilizer 0.371*** 0.371*** 0.383***
(0.134) (0.134) (0.135)
log (inorg) 0.142 0.142 0.124
(0.109) (0.109) (0.110)
log (pesticide) 0.0872*** 0.0872*** 0.0856***
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0103)
Land eroded 0.0154 0.0154 0.0188
(0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0134)
Land irrigated 0.0945 0.0944 0.101*
(0.0592) (0.0592) (0.0588)
Productive assets -0.124 -0.124 -0.143
(0.128) (0.128) (0.128)
NBR idio. shocks -0.176*** -0.175*** -0.177***
(0.0648) (0.0649) (0.0651)
NBR covariate shocks 0.103 0.102 0.105
(0.101) (0.102) (0.100)
Rainfall 0.822*** 0.822*** 0.808***
(0.260) (0.261) (0.258)
Mean temperature 0.0110 0.0109 0.0158*
(0.00977) (0.00977) (0.00947)
Greenness increase -0.0125*** -0.0125*** -0.0119***
(0.00263) (0.00263) (0.00261)
R-squared 0.383 0.383 0.385
Households F.E
Village*year F.E
Observations 7,050 7,050 7,050
Note: Sample: households with adult labor and with cultivated lands.
Standard errors are clustered at the ward level and are reported in
parentheses. ***,**,* means respectively that the coefficient is significantly
different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. We also control by
the percentage of cultivated lands allocated to maize, paddy, sorghum,
cassava, sweet potatoes, beans, cowpeas, sunflower,groundnuts and cotton,
the gender of the household’s head, the access to the plot GPS information,
the age of the household head, survey month dummies and year dummies.
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Table A1.11 : Effect of the number of children on
child labor by gender (first stage)
IV variables Girls Boys
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ng
Na
0.262*** 0.257***
(0.0343) (0.0395)
Nb
Na
0.237*** 0.234***
(0.0219) (0.0238)
R-squared 0.124 0.292 0.118 0.289
F-test 59.40 43.23 91.95 93.83
HH F.E × × × ×
village-year F.E × ×
Observations 1460 1482 1460 1482
Note: The estimation sample includes all households with adult labor
while the simulation sample is constrained to households with adult and
child labor. Standard errors are clustered and are reported in parentheses.
***,**,* means respectively that the coefficient is significantly different
from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Additional controls are
pesticide and inorganic fetilizer spending, the use of organic fertilizer, the
precipitation at date t, the number of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks,
the erosion and the irrigation status , the productive assets, the percentage
of cultivated lands allocated to maize, paddy, sorghum, cassava, sweet
potatoes, beans, cowpeas, sunflower,groundnuts and cotton, the gender
of the household’s head, the access to the plot GPS information, survey
month dummies and year dummies.
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Table A1.12 : Effect of the number of
children by age groups on child labor
(first stage)
perfect and imperfect translog
Age-group (1) (2)
10 0.150 0.0954
(0.186) (0.550)
11 0.439* 0.305
(0.248) (0.463)
12 0.187 -0.396
(0.154) (0.602)
13 0.304** -0.369
(0.133) (0.390)
14 0.504*** 0.897*
(0.152) (0.461)
15 0.486*** 0.807*
(0.136) (0.455)
R-squared 0.063 0.032
F-test 35.76 2.307
HH F.E × ×
Observations 4,811 4,921
Note: The estimation sample includes all households with
adult labor while the simulation sample is constrained to
households with adult and child labor. Standard errors are
clustered and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,* means
respectively that the coefficient is significantly different
from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Additional
controls are pesticide and inorganic fetilizer spending,
the use of organic fertilizer, the precipitation at date
t, the number of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks,
the erosion and the irrigation status , the productive
assets, the percentage of cultivated lands allocated to
maize, paddy, sorghum, cassava, sweet potatoes, beans,
cowpeas, sunflower,groundnuts and cotton, the gender
of the household’s head, the access to the plot GPS
information, survey month dummies and year dummies.
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Table A1.13 : Mean of semi-elasticities: perfect
specification with age heterogeneity (equation
(1.19)).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age OLS IV: N5−15Na
5 0.000665 0.00209 -0.000423 0.00298
(0.00348) (0.00451) (0.00714) (0.00906)
6 0.000937 0.00216 -0.000139 0.00304
(0.00305) (0.00392) (0.00679) (0.00870)
7 0.00121 0.00222 0.000146 0.00309
(0.00261) (0.00333) (0.00645) (0.00838)
8 0.00148 0.00229 0.000431 0.00315
(0.00219) (0.00275) (0.00615) (0.00809)
9 0.00175 0.00235 0.000715 0.00320
(0.00178) (0.00218) (0.00588) (0.00784)
10 0.00202 0.00242 0.001000 0.00326
(0.00139) (0.00165) (0.00564) (0.00764)
11 0.00230** 0.00248** 0.00128 0.00332
(0.00106) (0.00119) (0.00545) (0.00748)
12 0.00257*** 0.00255*** 0.00157 0.00337
(0.000854) (0.000932) (0.00530) (0.00737)
13 0.00284*** 0.00262** 0.00185 0.00343
(0.000857) (0.00103) (0.00520) (0.00732)
14 0.00311*** 0.00268* 0.00214 0.00348
(0.00107) (0.00141) (0.00515) (0.00732)
15 0.00339** 0.00275 0.00242 0.00354
(0.00140) (0.00192) (0.00516) (0.00738)
Adults 0.00207 0.00254 0.00330 0.00157
(0.00179) (0.00250) (0.00644) (0.00905)
Residual .17734 .03448
(1.01085) (1.35406)
F-test 20.12 11.61
Households F.E × × × ×
Village*year F.E × ×
Simulation sample 1,547 1,571 1,547 1,571
Note: The estimation sample includes all households with adult labor and
cultivated lands while the simulation sample is constrained to households
with adult, child labor and cultivated lands. Standard errors are clustered
at the ward level and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,* means
respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the
level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Additional controls are pesticide and inorganic
fetilizer spending, the use of organic fertilizer, the precipitation at date t,
the number of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks, the erosion and the
irrigation status , the productive assets, the percentage of cultivated
lands allocated to maize, paddy, sorghum, cassava, sweet potatoes, beans,
cowpeas, sunflower,groundnuts and cotton, the age of the household’s
head, the access to the plot GPS information, survey month dummies
and year dummies.
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Table A1.14 : Mean of the semi-elasticity of children aged 11 to 16 and adults aged
17 to 65
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Perfect Imperfect Translog
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Adult 0.00483*** 0.00412 0.00337*** 0.00604 0.00445*** 0.00389***
(0.000817) (0.00539) (0.000877) (0.00584) (0.000931) (0.000915)
Child 0.00121*** 0.00177 0.00391*** 0.00231 0.00493*** 0.00528
(0.000444) (0.00430) (0.000976) (0.00422) (0.00129) (0.00680)
η̂ -0.00534 0.334 -0.00145
( 0.760) ( 0.786) (0.132)
Test αaa = αcc = αac = 0 4.336
Test α(1 + ρ)γc = 0 0.273
Households F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: The estimation sample includes all households with adult labor while the simulation sample is constrained to
households with adult and child labor (16. Standard errors are clustered and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,* means
respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Additional controls
are pesticide and inorganic fetilizer spending, the use of organic fertilizer, the precipitation at date t, the number of
idiosyncratic and covariate shocks, the erosion and the irrigation status , the agricultural asset index, the percentage of
cultivated lands allocated to maize, paddy, sorghum, cassava, sweet potatoes, beans, cowpeas, sunflower,groundnuts and
cotton, the gender of the household’s head, the access to the plot GPS information, survey month dummies and year
dummies.
Table A1.15 : Mean of the semi-elasticity of labor. The instruments
are the number of children by age groups N10...N15.
Variables Perfect Imperfect Translog
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Without village-year F.E
Adult 0.003** 0.004 0.007*** 0.008 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Child 0.003*** 0.002 0.004*** 0.004 0.004*** 0.014
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.022)
η̂ 0.141 0.159 -0.179
(0.952) (0.961) (0.401)
αaa = αcc = αac = 0 4.926
α(1 + ρ)γc = 0 5.46
Prob>F 0.0198 0.0000 0.00237 0.0024
Climatic factors × × × × × ×
Households F.E × × × × × ×
Simulation sample 1460 1460 1460 1460 1460 1460
Note: The estimation sample includes all households with adult labor and cultivated lands while
the simulation sample is constrained to households with adult, child labor and cultivated lands.
Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the ward level and are bootstrapped for
IV estimates. ***,**,* means respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the
level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Climatic factors are the precipitation at date t, the mean temperature
and the greenness increase in days. For the perfect and the imperfect function, the IV is NcNa . For
the translog function, the IV is Nc.
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Table A1.16 : Comparison of households with and without
livestock
(1) (2)
Variables With livestock Without livestock
Age HH head 50,40 49,10
Education HH head 1,84 1,87
Production (TSH) 456627,80 271047,20
Cultivated area (acres) 6,78 4,11
Number of children aged 10 to 15 1,20 0,81
Number of adults 3,22 2,56
Days of child labor (10-15) 25,25 12,04
Days of adult labor (16-65) 209,07 144,28
Sources: LSMS-ISA panel data (2008,2010,2012)
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1.7.3 Semi-elasticities with function logM
Dependant variable
Equations (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6) describe the functional forms used in this paper
(respectively for the specifications perfect, imperfect and translog). These equations
follow the form log Y = f(Lc, La, X). We estimate these equations with the function
logM , as we need to take into account the observations that report an absence of output:
logMY = f(Lc, La, X).
This decision affects marginally the interpretation of the semi-elasticities. Indeed, the
monetary unit of Tanzania is small (1$ ≈ 1000TSh), and accordingly logMY ≈ log Y as
soon as Y > 0. Besides, let us write the fundamental model Y = u exp f(Lc, La, X) where
u ≥ 0 is a multiplicative error term independant from Lc, La, X.
logM(Y ) ≈ f(Lc, La, X) + log u when u > 0 (1.20)
= 0 when u = 0 (1.21)
E(logM(Y )|Lc, La, X) ≈ P (u > 0)E(log Y |u > 0, Lc, La, X) (1.22)
The semi-elasticities (1.7) and (1.9) are based on the difference in log Y between
two situations with and without labor. The corresponding differences in logM(Y ) are
differences in log Y multiplied by the chances to have a production. In other words, we
measure an additional production per day in percentage multiplied by the chances to have
a production.
Explanatory variables
The semi-elasticities (1.7) and (1.9) depend on the expected production for two different
levels of Lc, La. When log enters the estimated equations, we use the function logM in the
estimation and in the simulations following the estimation, hence the simulated function
is the same as the estimated function.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of the Universal Primary
Education Program on Labor Market
Outcomes: Evidence from Tanzania
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2.1 Introduction
Education is a cornerstone for economic growth and plays a crucial role in labor markets.
As a consequence, governments and non-governmental organizations have put education at
the top of their agenda. More specifically, several governments of developing countries have
implemented policies to universalize primary education. An extensive body of literature
underlines the positive correlation between education and earnings but does not inform
about the causality of this relationship. Card (2001) reviews papers that aim to identify
the causal impact of education on earnings. To disentangle the ability effect from the
education effect on earnings, these selected papers either instrument education based
on characteristics of the schooling system, or use family background as a control or an
instrument. Among the eleven papers included in Card’s survey, only two of them focus
on developing countries, the paper of Duflo (2001) where education is instrumented by
a school construction program in Indonesia, and the study by Maluccio (1998) where
education is instrumented by the distance to school in rural Philippines. Both authors
restrict their analysis to individuals who earn a wage, which raises the question of the
representativeness of the samples. Indeed, wage-earning individuals are likely to be self-
selected and to have specific characteristics. Maluccio (1998) does not deal with this
sample selection issue while Duflo (2001) adopts an imputation technique to compute a
wage for individuals from the self-employment sector. While this method is suitable for
countries with a developed formal sector, it is less adapted to countries that are mainly
agriculture-based. Indeed, in agriculture, few individuals are wage-earners, and household
level agricultural production is more likely to be more representative of household wealth.
To address this important issue, another strand of the literature estimates the returns
to education among agricultural households. Griliches (1964) was the first researcher
to measure the impact of the education of the household head on agriculture with a
production function. Lockheed et al. (1980) review papers estimating the impact of
education on agricultural production and find very mixed results depending on the country
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and the specification of education. However, these papers do not consider the endogeneity
of education of the head.
The first contribution of this paper is to assess the efficiency of a massive primary
education program. To do so, I evaluate whether the Universal Primary Education
program implemented in Tanzania from 1974 to 1978 ensured the expansion of the
education system and contributed to reducing inequality in access to education.
The second contribution is to estimate the returns to education in developing countries
for the entire population. Since developing countries are often characterized by the large
size of both the non-agricultural self-employed sector and the agricultural sector, I use
consumption aggregates that are available for all sample households. To account for
the potential endogeneity of education, I instrument education of the household head
by the intensity of the UPE program, which constitutes a natural experiment. In 1974,
educational levels were low at the national level, with wide variation between regions.
The introduction of the UPE program led to substantial results: 3.3 million children aged
7 to 13 were enrolled in 1980, compared to 1.2 million in 1974 (Bonini, 2003). To reduce
disparities in access to education, the Tanzanian socialist government gave priority to
deprived areas, which led the latter to experience higher schooling expansion. Therefore,
the exposure to the UPE program varied according to the age of the individual at the
time of the reform and to the educational level by regions before the introduction of the
program. Thus, the UPE program gives rise to an exogenous variation in education that I
exploit to instrument education and to determine the effect of education on consumption.
In order to capture variability in the returns to education, I also distinguish between the
returns to education for subgroups: the agricultural sector, the non-farm self-employed
sector, and wage-work activities.
The third contribution of this paper is to address the effect of education on the labor
market organization, more precisely, on the probability of working in each sector of
activity. In order to do so, I adopt the same identification strategy and I instrument
education by exploiting the nature of the UPE program.
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The main findings of this paper suggest that the UPE program reduced inequalities
of access to education and that one additional year of education augmented consumption
aggregates from 7.4 percent to 10.5 percent. Since the program was directed toward
agriculture by providing a specific curriculum with agricultural classes, returns to
education were higher in the agricultural sector than in the wage-earner sector. Similarly,
education increased the probability of working in agriculture and decreased the probability
of working in the non-agricultural self-employement sector.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 3.3 provides a broad picture
of the evolution of education in Tanzania and describes the data and the main variables of
the analysis. Section 2.3.1 introduces the identification strategy; section 2.3.2 presents the
effect of the UPE program on education; section 2.4.1 and section 2.4.3 respectively, focus
on the effect of education on consumption and on labor market participation. Finally,
section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The program
2.2.1 Historical background and the UPE program.
When colonization ended in 1961, access to education in Tanzania was very unequal
between regions (Court and Kinyanjui, 1980). These spatial disparities were based
on ecological endowments and were exacerbated by colonial activities and transport
networks.1 At this time, the purpose of primary education was to prepare for secondary
education and was to encourage a small number of rural students to find white-collar jobs
in urban areas (Kinunda, 1975). The arrival in power of the Prime Minister Nyerere in
1964 marked a radical political and economic change. In 1967, the policy of Education
for Self-Reliance (ESR) was approved. Education became the mainstay of the Tanzanian
socialist economy that would ensure economic growth and primary education was put at
the service of the development of rural areas, where 96 percent of the population lived.
1The most privileged zones were the Arusha-Kilimanjaro-Tanga and the Mwanza-Shinyanga corridors,
and the Coast Morogoro-Kigoma (Maro and Mlay, 1979).
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This policy should have led to radical changes but, in practice, was slowly enforced. It was
only in 1974 that the government committed itself to reach at a forced-march Universal
Primary Education (UPE) by 1978. The aim of this program was threefold: i) to improve
the equity of access to education, ii) to teach agricultural skills that would be relevant in
a rural society, and iii) to offer a political and civic education (Nyerere, 1967).
To achieve the UPE goal, the government made a series of changes. First, it
implemented a villagization program to increase access to schools and other social services.
From 1968, villagization consisted of constructing community villages commonly called
ujamaa, but in 1974, households living in remote areas were forced to move (see Table
2.2 ). Most of the time, the distance to their prior dwelling was less than five kilometers.
From 1974 to 1977, more than 10 million people were moved and 2,650 ujamaa were
built (Martin, 1988). Prime Minister Nyerere (1987) considered that gathering the rural
population was necessary to develop education, to reduce inequalities and to improve
agricultural production. The Tanzanian government invested massively in primary
education and concentrated its efforts on deprived areas. Local resources were mobilized
for classrooms and a large number of new schools were built. In 1978, expenditure on
primary education was three times the amount dedicated to secondary education (Bonini,
2003). Thus, the UPE program combined with villagization greatly reduced distances to
schools. Simultaneously, teachers’ recruitment and teacher training were restructured. To
deal with the growing number of pupils, the government trained 10,000 teachers. Despite
this, there was still a shortage of primary school teachers, which may have affected the
quality of education, especially in the beginning of the UPE plan (Sabates et al., 2011).
The government also made additional adjustments to improve schools’ attractiveness.
Tuition fees were eliminated, primary education became mandatory, and Swahili, most
pupils’ mother tongue, was designated as the language of instruction.
The aim of primary school was also to become a self-reliant economy through
agriculture: «kilimo cha kufa na kupona», Agriculture for Life and Dealth. To fulfill
this goal, the examination in the middle of the primary cycle was removed, the starting
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Table 2.1 : Villlages in Tanzania
Year Number of villages Number of residents
1968 180 58 000
1969 650 300 000
1970 1200 50 000
1971 4484 1 595 240
1972 5556 1 980 862
1973 5631 2 028 164
1974 5008 2 560 474
1975 6944 9 140 229
1976 7658 13 067 220
1978 7768 13 847 000
1979 8200 13 905 000
Source: Shao (1982)
age was postponed from 5 to 7 years old and agriculture classes were introduced in the
curriculum. As a result, pupils leaving the primary schools would be old enough and would
have acquired the abilities to work in the fields. To encourage people to start working
after primary school, access to the secondary cycle was drastically limited by regional
quotas (Martin, 1988).2
The results of this UPE plan were considerable: From 1974 to 1978, enrolled children
aged 7 to 13 rose from 43.1 to 90.4 percent, access to primary education was improved due
to the construction of new schools, and disparities among regions were reduced (Bonini,
2003).
2.2.2 Data
2.2.2.1 Data sets
This study uses three data sources: a census data set, a household panel survey, and
administrative data. First, the census data used are a 10 percent IPUMS sample from
the 2002 Population and Housing Census in Tanzania. This census was carried out
by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and contains basic information on dwelling
characteristics, individual demographics and socio-economics for 500, 519 households.
2Despite this policy, no significant drop of the secondary enrollment rate is observed.
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Secondly, the household panel data are the LSMS-ISA (LSMS-Integrated Surveys on
Agriculture) data collected by the World Bank in 2008-2009, 2010-2011 and 2012-2013.3
The LSMS-ISA data include 3265 households in 2008, 3924 households in 2010 and 5015
households in 2012. The number of households is increasing over the three waves due
to the high number of split-off households and to the low attrition rate that does not
exceed 5 % over the three rounds. This dataset gives detailed information on labor
activities, household consumption, agriculture inputs and outputs and on other individual
characteristics. Despite a district reorganization between the dates of the two datasets,
both data cover the 26 Tanzanian regions and are representative at the regional and
national levels.
Finally, I use administrative data collected by the Ministry of Economic Affairs
and Development Planning and recorded in Jensen et al. (1968). These data gather
information on the distribution of primary schools and on GDP by regions and districts
in 1967 for mainland Tanzania. GDP records are divided in sub-activities such as crops,
livestock, mining, manufacturing, construction, public utilities, transport, rent, and other
services. These data are unique because they constitute, to the best of my knowledge, the
only source of information on primary school provision in Tanzania at this time.4
2.2.2.2 Measuring household wealth
Usually, living standards are measured either by income or by consumption. In developing
countries where agriculture is widespread, incomes are very sensitive to current shocks
and may not be representative of household well-being (Meyer and Sullivan, 2003) while
consumption can be smooth through formal or informal mechanisms. In this respect,
consumption has the advantage of being more representative of long-run well being. The
second interest of using consumption stems from the labor organization in developing
countries. Individuals mostly work in household activities such as agriculture or self-
employed activities where individual incomes are not well identified (Jolliffe, 1998).
3From October 2008 to December 2009 for the first wave, from October 2010 to December 2011 for
the second wave, and from October 2013 to December 2013 for the third wave.
4The National Bureau of Statistics gives access to the number of schools by region only from 2002.
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Additionally, income is not similarly measured between sectors,5 which calls into question
the reliability of comparison between sectors. Last, but not least, consumption is available
for all households, which allows one to avoid selection and imputation issues. Thus,
these features advocate the use of consumption rather than incomes data in developing
countries.
Deaton and Zaidi (2002) propose guidelines to construct a very detailed consumption
variable from household survey data. They consist of defining a weighted per capita
consumption variable composed of four components, food items, non-food items (electicity,
health expenditure, etc), housing consumption (derived from imputing a rent for
each household) and consumption from consumer durables. To adjust household
consumption for variation in household composition, the consumption variable is divided
by an equivalence scale.6 The Living standard Measurement Study (LSMS) data
are particularly well suited for constructing the consumption index since they collect
exhaustive information on consumption expenditures. However, the serious limitation of
the Deaton and Zaidi (2002) method is such accurate data are costly to collect and are
often not included in large datasets. As in most census data, the 2002 Tanzanian census
excludes income and expenditures, but records a list of dwelling characteristics and durable
goods. A large number of authors ((McKenzie, 2005), (Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006))
adopt a factor analysis which consists in constructing an asset index based on access
to utilities and housing characteristics. This index proves to be useful for measuring
inequalities between households and are good proxies for long-term wealth. The additional
advantage of these indexes is that they limit measurement errors (Sahn and Stifel (2003),
(Filmer and Pritchett, 2001)). Thus, I construct a consumption variable from the
Tanzanian LSMS data7 and a consumption proxy from the 2002 census.
To take advantage of the large sample size of the census data and obtain a monetary
value of consumption which eases comparision with the literature (Duflo (2001) and
5Self-employment income is rarely a wage and agricultural income is measured through production.
6The equivalence scale is made from the household’s size: every adult represents one unit and each
child represents 0.3 units.
7The data report detailed spending, except for consumer durables.
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Maluccio (1998)), I construct a consumption proxy from the census data by adopting
the method developed by (Elbers et al., 2003) and (Tarozzi and Deaton, 2009)) from
census data and household survey matching. By following a two step-procedure, I predict
household consumption from a set of predictors X that are common to both data sources.8
The idea behind this method is first to estimate the joint distribution of logC and X from
the household survey:
LogCi = bXi + νi (2.1)
Where νi is the error term of household i. Then, I use the estimated distribution to
predict l̂ogC in the census data. This method is valid only if several assumptions hold.
The predictors X should be similarly measured in both data sets. Questions regarding the
predictors have the same wording for the two questionnaires, but as Tarozzi and Deaton
(2009) suggest, differences may still persist due to differences in questionnaire length
or interviewer training.9 Table A2.3 gathers coefficients of equation 2.1 in the LSMS
data. As predicted, all dwelling characteristics have a positive and significant impact on
consumption. The R-squared coefficient is high (0.53), meaning that the predictors have
good explanatory power.
Graph A2.3 plots the relationship between the expected utility l̂ogC and logC in
the LSMS data.10 I find a clear positive linear relationship between these two variables.
However, l̂ogC may not capture all the variation in consumption, especially at the ends of
the distribution where large consumption gaps can exist between households who have all
the basic dwelling characteristics. As a result, the dispersion for extreme values of l̂ogC
is larger, but this effect seems negligible. To account for the artificially low variance of
l̂ogC compared to logC, I adopt the method proposed by Barham and Boucher (1998)
and Gubert et al. (2010). This recommends adding to l̂ogC, an error term drawn from a
normal distribution with the same variance that ν̂i observed in the survey data. To make
8The number of rooms in the dwelling, whether the household has drinking water, electricity, a phone,
a flush toilet, a high quality roof, high quality walls, etc.
9To avoid anachronism issues, I do not include in the list of predictors “having a phone” that may
have a different meaning across time and across the data.
10For each value of l̂ogC, I compute the average value of logC depicted by a dot.
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sure that the results are independent from the random draw, this procedure is replicated
a large number of time. Thanks to this method, the standard errors can be normally
interpreted. However, this assumes that νi is exogenous, which may not be the case in
practise.11
2.2.3 Measuring intensity of the UPE program
The UPE program was applied during a limited time frame and targeted regions with
poor access to education. Hence, exposure to the program is captured by two types
of varation, across locations and over time. The spatial variations can be captured by
referring to several administrative geographical units. The smaller the unit, the higher
will be the accuracy of the instrument. In this respect, the census district is best suited for
the analysis. However, census data report only the district of residence. Since individuals
could have moved from one place to another during the UPE program, the place of
residence might be endogenous. To avoid this endogeneity issue, I use instead the region
of birth, which was determined prior to the program.12
Since the UPE program seeks to equalize access to education across all locations, the
intensity of the program should be a decreasing function of a locality’s initial education
level. To capture the heterogeneity in the treatment, I first need to obtain information
on each locality’s education level before the introduction of the UPE program. The UPE
program was fully implemented starting in 1974, but pilot programs started in 1968, just
after the ESR policy. As a consequence, some regions benefited from financial support
and from the villagization procedure between 1968 and 1974. Thus, the age-cohorts that
were in school from 1968 to 1974 were likely to be partially treated. Consequently, the
education level of region j in 1967, Sj,1967 is the best indicator of the initial education
level.13
11In section 2.4.1, consequences of relaxing this hypothesis will be further studied.
12Results that use the district of residence as geographical unit are similar and are available upon
request.
13Given that primary school in Tanzania ends at 13 years old, Sj,1967 is computed from the education
level of individuals born in 1954.
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Figure A2.4a maps this variable, and it is clear that, indeed, education was unequal
across regions: Zanzibar West and Kilimanjaro had already reached the maximum years
of primary education while the average education in others regions was low. In contrast,
education levels were higher and more homogenous by the end of the UPE program in
1978 (see figure A2.5b). Although Sj,1967 gives a good picture of access to education by
region in 1967, it also reflects the demand for education, and so it might be endogenous.
To get around this problem, I also use data on school infrastructure and I construct Nj,1967,
the number of primary schools per square kilometer, by region. Figure A2.4c depicts the
distribution of Nj,1967. Two striking features are evident. Firstly, the schooling supply was
very unequal between regions in 1967 and secondly, the supply of schools seems correlated
with the distribution of the education level at this time.
2.2.4 Sample and Descriptive statistics
Knowing that the UPE program partially started in 1968 and was fully implemented
in 1974, I focus my analysis on two main groups, the pre-treatment group T0 and the
treatment group Ttot. I define T0 to be household heads not affected by the UPE reform.
It is composed of individuals born between 1945 and 1954 who were older than 13 before
the introduction of the program in 1968. The UPE program affected several age-cohorts
but with varying intensity. I define Ttot to include all treated children and I distinguish
three treated sub-groups according to the age of the household head (see Table 2.2 ). Both
the T1 and T2 cohorts were affected by the reform before it ended in 1978. Household
heads from T1 (born from 1961 to 1966) were likely to be treated at the beginning of the
reform while household heads from T2 (born from 1967 to 1971) were likely to be treated
at the end of the reform. After 1978, school attendance started flattening (King, 1984) but
children still benefited from the UPE program infrastructure. This last group, denoted
by T3 (born between 1972 to 1978) can be used to test whether the effect of the UPE
program was persistent over time. Alternatively, the control group can be considered to
be Tpt (born from 1945 to 1960), that consists of household heads that were likely to be
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partially treated by the UPE program.
Table 2.2 : Age Cohorts
Age Year of birth Age in 1974 Potential education level Obs. Obs.
cohorts during the UPE plan IPUMS LSMS
Tb 1935-1945 29-39 over postsecondary 77,115 1,083
T0 1945-1954 20- 29 postsecondary and over 111,818 1,706
Tpt 1945-1960 14-19 secondary and postsec. 83,937 1324
T1 1961-1966 8 -13 primary-secondary 113,063 1”
555
T2 1967-1971 3-7 no education- primary 103,406 1,408
T3 1972-1978 not born-2 no education 172,232 2,156
Ttot 1961-1978 not born-13 no education-secondary 388,701 5,119
Figure 2.1 shows the education distribution among these age-cohorts. One notices
that the percentage of individuals with no education drastically decreased from T0 to T1
(falling from 45 to to 24 percent): not only were more people enrolled in primary school,
but more people completed primary education. From T1 to T2, the percentage of the
population with primary completion kept growing, but the percentage of people with no
education remained stable. Although the substantial increase in education between the
control and treated groups, about 20% of the population had no education.
Figure 2.1: Evolution of the education attainment by Age-Cohort.
Source: 2002 census (IPUMS data).
Table A2.1 and A3.1 present descriptive statistics for the LSMS and the census
data, respectively. On average, individuals from Ttot appear to be more educated than
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individuals from T0, and this gap is larger for women. Besides, the head man of the
household seems slightly more educated than his partner. Turning to consumption, I
notice that l̂og C is very close to the log C in the LSMS-data (see TableA3.1) and that
l̂og C is slightly larger in the census data than in the LSMS data. When I compare
consumption by age-group, I find no statistical difference between household heads from
T0 and household heads from Ttot. Moving to the sector of activity, I observe that they
are not similarly defined in both data sets. The census data distinguish between four
categories: i) unemployed or domestic unpaid workers, ii) wage-workers either in the
public or the private sector, iii) self-employed workers in non-agricultural activities14 and
iv) self-employed workers in agriculture. The LSMS survey defines the same categories
but specifies whether individuals hold several jobs. Agriculture is by far the dominant
sector. From T0 to Ttot, the distribution between sectors was relatively stable, despite the
shift from agriculture to self-employed non-agricultural activities.
2.3 Empirical strategy
To analyze the effect of education on labor market outcomes, I rely on the following basic
equation:
Yi = θ1Si + θX ′i + εi (2.2)
where Yi , the outcome of interest, denotes the consumption per capita or the occupational
status. Si is the years of schooling of the head in household i, X
′
i is a set of controls and
εi is the error term.
As the literature underlines (Card, 2001), education depends on individual choices that
may be endogenous. Thus, unobserved omitted variables may influence both education
and the outcome interest and simple OLS estimations would lead to inconsistent estimates
of θ1. To address this endogeneity issue, I adopt an instrumental variable approach.
14This includes non-agricultural business with employees and without employee.
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2.3.1 Identification strategy
The instrumental variable approach that I use is based on the UPE program. This assumes
that being exposed to the program increases the probability of being enrolled in school
but is orthogonal to unobserved household characteristics that determine labor market
outcomes. Because the UPE program is an exogenous source of education variation, it
should be a reasonable instrument.
To capture exposure to the UPE program, I adopt a difference-in-differences strategy
based on variations in time and in space. It consists of comparing pre-treatment cohorts
(T = 0) with treated cohorts (T = 1), for whom the intensity of the treatment varied
across regions.
Since the program aimed at improving equity of access to education, the intensity
should decrease with the education level before the program, S67. As mentioned above,
Zanzibar West was the most educated region in 1967. It is also the region that experienced
the lowest increase in years of schooling between 1967 and the end of the program in 1978.
Thus, I define the intensity of the program as:
Ij,67 = (SZanzibar West,67 − Sj,67)
By construction, Zanzibar is untreated and the intensity of the treatment is a decreasing
function of Sj,67. Thus, I instrument education by T ∗ Ij,67, which captures the UPE
program’s exposure. This variable is a valid instrument (IV) if two conditions are satisfied:
i) the IV is correlated with education, and ii) the IV explains the outcome of interest
only through education. In such cases, IV estimates correspond to the Local Average
Treatment Effect (LATE). Otherwise, IV estimates give inconsistent and biased results.
Since the interpretation of IV estimates relies on the quality of the instrument, I now
discuss whether the interaction term T ∗ Ij,67 is a valid instrument.
The IV variable is a relevant candidate if it is highly correlated with the endogenous
variable. To check whether Sj,67 explains the education expansion by regions, I plot in
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figure A2.6 the education increase from the pre-treatment group T0 to the program period
T1 according to the regional education attainment in T0. Each dot depicts a region of birth.
I show that, indeed, there is a clear negative relationship between the initial education
level and the education increase: the UPE program was more intense in regions with low
schooling enrollment at T0. I find the same result in figure A2.7, where I consider the
supply of school instead of the education level. Likewise, the same conclusion can be
drawn at the district level in figure A2.8: the lower the education in T0, the higher is the
education increase from T0 to T1.
15 However, this relationship is not necessarily causal.
The main concern is that the education expansion between T0 and T1 is not exclusively
due to the UPE program but to other factors correlated with the instrument and the
outcome of interest. Despite the fact that the exclusion restriction could not be tested,
I try to identify all potential sources that could discredit this condition, and I provide
evidence that the instrument is exogenous.
First, I check whether the education expansion is due to the introduction of the UPE
program and not to a convergence phenomenon. In case of convergence, less educated
regions could have had a higher education increase in order to catch up with the more
educated regions. If this were to be true, this phenomenon would be observed before
and after the introduction of the UPE program. Subsection 2.3.2 addresses this question
and confirms that during the pre-treatment program, the education progression was not
statistically different between educated and non-educated regions, whatever their initial
education level. On the contrary, there is a trend reversal during the UPE program period
and the education expansion was statistically higher for deprived regions.
The exclusion restriction can still be invalidated if other region’s characteristics
generate the same trend reversal or are correlated to the outcomes of interest. In order
to insure the exogeneity of the instrument, I add a set of controls. Among these control
variables, I add the number of children aged 7 to 13 to account for possibility that the
education expansion may depend on the size of the cohort. Furthermore, the level of
wealth may have non negligible impacts on the development of the schooling supply:
15Each dot represents a district of residence because the districts of birth are not available.
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wealthy regions can have higher needs in skilled labor and invest more in education.
In addition, when a region becomes specialized in a given sector of activity, this region
becomes more vulnerable to all the specific shocks of that sector. For instance, regions
with a developed agricultural sector are more likely to be sensitive to commodity price
shocks while mining regions are probably more perturbed by variations in energy prices.
These variations in the labor market organization can also bias the results if they affect
the demand for education and the returns to education. Hence, if regions are not
homogeneously affected by sectoral economic shocks, the exclusion restriction is not valid
and IV estimations are inconsistent. One way to ensure the validity of the instrument is to
control for heterogeneity in order to capture variations in shocks between regions. In this
respect, I add regional GDP by sector of activity interacted with a time trend. Among
these sectors, I distinguish between the following economic activities: crops, livestock,
mining, manufacturing, construction, and activities from the tertiary sector, including
public utilities, transport, rent, and other public services.
In addition, De Chaisemartin and d Haultfoeuille (2015) highlight that IV estimates
can be far from returns to education in any location when the homogeneity assumption
does not hold. However, they show that difference-in-difference (DID) methods with fuzzy
treated groups16 should provide unbiased estimates without relying on any homogeneity
assumption, as long as 1) the common trend assumption is valid; 2) there is a control group
for which the treatment does not change overtime. According to the above results, these
two assumptions seem to be satisfied. In this study, 2) implies there is at least one region
where education has not evolved between the pre-treatment period and the treatment
period, which is precisely the case of Zanzibar West.17 This lack of education increase has
two explanations: education has already reached the maximum years of primary education
in 196718 and access to secondary education was cut at time of the UPE program.
Last but not least, IV estimates are biased if the program has influenced outcomes
other than education that explain the level of consumption. Thinking of forced
16This refers to DID when the intensity of the treatment varies between treated groups.
17The education level decreases by 0.1 year between 1967 and 1978 which is negligible.
18Zanzibar, independent in 1964, benefited from a better access to education.
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villagization, this is very likely to happen. Among the possible channels, the program
could have changed the access to other social services and the living conditions.
Nonetheless, this should not call into question the validity of the instrument in this
particular case. Indeed, the specificity of the villagization program is that all individuals
were concerned since entire families were asked to move. As a consequence, the treatment
group and the control group were similarly affected by these changes. On the contrary,
the education policy consisting in education reforms was beneficial only for the treatment
group and had no reason to affect outcomes other than education.
2.3.2 The impact of the UPE program on education expansion
Since education may be endogenous, I adopt a two-stage procedure, the first stage of
which is :
Sijt = α + βj + βt + γT ∗ Ij,1967 + δt ∗Xj,1967 + µijt (2.3)
βj and βt are region-of-birth fixed effects and birth-cohort fixed effects to account for
permanent differences across regions and over time. T is a dummy taking the value 0 for
people belonging to T0 and 1 for people belonging to either T1, T2, T3 or Ttot. Ij,1967 ∗ T
captures the intensity of the UPE program and Xj,1967 is a set of region characteristics.
It includes the log of population aged 7 to 13 and regional GDP by sectors of activity in
1967. These controls are interacted with a time variable t. The coefficient of interest, γ,
represents the effect of the UPE program on education (years of schooling). When Ij,1967
increases, the education expansion between T0 and the treatment groups are expected to
be larger.
Table 2.3 reports the results of equation 2.3. I distinguish the effect for the whole
treatment group Ttot and by age cohorts T1, T2 and T3. To consider the possible serial
correlation in errors, I cluster standard errors at the regional level (Bertrand et al., 2004).
Without GDP controls, I find that when the predicted intensity Ij,67 is raised by one
additional year between the control group T0 and Ttot, the education expansion increases
by 0.34 between the two periods. This result is consistent with the idea that the UPE
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Table 2.3 : Effect of the program on education: γ coefficients of equation (2.3)
Dependant (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
variable Ttot T1 T2 T3
Years of 0.369*** 0.336*** 0.277*** 0.226*** 0.418*** 0.373*** 0.435*** 0.443***
education (0.064) (0.060) (0.057) (0.053) (0.050) (0.078) (0.065) (0.089)
R-squared 0.276 0.273 0.318 0.315 0.339 0.337 0.298 0.297
F-test 33.38 31.83 23.70 18.60 70.14 23.34 45.55 25.97
Primary 0.038*** 0.030** 0.029** 0.015 0.045*** 0.031* 0.042*** 0.036**
completion (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
R-squared 0.238 0.238 0.289 0.291 0.329 0.332 0.283 0.285
F-test 8.940 5.314 5.181 1.467 12.89 3.367 10.22 4.472
Sample T0 +T1+T2+T3 T0 +T1 T0 +T2 T0 +T3
Cohort FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regiont FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
GDP Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 440,676 423,419 199,450 190,148 190,466 182,454 247,502 238,723
Source: the 2002 census. Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the region of birth level and are reported in parentheses.
***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficient are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Additional
controls are the population aged 7 to 13 in 1967, the household size and the principal sector of activity of the household
head.
program targeted regions with low initial education attainment and contributed to the
equalization of access to education among regions. We can deduce from columns (3),
(5) and (7) that the effect of this program was progressive: when Ij,1967 increases by one
year, the education expansion increases by 0.28 years of education from T0 to T1, by 0.42
years of education from T0 to T2 and by 0.44 years of education from T0 to T3. These
results are in line with the expectations: the effect becomes larger when the exposure to
the treatment increases. For all estimations, F-test values are large. When I introduce
GDP controls interacted with a time trend (columns (2), (4), (6) and (8)). The effect of
Ij,1967 is still positive and significant but the coefficient is slightly lower. It is worth noting
that the introduction of this control changes the sample of the analysis since the regional
GDP variables are only available only for mainland Tanzania. The bottom panel of Table
2.3 indicates whether the UPE plan had fully reached its goal by convincing people not
only to enroll in school but also to complete primary education. It is not obvious since
primary education lasts seven years and the UPE plan was strictly implemented for four
years. When I control by regional GDP, reported result for Ttot indicates that Ij,1967
significantly increases the primary completion by 3.1 percent age points. However, F-test
values are lower, suggesting that Ij,1967 is a much stronger predictor for the number of
years of education than for primary completion.
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As a robustness check, I also test the impact of the density of schooling infrastructures
Nj,1967. Since I do not have information of the number of schools in Zanzibar, I choose
Kilimanjaro as the reference19 and the intensity is rewritten as a decreasing function of
the number of schools I ′j,67 = (NKilimanjaro,67−Nj,67). As a result, the first-stage equation
becomes:
Sijt = α + βj + βt + γT ∗ I ′j,1967 + δtXj,1967 + µijt (2.4)
Table A2.4 presents the estimates for mainland Tanzania. Coefficients are positive and
significant for all treatment groups. When the intensity increases by one additional school
per square kilometer, the education expansion between the control and the treatment
groups is raised by 0.05 year to 0.08 years of education, depending on the specification.
I also estimate equations 2.3 and 2.4 using the LSMS data. Results, gathered in Table
A2.5 , provide a less clear message. First, F-test values are much lower, and second, the
effects are not robust to the introduction of GDP controls and to the change of instrument.
This can be explained by the smaller sample sizes of the sub-samples.20 Thereafter, I use
only the 2002 census to study the impact of UPE program on education.
I also estimate a more flexible regression that allows the effect of the UPE program to
vary according to the time exposure to the program:
Sijt = α + βj + βt +
1954∑
t=1945
γtIj1967 +
1978∑
t=1961
γtIj1967 + δtXj1967 + µijt (2.5)
In this equation, γt indicates age-cohort coefficients. It measures the effect of the reform
by age-cohort. The difference between γt and γt+1 represents the education expansion
between t and t+1 generated by the education level in 1967. For the pre-treatment group,
Ij,67 should have no impact on education expansion and γt values should be close to 0,
while for treated groups, regions with a high predicted intensity Ij,67 should benefit from a
19Kilimanjoro is the second most educated region in 1967, and it also experienced a negligible education
expansion from 1967 to 1978.
20Since few observations are available by region and by year, I cannot capture any effect.
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larger education progression and γt values should be increasing . This is precisely what is
Figure 2.2: γt coefficients of the interaction between age-cohorts and
education level by region in 1967.
Source: 2002 census (IPUMS data).
shown in figure 2.2. Each coefficient in this table corresponds to γt coefficients of equation
2.5. The reference year is the year before the introduction of the UPE program, in 1967,
which corresponds to the age-cohort born in 1954. As expected, most of the coefficients
in the pre-treatment program were not statically different from 0. From 1961 to 1978,
γt coefficients steadily increased by 0.4 point. Cohorts born after 1968 were still exposed
but the slope declines afterward. This graph confirms that the identification strategy is
reasonable: the trend was not present before the program and the UPE program had a
significant impact on education for the treated cohorts (all coefficients are significant at
1% level). Thus, if no regional time-varying characteristics correlated with the program’s
intensity are omitted, these fuzzy difference-in-difference results should correctly estimate
the impact of the UPE program.
2.4 Results
This section presents the main results. The first sub-section is devoted to the returns
to education for the entire population. To better understand the distribution of these
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returns, I also compare in sub-section 2.4.2 the returns to education across different
sectors of activity. Education may also have the advantage of increasing the probability
that individuals can obtain work in sectors that are better paid. Then, subsection 2.4.4
investigates whether the returns to education come from the returns “within sectors” or
from a “distribution effect”.
2.4.1 The returns to education
I measure the returns to education by looking at the effect of education Sijt of household
head i born in region j at year t on current consumption Cijt. The main equation is:
Log(Cijt) = α + βj + βt + θSijt + δtXj + ijt (2.6)
where βj and βt are, respectively, region-of-birth and year-of-birth fixed effects. Regional
controls Xj are also included. For the sake of comparison with my earlier results, this
equation is estimated separately for treatment groups Ttot, T1, T2 and T3.
I first ignore the potential endogeneity of education and run OLS regressions. Several
conclusions can be drawn from Table A2.7 . In the top panel, the estimates indicate that
education increases the log consumption aggregate (constructed using the Deaton and
Zaidi method) by 7%. Comparing the middle and bottom panels, the estimates from the
consumption proxy L̂ogCijt are very similar for the LSMS data and for the census data and,
around 4.2%. Notwithstanding, there is an important gap between consumption estimates
and consumption proxy estimates. To correctly interpret these results, it is necessary to
clarify under which conditions the proxy for consumption is a relevant outcome.
In traditional settings, θ in equation 2.6 captures the causal impact provided that Sijt
is not correlated with ijt. In contrast, using the proxy for consumption introduces an
additional assumption: bˆ and ν̂ijt estimates from equation 2.1 should be unbiased. Recall
that ν̂ijt was drawn from a normal distribution and was assumed to be exogenous.
Yet, νijt, the consumption part not explained by households’ dwelling characteristics,
results from households’ preferences and is probably influenced by the education of the
96
households’ heads. For instance, households with educated household heads may be more
willing to spend money for the education or health of their children. If so, there is a
remaining endogenous part of the residual ν ′′ijt that is not captured by ν̂ijt. Thus, equation
2.6 can be rewritten:
bˆXjt + ν̂ijt = α + βj + βt + θSijt + δtXj + ijt − ν ′′ijt (2.7)
And θ̂ = θ + cov(ijt,Sijt)
V (Sijt) −
cov(ν′′ijt,Sijt)
V (Sijt) .
The positive correlation between education and ijt leads to the traditional upward
bias, while the positive correlation between education and ν ′′ijt causes downward bias in
the coefficient of interest. In conclusion, if νijt is not purely exogenous, using the proxy
for consumption adds an additional source of bias. To obtain consistent estimates of θ, I
instrument education and I rely on the first-stage equations 2.3 and 2.4. Instead of using
a dummy treatment variable, I also distinguish the effect of the treatment by age-cohort.
I refer to equation (2.5) but I impose that each γjt equals 0 for the pre-treatment cohorts:
Sijt = α + βj + βt +
1978∑
t=1961
γtSj1967 + δtXj + µijt
In this equation, γt identifies the effect of the UPE program by age-cohort in comparison
with the pre-program period T0.
If the instrument is not correlated with ν nor with , and if the relevance condition
is valid, IV estimates identify the causal impact of education. Even though this first
condition cannot be empirically tested, the intensity of the treatment has no obvious
reason to be correlated with ν and , except though education.
Table 2.4 reports the 2-SLS estimates for the 2002 census. When I consider the entire
treatment period, Ttot, results are robust to the instrument and to specifications. When I
add controls for GDP by sectors of activity, I find that one additional year of education
of household head increases the log of household consumption between 7.1 and 9.3 %.
F-statistics are high, which suggests that the instruments have strong predictive power.
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Table 2.4 : Estimations of education on ̂consumption
Ttot T1 T2 T3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS estimates
0.042*** 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.043***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R-squared 0.574 0.575 0.601 0.603 0.595 0.595 0.581 0.582
IV estimates with T ∗ Ij,1967
Sj67 ∗ T 0.075*** 0.082*** 0.077*** 0.067** 0.061*** 0.071*** 0.079*** 0.088***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.028) (0.029) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019)
R-squared 0.455 0.446 0.510 0.523 0.511 0.505 0.459 0.443
F-test 33.38 31.83 23.70 18.60 70.14 23.34 45.55 25.97
IV estimates with
∑1978
t=1961 γt ∗ ij,1967
0.068*** 0.073*** 0.065** 0.049** 0.060*** 0.067*** 0.078*** 0.087***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.026) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019)
R-squared 0.468 0.463 0.527 0.537 0.517 0.513 0.464 0.450
F-test 188.7 131.6 24.18 17.73 35.21 9.094 21.86 7.266
Observations 440,676 423,419 199,450 190,148 190,466 182,454 247,502 238,723
IV estimates with I ′j,1967 ∗ Ttot
Nj67 ∗ T 0.076*** 0.093*** 0.0916*** 0.0887*** 0.068*** 0.078*** 0.0721*** 0.081***
(0.020) (0.025) (0.0185) (0.0265) (0.017) (0.023) (0.0207) (0.026)
R-squared 0.232 0.189 0.305 0.312 0.326 0.312 0.259 0.242
F-test 69.16 21.55 42.31 35.36 97.80 27.36 82.75 20.75
IV estimates with
∑1978
t=1961 γt ∗ I ′j,1967
0.067*** 0.076*** 0.082*** 0.072*** 0.066*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.081***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026)
R-squared 0.247 0.233 0.326 0.344 0.327 0.318 0.258 0.242
F-test 37.90 39.75 23.67 12.52 36.92 6.640 18.05 7.303
Observations 423,419 423,419 190,148 190,148 182,454 182,454 238,723 238,723
Sample T0 +T1+T2+T3 T0 +T1 T0 +T2 T0 +T3
Cohort FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regiont FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
GDP Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes
Source: the 2002 census. Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the birth region level and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,*
mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Additional controls are
the population aged 7 to 13 in 1967, the household’s size and the sector of activity.
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In comparison with OLS estimates, coefficients are larger. With regard to the ability
bias, this result is counter-intuitive. If educated individuals have higher abilities, θ
captures both the education and the ability effect and OLS estimates are likely to be
over-estimated. However, the opposite effect can be observed when education is measured
with error (Griliches, 1977) and when returns to education are heterogenous21 (Card,
2001). The most plausible explanation in this framework is that instrumenting education
removes the negative bias from the correlation between education and ν. In addition, is
worth emphasizing that these IV estimates are close to those in the existing literature
(Maluccio (1998), Duflo (2001)).
To test whether IV estimates are unbiased, I implement a series of robustness checks.
First, I test whether results are robust when I use the primary education level by region
in 1967, Pj,1967 instead of Sj,1967.
22 Table A2.8 show that IV estimates are not very
sensitive to this choice: the returns are about 1% lower, but the difference is not statically
significant. Finally, I test whether the introduction of partial treated individuals Tpt in
the treatment group changes the results and I deduce from Table A2.9 that the estimates
are very similar and are not statically different.
Heretofore, standard errors are clustered at the level at which the instrument is defined,
in other words, at the regional level. Yet, a small number of clusters can lead to over-
rejection of standard asymptotic tests (Cameron et al., 2008). To check whether I under-
estimate the standard errors, I run equation 2.6 by instrumenting education with the
intensity Ij′,67 defined at a lower scale, the district of residence j’.
23. Since I construct this
variable from the district of residence , this method provides biased estimates in case of
selective migration.24 Table A2.10 shows that results are very similar. Coefficients are
close and are still significant at the 1% level. This entails that selective migration and
21When the instrument affects the education choices of less-educated subgroups, which have high
marginal returns to education, IV estimates are upward-biased. Regarding the UPE program that focused
on individuals with restricted access to primary schools, IV estimates may over-estimate the average
marginal returns to education of the entire population.
22Pj,1967 represents the education level but cannot be above 7, the length of primary education.
23In 2012, there were 31 regions against 169 districts in Tanzania.
24I construct the instrument from the district of residence instead of the district of birth, which is not
available.
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over-rejecting issues are negligible.
2.4.1.1 Quality bias
The analysis of these IV estimates is controversial if the UPE program affected both the
quantity and the quality of education (Duflo, 2001). If so, the UPE program’s results
would confound these two entangled effects. This massive education program could have
lowered the quality of education if it had led to overcrowded rooms (Little, 2008) or if
the quality of teachers and the status of teaching had fallen (Towse et al., 2002). To test
whether it is true, I compare the returns to education from different treated age-cohorts
(T1, T2 and T3) that were affected by the UPE program with different intensities. For
instance, the T1 cohort was exposed to the program at the end of their education while
the T2 cohort was exposed to the program from the beginning of their education. At
this period, primary schools had to face up to an increasing number of pupils. From 1974
to 1978, the number of students in grade 1 increased from 200,000 to 901,770 students
and these rapid changes could have lowered the quality of education (King, 1984). On
the contrary, the T3 cohort was only indirectly treated by the program and primary
enrollment started flattening out for the T3 age-cohort (King, 1984) (see Table A2.11).
In the meantime, primary education was exposed to structural changes 25 and quality
of education was defined as the new priority (Bonini, 2003). Then, one would expect
that quality of education would be lower for T1 and T2 and would be higher for T3. If
so, returns to education in T1 and T2 would constitute a lower bound while returns to
education in T3 would constitute a higher bound. This is precisely what is observed in
Table 2.4 . Whatever the instrument and the specification, returns to education are higher
for the T3 cohort. However, these differences are small and are almost never significant.
This comparison from different age-cohorts suggests that the UPE program may have
lowered quality of education but to a small extent.
25The structural changes started in 1986 when Tanzania signed agreements with the IMF and the
World Bank
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2.4.2 Returns to education by sector of activity
So far, returns to education have been estimated for the whole population. However,
they can vary from one sector of activity to another. In this subsection, I investigate this
question and I estimate the consumption equation for each sector:
Log(Ciajt) = αa + βaj + βat + θaSijt + δtaXj + iajt (2.8)
where the subscript“a”depicts the household head main activity and indicates whether he:
1) does not work or is unpaid, 2) works in agriculture, 3) works in non-farm self-employed
activities, or 4) is a wage-worker.
Table 2.5 : IV estimates of the returns to education by sectors
Activity Don’t paid agri. self wage- Don’t paid agri self wage-
Don’t work employed work Don’t work employed work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS estimates
0.030*** 0.033*** 0.062*** 0.055*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.064*** 0.055***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
R-squared 0.545 0.415 0.505 0.457 0.543 0.416 0.511 0.464
IV estimates: T ∗ I ′j,1967
0.491 0.074*** 0.096*** 0.098*** 0.116 0.097*** 0.103*** 0.048**
(0.871) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.119) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024)
F-test 0.400 25.75 72.65 37.01 3.842 8.315 15.69 65.22
IV estimates with sample selection correction (IV for occupation equation: T ∗ I ′j,1967
0.312 0.075*** 0.095*** 0.087*** 0.190 0.096*** 0.110*** 0.048*
(0.437) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.183) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027)
Mills no work -0.008 -0.010
(0.003) (0.008)
Mills agri. -0.011*** -0.010***
(0.010) (0.003)
Mills self. 0.004 0.004*
(0.003) (0.003)
Mills wage 0.025** 0.020
(0.012) (0.014)
F-test 0.547 25.85 56.73 28.88 6.677 8.569 13.21 51.74
Cohort FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regiont FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
GDP control no no no no yes yes yes yes
Observations 3,518 277,747 81,396 60,536 3,518 277,747 81,396 60,536
Source: the 2002 census. Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the region of birth level and are reported in parentheses. In IV
estimations, standard errors are bootstraped. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the
level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Additional controls are the population aged 7 to 13 in 1967, the household’s size and the sector of activity.
The first panel of Table ?? presents the OLS results. It shows that returns to education
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are much lower in agriculture than in the non-farm self-employment activities and in the
formal (wage work) sector. However, 2SLS estimates (Table ?? and A2.12 ) do not
lead to the same conclusion: returns to education are higher in agriculture and in non-
farm self-employed activities than in the wage-activities. Differences between agriculture
and self-employed activities are not statistically different, but the returns to education
are statistically higher in agriculture than in wage-work activities when instrumenting
education with I ′j,67.
By comparison, IV estimates are three times, 32% and 15% larger than OLS estimates
in agriculture, non-farm self-employed activities and wage-workers activities, respectively.
These ratio of IV to OLS estimates illustrates the size of the bias. These discrepancies of
bias between sectors have several possible explanations.
First, this may come from changing correlations between education Sijt and the error
terms ijt and νijt. For instance, if working in the formal sector requires higher abilities,
the correlation between Sijt and ijt may be higher and entails a larger upward bias for
wage-workers. Besides νijt, the determinants of households’ consumption unexplained
by dwelling characteristics are likely to be correlated to education of the household’s
head Sijt. However, there is no clear reason for differences in these correlations across
sectors of activity.26 Last, but not least, these differences of bias can be explained by the
nature of the UPE program itself. IV estimates probably capture an estimate of LATE,
representative of the specificities of the UPE program and of the schooling curriculum at
that time. Indeed, the aim of this program was to improve agricultural skills and to boost
rural productivity through agricultural classes (Kinunda, 1975). This could explain why
individuals who benefited from this program have higher returns to education when they
work in agriculture.
26Figures A2.1 and A2.2 depict the distribution of education spending and food items. Expenditures
are slightly lower in agriculture but the distributions look similar.
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2.4.2.1 Sample selection bias
Contrary to other studies, I do not need to adopt an imputation method because
consumption, the outcome of interest, is available for every household. Despite this, I
still may encounter selection issues when I estimate the returns to education for non-
random sub-samples such as sectors of activity. To address this possible sample selection
bias, I adopt the two-stage model proposed by Wooldridge (2010) that deals with the
endogeneity of education and the selection issue by using an exclusion restriction variable
in the first stage equation and in the selection equation (see appendix 2.5.1 for more
details). Since the UPE program was expected to influence both access to education and
the labor market organization, I use the intensity of the UPE program, as the excluded
variable for both equations.
Results with sample selection correction are reported at the bottom panel of Table
?? and A2.12 . The introduction of sample selection corrections does little to change the
2SLS estimates: the returns are still much higher in the agricultural sector and in the
self-employed sector while they are lower in the formal sector.27 Furthermore, there is
little evidence of sample selection bias. Coefficients of the Mill’s ratio are close to 0 and
are not statistically significant except in the agricultural sector. Thus, estimating the
consumption by sectors of activity does not seem to generate significant sample selection
issues.
2.4.3 Effect of education on the labor market participation
Education can also ease the access to sectors that require skilled labor. In a rural country
where the government promoted education to increase the agricultural productivity, it
could be interesting, both from a macroeconomic and a microeconomic perspective, to
identify the effect of education on the distribution between the sectors of activity. I
estimate a multinomial logit model where Aijt is the sector of activity, taking the value of
27When instrumenting education with I ′j,67, the difference between agriculture and wage-work activities
is still statistically significant.
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1 if the individual does not work or are unpaid, 2 if the individual works in the agricultural
sector, 3 if the individual is self-employed in non-farm activities and 4 if he has a wage-
work. The activity equation has the following functional form:
Aijt = α + βj + βt + θSijt + δtXj + ijt (2.9)
To avoid endogeneity issues, I instrument education by the exposure to the UPE program
and I follow a two-step Control Function approach (Wooldridge, 2014). After obtaining
the predicted residual from the first stage equations, I plug it into equation (2.9). This
predicted residual is also used to test the endogeneity of education.
Table 2.6 : Average marginal effect of education on the probability of working in each sector
of activity (mult. logit)
Activity Don’t paid agri. self formal Don’t paid agri self formal
Don’t work employed Don’t work employed
(ref) (ref)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS -0.001*** -0.003* -0.004*** 0.007*** -0.001*** -0.003* -0.004** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Observations 443,541 426,261
Instrument: Ij1967 ∗ Ttot 0.000 0.017*** -0.020*** 0.002 -0.000 0.015** -0.010* -0.005
(0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004)
µˆijt 0.045 0.336*** 0.312*** 0.059 0.300* 0.374**
(0.074) (0.080) (0.076) (0.158) (0.160) (0.157)
F-test 33.25 30.96
Observations 443,541 426,261
Instrument: I ′j1967 ∗ Ttot 0.001 0.010** -0.013*** 0.003* 0.001 0.006* -0.007** -0.001
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
µˆijt 0.095 0.284*** 0.287*** 0.111 0.3066*** 0.328***
(0.059) (0.071) (0.069) (0.074) (0.103) (0.088)
F-test 69.53 48.14
Observations 426,261 426,261
Cohort FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
GDP control no no no no yes yes yes yes
Sources: 2002 census. Notes: Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are bootstraped and clustered at the birth region
level. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
CF-IV: IV estimates with control function method. Additional controls are the population aged 7 to 13 in 1967 and the
household’s size.
Results are reported Table 2.6 . From OLS estimates, I observe that education
decreases the probability of being unemployed, of working in agriculture and in non-
agriculture self-employed activities while it increases the probability of having a wage
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work. However, IV estimates show a completely different picture. Education raises the
probability of working in agriculture and reduces the probability of being self-employed
in non-farm activities. These effects, robust to the instrument used, probably identify
the LATE explained by the specificity of the UPE program. In most estimations, the
predicted residuals are statistically different from 0 which confirms the importance of
dealing with the endogeneity of education.
2.4.4 Decomposition of the education effects
To investigate the relative impact of education on consumption and on the probability
of working in each sector of activity, I base my analysis on the following expected
consumption: E(C) = ∑na=1 Pa ∗ Ca, where Pa is the probability of working in the sector
of activity a and Ca is the consumption level of individuals working in activity a. If
education impacts both the choice of the sector of activity and the level of consumption
in these respective sectors, I can decompose the education effect in two parts:
δE(C)
δS
=
distribution effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
n∑
a=1
δPa
δS
∗ Ca +
intra sector effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
n∑
a=1
Pa ∗ δCa
δS
(2.10)
The first term represents the monetary benefit of education due to the change in the
distribution between sectors and the second term corresponds to the returns to education
within sectors. More specifically, δPa
δS
is the effect of education on the probability of
working in activity a (see Table 2.6 ) and δCa
δS
is the return to education by activity (see
Table A2.12 and Table ??). Ca and Pa are approximated by the predicted values of Cˆa
and Pˆa from equation 2.8 and equation 2.9, respectively.
Table 2.7 provides results from equation 2.10. OLS estimates show that both the
distribution and the intra-return effects are positive and significant. I conclude from this
decomposition that total returns to education come only from the intra-returns effect. IV
estimates suggest that the intra-returns effect is the main effect while the distribution
effect is much small and slightly negative. Since education increases the probability of
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Table 2.7 : The cumulative effect of education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model OLS IV: Sj,1967 ∗ Ttot IV: Nj,1967 ∗ Ttot
Distribution effect 0.0018*** 0.002*** -0.0023*** -0.002 *** -0.002*** -0.002 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001)
Intra sector effect 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.081*** 0.093*** 0.081*** 0.091***
(0.010) (0.010 ) (0.0029) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014)
Cohort FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regiont FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
GDP Control no yes no yes no yes
Observations 440,452 423,191 440,452 423,191 423,191 423,191
Source: the 2002 census. Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the region of birth level and are reported
in parentheses. Since results are produced from a multi-stage procedure, standard errors are bootstraped.
***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and
10%. Additional controls are the population aged 7 to 13 in 1967, the household’s size and the sector of
activity.
working in the agricultural sector (see section 2.4.3), and average consumption is lower in
this sector, this effect is not surprising and illustrates the specificity of the UPE program.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the benefits of education in Tanzania and considers two particular
aspects, household consumption and the choice of the sectors of activity. To instrument
education of household heads, I exploit variation in time and in space of the Universal
Education Program, supported by the villagization from 1974 to 1978.
I find that this massive primary education program contributed to a reduction of
inequalities among regions. After this program ended, its effects persisted for the
next age-cohorts. Despite the controversial means of villagization, the Tanzanian
government fulfilled its goals by improving access to basic education, even in remote
areas. Unfortunately, several changes were implemented at the same time, which prevents
one from identifying the relative efficiency of each policy.
By using a household survey, census data, and records on the number of schools, I find
that education increases household consumption between 7.3 and 9.3 percent, depending
on the specification and the instrument. This analysis has the advantage of focusing on
the entire population, instead of wage-workers, who are in the minority in most developing
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countries and are very likely to be self-selected. I also compare the returns to education
between sectors of activity. I find that the returns to education are higher in agriculture
and in non-farm self-employed activities than in wage-work activities. This conclusion, at
first sight surprising, is consistent with the Tanzanian governmental policy that aimed to
put education at the service of agriculture by teaching agricultural skills. Compared to the
few studies on the benefits of primary education in agriculture in African countries that
find low returns (Appleton et al., 1996; Jolliffe, 2004), I argue that returns to education
in agriculture are positive, provided that the curriculum at school is consistent with
agriculture. This gets closer to Foster and Rosenzweig (1996)’s results suggesting that
returns to education are positive only during specific contexts such as during technological
changes, when education helps farmers to adopt new technologies.
This suggests that the introduction of agricultural classes could help households
to escape poverty by increasing the farmers productivity. In terms of public
recommendations, this result is all the most relevant in a context where the large majority
of indidivuals work in rural activities and where the government has a limited range of
intervention tools to support farmers.
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Appendix A2
2.5.1 Measuring the effect of education by sector of activity with
the Heckman selection model
To overcome endogeneity issues and selection issues, I follow the Wooldridge (2010) ’s
method. It consists in estimating three different equations :
log(Ciajt) = α1a + β1aj + β1at + θ1aSijt + δ1taXj + 1isjt
Aijt = α2a + β2aj + β2at + θ2aIj,67 ∗ T + γ2aNijt + δ2taXj + 2iajt
Sijt = α3a + β3aj + β3at + θ3aIj,67 ∗ T + +δ3taXj + 3iajt
The first equation is the equation of interest, the consumption equation by sector of
activity a. The second equation is the selection equation. Aijt is the main sector of
activity of households head (unemployed or domestic unpaid workers, wage-workers , self-
employed workers in non agricultural activities and self-employed workers in agriculture).
The third equation represents the endogenous education equation of househould i.
Ij1967, is the instrument for both Sijt and for Aijt. To obtain unbiased estimates of
the impact of education on consumption, I compute the inverse Mills ratios λˆia with from
the predicted probabilities in the selection equation. Then, I introduce the inverse Mills
ratios into the consumption equation :
Log(Ciajt) = α1a + β1aj + β1at + θ1aSijt + δ1taXj + γ1aλˆia + 1iajt
This equation is estimated by 2SLS, using Ij,67 as an instrument. Standard errors have
to be bootstraped to account that it is a two-step procedure. The sample selection issue
can be tested by checking whether γ1a is significantly diffferent from 0. As Wooldridge
(2010) underlines, if the same instruments are used for the occupational equation and for
the consumption equation, the introduction of the Mills ratio generates collinearity that
may affect performance in the case of small samples. Since, sub-samples’ size are very
large in this analysis, this collinearity issue should be limited.
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2.5.2 Sample and statistic descriptives
Table A2.1 : Descriptive statistics
from the 2002 census
T0 Ttot
Edu. main man 4.29 5.98
Edu. main woman 2.89 4.96
̂log consumption 14.185 14.238
Activity of main man (%)
Does not work/unpaid 6.4 6.1
Agriculture 63.1 55.9
Self-employed 11.9 22.1
Wage worker 18.5 15.8
Activity of main woman (%)
Does not work/unpaid 19 23.6
Agriculture 69.7 58.6
Self-employed 6.6 11.5
Wage worker 4.6 6.2
same activity 34.7 34.8
both actif 43.6 42.5
rural 61.5 53.9
HH size 5.039 4.023
Obs. 111,818 388,701
Sources: The 2002 census (IPUMS data).
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Table A2.2 : Descriptive statistics from the LSMS-ISA
data
Year 2008 2010 2012
Composition of samples
Number of districts 126 128 131
Number of wards 87 103 108
Number of HH 3265 3921 5004
Number of children 4512 5239 6236
Household characteristics
Number of adults 3.208 3.425 3.511
Number of children 3.315 3.321 3.305
Household production (TSH) 246957.4 372482.4 708005.2
cultivated area (acres) 4.822 4.548 5.759
Children characteristics
Child’s age 11.407 11.370 11.335
Child is female 0.507 0.503 0.507
Child is enrolled in school 0.815 0.883 0.858
Number of completed grade 4.295 4.388 4.324
Child dropout school this year 0.043 0.050 0.061
Child has repeated a grade this year 0.123 0.117 0.129
Child reads and writes . 0.733 0.720
Child works last week 0.114 0.422 0.262
Child works last year 0.116 0.444 0.382
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2.5.3 Construction of the proxy for consumption
Table A2.3 : Effect of dwelling
characteristics on consumption
VARIABLES log (consumption)
Solid wall 0.148***
(0.015)
Housing water 0.124***
(0.019)
Flush toilet 0.040**
(0.016)
Electricity 0.388***
(0.019)
Permanent floor 0.379***
(0.017)
Solid roof 0.478***
(0.055)
Nb. of bedrooms 0.093***
(0.005)
Age HH head -0.002***
(0.000)
Gender HH head -0.107***
(0.014)
Nb. child aged 5-15 0.092***
(0.004)
Nb. adult aged 16-65 0.157***
(0.004)
Constant 12.566***
(0.041)
R-squared 0.532
Observations 12,178
Sources: The three pooled waves of the LSMS
data. Notes: additional controls: Regions dummies,
survey year dummies. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. ***,**,* mean respectively that the
coefficient are significantly different from 0 at the
level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Figure A2.1: Distribution of
education spendings.
Figure A2.2: Distribution of food
spendings.
Sources: The LSMS data (2008, 2010, 2012).
Figure A2.3: Relationship between the expected consumption l̂nC and
lnC.
Source: LSMS data (2008, 2010, 2012)
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2.5.4 First stages
Table A2.4 : Effect of the program on the education level: γ coefficients of 2.4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcomes Ttot T1 T2 T3
years of 0.052*** 0.045*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.063*** 0.065***
education (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014)
R-squared 0.272 0.273 0.315 0.315 0.336 0.337 0.296 0.297
F-test 69.53 21.66 42.44 34.62 99.29 28.42 82.55 20.73
Primary 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008***
completion (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
R-squared 0.238 0.239 0.290 0.291 0.332 0.333 0.285 0.286
F-test 30.45 19.10 15.48 32.71 35.75 30.60 28.03 17.83
Cohort FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regiont FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
GDP Control no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 423,419 423,419 190,148 190,148 182,454 182,454 238,723 238,723
Source: the 2002 census. Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the birth region level and are reported in parentheses.
***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Additional
controls are the population aged 7 to 13 in 1967, the household’s size and the sector of activity.
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Table A2.5 : Effect of the
program on the education
level from the household
survey (γ coefficients of 2.3).
Instrument (1) (2)
Ij67 ∗ Ttot 0.198* 0.370
(0.103) (0.239)
R-squared 0.203 0.198
F-test 3.690 2.399
Observations 5,820 4,982
I ′j67 ∗ Ttot 0.00700 0.0281
(0.0179) (0.0182)
R-squared 0.176 0.178
F-test 0.152 2.395
Observations 4,982 4,982
Cohort FE yes yes
Regiont FE yes yes
GDP Control no yes
Source: the pooled LSMS survey (2008,
2010, 2012). Notes: Standard errors
are clustered at the region of birth level
and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,*
mean respectively that the coefficients are
significantly different from 0 at the level of
1%, 5% and 10%. Additional controls are
the population aged 7 to 13 in 1967, the
household’s size and the sector of activity.
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Table A2.6 : Evolution of education attainment by period and
region groups
Age-cohort Region - Region + Difference (region+ - region-)
Tb 1.536 2.806 1.270
(.0119) (.0.227) (.0270)
T0 2.571 4.249 1.677
(.0128) (.0221) (.0255)
T1 4.746 6.265 1.518
(.0128) (.0186) (.0226)
T2 4.524 6.675 1.150
(.0119) (.0167) ( .0205)
T3 5.392 6.529 1.137
( .008) ( .0119) (.0144)
Difference (T0-Tbaseline) 1.035 1.443 .408
(.0175) (.0316) (.0362)
Difference (T1-T0) 2.175 2.016 -.158
(.0181) ( .0288) ( .0340)
Difference (T2-T0) 2.952 2.426 -.527
(.0175) ( .0276) ( .0328)
Difference (T3-T0) 2.821 2.280 -.541
( .0152) ( .0251) (.0293)
Source: IPUMS data, 2002. Notes: Standards errors are in parenthesis. Region + represents regions with education in 1958 higher
than 3 years of education, the average primary education level by this time. Region - represents regions with education in 1968
lower than 3 years of education, the average primary education level by this time. Tb: individuals born between 1935 and 1945.
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Figure A2.4: Access to education in Tanzania
(a) Education level in 1967
(b) Education level in 1978
(c) distribution of primary school
by region in 1967
Source: Jensen & al.’s record (1968) and 2002 census.
116
Figure A2.5: Consumption level of household heads
(a) Consumption of household heads
born in 1967
(b) Consumption of household heads
born in 1978
Source: LSMS-ISA data (2008, 2010, 2012).
117
2.5.5 Robustness Checks :
Table A2.7 : OLS estimates of the returns to education
Ttot T1 T2 T3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LSMS: Deaton and Zaidi consumption aggregate log(C)
0.070*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.073***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
R-squared 0.425 0.425 0.478 0.480 0.443 0.447 0.463 0.464
LSMS: l̂og(C)
0.041*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.0427***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.00325)
R-squared 0.570 0.569 0.633 0.634 0.604 0.606 0.583 0.584
Observations 5,820 4,982 2,699 2,282 2,556 2,138 3,215 2,816
IPUMS: l̂og(C)
0.042*** 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.043***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R-squared 0.574 0.575 0.601 0.603 0.595 0.595 0.581 0.582
Sample T0 +T1+T2+T3 T0 +T1 T0 +T2 T0 +T3
Cohort FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
GDP Control no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 440,676 423,419 199,450 190,148 190,466 182,454 247,502 238,723
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the birth region level and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,* mean respectively
that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Additional controls are the population
aged 7 to 13 in 1967, the household size and thesector of activity of the household head.
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Table A2.8 : Effect of education on consumption : IV estimations with education
level and primary education level.
Ttot T1 T2 T3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IV estimates with Ij67 = SZanzibar West,67 − Sj67
0.075*** 0.082*** 0.077*** 0.067** 0.061*** 0.071*** 0.079*** 0.088***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.028) (0.029) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019)
R-squared 0.455 0.446 0.510 0.523 0.511 0.505 0.459 0.443
F-test 33.38 31.83 23.70 18.60 70.14 23.34 45.55 25.97
IV estimates with PZanzibar West,67 − Pj67
0.071*** 0.075*** 0.073** 0.059* 0.059*** 0.065*** 0.077*** 0.082***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.030) (0.031) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020)
R-squared 0.241 0.233 0.340 0.358 0.334 0.329 0.251 0.239
F-test 27.08 26.14 17.98 13.43 51.24 19.18 34.04 22.15
IV estimates with
∑1978
t=1961 γt ∗ Ij1967
0.068*** 0.073*** 0.065** 0.049** 0.060*** 0.067*** 0.078*** 0.087***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.026) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019)
R-squared 0.468 0.463 0.527 0.537 0.517 0.513 0.464 0.450
F-test 188.7 131.6 24.18 17.73 35.21 9.094 21.86 7.266
IV estimates with
∑1978
t=1961 γt ∗ (PZanzibar West,67 − Pj67)
0.064*** 0.065*** 0.061** 0.040* 0.056** 0.060*** 0.075*** 0.079***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.028) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019)
R-squared 0.251 0.250 0.354 0.363 0.335 0.334 0.255 0.245
Additional CC YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
F-test 297.0 174.3 27.39 24.90 41.74 7.430 31.61 7.827
Sample T0 +T1+T2+T3 T0 +T1 T0 +T2 T0 +T3
Cohort FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regiont FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
GDP Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 440,676 423,419 199,450 190,148 190,466 182,454 247,502 238,723
Source: the 2002 census. Notes: standard errors are clustered at the birth region level and are reported in parentheses.
***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Additional
controls are the population aged 7 to 13 in 1958, the percentage of people living in rural areas in 1958, the household’s size
and the sector of activity.
Table A2.9 : Effect of education on consumption:
IV estimations with partially treated.
Ttot Ttot and partial treated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ij67 ∗ T 0.075*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.097***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.031)
R-squared 0.234 0.220 0.234 0.196
F-test 33.38 31.83 26.34 13.50
Sample T0 + T1 + T2 + T3 T0 + Tpt + T1 + T2 + T3
Cohort FE yes yes yes yes
Regiont FE yes yes yes yes
GDP Control no yes no yes
Observations 440,676 423,419 516,061 495,082
note: Source: the 2002 census. Standard errors are clustered at the birth
region level and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,* mean respectively
that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5%
and 10%. Additional controls are the population aged 7 to 13 in 1967, the
household’s size and the sector of activity.
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Table A2.10 : IV estimations at
different geographical scales
Instrument (1) (2)
Ij,1967 ∗ T 0.075*** 0.082***
(0.019) (0.022)
R-squared 0.455 0.446
F-test 33.38 31.83
Ij′,1967 ∗ T 0.074*** 0.073***
(0.014) (0.020)
R-squared 0.243 0.262
F-test 52.81 74.00
Sample T0 + T1 + T2 + T3
Cohort FE yes yes
Regiont FE yes yes
GDP Control no yes
Observations 440,676 423,419
Source: the 2002 census. Notes: standard
errors are clustered at the birth region level
and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,*
means respectively that the coefficient is
significantly different from 0 at the level of
1%, 5% and 10%. Additional controls are
the population aged 7 to 13 in 1967, the
household’s size and the sector of activity.
Figure A2.6: Evolution of
education attainment by region
from T0 to T1 according to the
education level in T0.
Figure A2.7: Evolution of
education attainment by region
from T0 to T1 according to the
number of schools in 1967.
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Table A2.11 : Effect of
education on the wealth index
(Income index constructed from
the 2002 census data)
(1) (2)
OLS estimates
0.051*** 0.051***
(0.003) (0.003)
R-squared 0.470 0.465
IV estimates
Ij67 ∗ T 0.105*** 0.128***
(0.0158) (0.0263)
R-squared -0.007 -0.066
F-test 33.37 31.82∑1978
t=1961 γt ∗ Ij1967 0.096*** 0.116***
(0.017) (0.023)
R-squared 0.011 -0.033
F-test 195.8 132.7
Sample T0 +T1+T2+T3
Cohort FE yes yes
Regiont FE yes yes
GDP Control no yes
Observations 440,683 423,426
Source: the 2002 census. Notes: standard
errors are clustered at the birth region level
and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,* mean
respectively that the coefficients are significantly
different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Additional controls are the population aged 7 to
13 in 1967, the household’s size and the sector of
activity.
Figure A2.8: Evolution of the education attainment by district
according to the education level in 1967.
Sources: The 2002 census.
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Table A2.12 : IV estimates of the returns to education by sector
Activity Don’t paid agri. self formal Don’t paid agri self formal
Don’t work employed Don’t work employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS estimates
0.030*** 0.033*** 0.062*** 0.055*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.064*** 0.055***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
R-squared 0.545 0.415 0.505 0.457 0.543 0.416 0.511 0.464
IV estimates :T ∗ Ij,1967
0.173 0.086*** 0.095*** 0.089*** 0.100 0.101*** 0.085** 0.064*
(0.306) (0.019) (0.024) (0.027) (0.110) (0.026) (0.033) (0.034)
F-test 0.181 18.63 38.89 21.74 1.619 10.11 21.66 25.08
IV estimates with sample selection correction (IV for occupation and first-stage equation: T ∗ Ij,1967)
0.179 0.088*** 0.100*** 0.087*** 0.103 0.103*** 0.086** 0.068**
(0.313) (0.019) (0.025) (0.026) (0.109) (0.026) (0.034) (0.034)
Mills no work -0.011* -0.011
(0.006) (0.009)
Mills agri -0.009*** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003)
Mills self. 0.005** 0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
Mills wage 0.026** 0.022
(0.011) (0.014)
F-test 0.181 19.05 33.21 22.18 1.625 10.18 20.80 23.79
Cohort FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regiont FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
GDP control no no no no yes yes yes yes
Observations 3,576 284,127 87,582 65,167 3,518 277,747 81,396 60,536
Source: the 2002 census. Notes: standard errors are clustered at the region of birth level and are reported in parentheses. In IV estimations,
standard errors are bootstraped. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Additional controls are the population aged 7 to 13 in 1967, the household’s size and the sector of activity.
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Figure A2.9: Education level by
district in 1967.
Figure A2.10: Education level by
district in 1978.
Sources: The 2002 census.
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Figure A2.11: Primary education level (in years) by age cohorts.
Sources: The 2002 census.
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Chapter 3
Good or bad timing? The
pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical
effect of shocks on education
investment and on schooling
performance.
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3.1 Introduction
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) records that natural disasters such
as droughts and floods have been multiplied by two over the last 25 years. Concurrently,
the Food Agriculture Organization (FAO) highlights that commodity prices have become
more volatile. This increasing number of shocks, which sparks politicians’ and academics’
interest, strikes most sub-Saharan African countries, where agriculture is the dominant
activity. To face these productivity shocks in an environment where formal markets are
imperfect, households may use child labor and cut back on education investment (Jacoby
and Skoufias, 1997b). This raises concerns about transmission of inequalities from one
generation to the next and perpetuation of poverty. In this paper, I focus on climate and
price shocks to investigate the impacts of productivity shocks on education decisions and
on schooling performance.
Theoretically, this relationship is not straightforward. Productivity shocks induce an
income effect and a substitution effect that move in opposite directions. The income
effect results from the change in the available income for education, and is expected to
vary with households financial constraints and access to formal insurance.1 In contrast,
the substitution effect which results from the change in the labor productivity is likely to
vary with access to the labor market2 (?).
Ferreira and Schady (2009) conduct a literature review on the relationship between
productivity shocks and education and show that negative productivity shocks worsen
education investments in developing countries – in other words, education is a procyclical
outcome. To capture the causal effect of negative shocks on education, several authors
focus on transitory crop shocks that reflect agricultural crises. Whether they consider
pests, rodents, birds and locusts (Gubert and Robilliard, 2007), adverse weather shocks
(Jensen, 2000), or drastic falls in cash-crop prices (Cogneau and Jedwab, 2012), they find
1A large body of the literature finds that when households have large assets or have access to credit
markets, they do not need to call on marginal workers such as children to cope with shocks (?).
2To take advantage of a labor productivity increase, households can use hired labor instead of
increasing child labor.
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that these unanticipated income shocks reduce school enrollment. These results indicate
that the income effect outweighs the substitution effect.
With this consideration in mind, a closely related question is whether the effects
of productivity shocks are symmetric, so that positive shocks encourage education
investments. More recently Shah and Steinberg (2017) argue the opposite and show that
higher rainfalls in India lower education achievement. Similarly, Beegle et al. (2006b) and
Boozer and Suri (2001) also find that larger rainfalls increase child labor, reducing school
year and enrollment. By comparison, Kruger (2007) looks at the effects of coffee price
increase in Brazil. All these papers have in common that they look at positive shocks
rather than negative ones. Taken together, these empirical findings point out that the
relationship between productivity shocks and schooling decisions is not linear.
The first contribution of this paper is to precisely check whether positive and negative
productivity shocks hinder education. To investigate this question, I consider two main
outcomes, education decisions and schooling performance. These two dimensions are
complementary and allow oneto capture different changes in education investment.3
Second, this paper aims to assess the effect of repetition of shocks. Although
households can develop strategies in the short-run to cope with income shocks, they may
not necessarily manage to protect the education of their children when the shocks are
recurrent. Looking at the effect of the number and the length of shocks is all the more
relevant when we consider schooling performance, which is the result of a cumulative
process.
Finally, the relationship between productivity shocks and education can be analyzed
with respect to the child’s age at which the shock occurs. A large literature focuses
on the fetal origins hypothesis, claiming that nutritional shocks in early life have severe
and permanent consequences on human capital accumulation (Almond and Currie, 2011;
Currie and Vogl, 2013). De Vreyer et al. (2014) take the locust plague in Mali as a
natural experiment and find that children born during the plague have a lower educational
attainment. However, the heterogeneity of these effects along children’s age has been less
3Productivity shocks may change the time spent at school without changing enrollment.
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studied. Yet, Shah and Steinberg (2017) highlight that the substitution effect may be
substantially different if the opportunity cost of time evolves as children age. In this
respect, the third contribution of this paper is to provide a dynamic picture by looking at
the effects of shocks from birth to date.
Based on a simple human capital model with two periods, I first identify the underlying
mechanisms behind productivity shocks in early life and in school age. Then, I use the
LSMS-ISA panel survey (2008 to 2012) and the Uwezo cross section survey (2010 to
2014) in Tanzania to study the relationship between productivity shocks and education
outcomes. To capture exogenous productivity variation, I consider weather shocks and
variation in cash-crop prices that are expected to increase available incomes for education
and to change the opportunity cost of children’s time. I conduct a geographically
disaggregated analysis where the identification strategy exploits variation in the intensity
of shocks across geographical areas and over time.
The main findings suggest that current productivity shocks affect education decisions
but have little effect on schooling performance. In contrast, when schooling shocks are
recurrent, schooling performance significantly drops. In line with Shah and Steinberg
(2017), I also find that this relationship depends on the age at which the shock occurs. In
early-life, the relationship is procyclical since positive productivity shocks are favorable
to future schooling performance. When children are of school age and can work, the
relationship becomes counter-cyclical.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 outlines the conceptual
model, section 3 describes the background, the data and the shocks variables, section 4
presents the empirical strategy and the results and section 5 introduces some robustness
checks .
3.2 Framework
In this section, I provide a simple human capital model to understand how parents allocate
their children’s time when there is a labor productivity shock.
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I assume unitary households in which rational agents maximize their utility over two
time periods. In the first period, t1, children are too young to go to school and to work,
while in the second period, t2, children can do both activities. The parents’ utility is a
function of their consumption in the two periods, and of child’s cognitive skills A:
U = U(C1, C2, A;X) (3.1)
I consider that U is an increasing strictly quasi-concave function in C1, C2, and A, and
add X a vector of households characteristics. Parents care about their child’s cognitive
skills for two possible reasons: either they have pure preferences for education, or they
anticipate that education will make them better off later in life.4 These cognitive skills
are acquired according to the following production function:
A = αA(C1, C2, E2) (3.2)
Where α depicts the child’s learning efficiency, which depends on the child’s innate
ability, the child’s motivation, and the parents’ motivation (Glewwe, 2002). A is an
increasing function of the time spent at school E2, of consumption in early childhood C1,
and of current consumption C2. The nutrition-learning nexus assumption is supported by
the World Health Organization (WHO), which emphasizes that stunting has long-lasting
consequences on the health and education of children.5 For the sake of simplicity, I
assume that cognitive skills do not depend on households’ spending for education.6 In
the Tanzanian setting, this assumption seems plausible since very few children go to
preschool, and 93.5% of enrolled children aged 7 to 16 go to free public schools. In t2,
parents decide to allocate total child’s time T2 between schooling attendance E2 and
labor L2c
7:
4If the returns to education are positive, educated children will be able to send larger transfers to
their parents in the future.
5Stunting is defined as height-for-age is being minus two standard deviations below the mean.
6This assumption can be relaxed without changing the results.
7Child leisure is neglected but this assumption does not change the model’s interpretations. Results
are available upon request.
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T2 = E2 + L2c (3.3)
In the two periods, households spending correspond to the available income I and are
expressed as follows:
C1 = w1L1a(1−∆) = I1(w1,∆) (3.4)
C2 = w2L2a + γw2L2c + ∆w1L1a (3.5)
Equation (3.5) can be rewritten as:
C2 + γw2E2 = w2L2a + γw2T2c + ∆w1L1a = I2(w1, w2, γ,∆)
where w1 and w2 denote labor productivity on the farm, commonly called the shadow
wage. L1a and L2a stand for adult labor in the two periods, and γ ∈ [0, 1] is the relative
productivity of child labor compared to adult labor. Based on the literature’s findings
in developing countries, I assume that credit, saving and labor markets are imperfect
(Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994; Chavas et al., 2005; Le, 2009). Although households have
no access to formal markets, I suppose they can cope with income shocks by informally
saving a fraction of their income ∆ ∈ [0, 1] from t1 to t2.
For a sake of simplicity, I assume that ∆ is exogenous and does not vary with current
labor productivity. This hypothesis can be relaxed without changing interpretations of
the model.8
By substituting (3.2) in (3.1), I express household utility as a direct function of
consumption and education:
U = U(C1, C2, A;X) = U˜(C1, C2, E2;X) (3.6)
8The amount of transfer between the two periods becomes DeltaL1a+ ∂∆∂w1w1L1a. It is unclear whether
parents increase or decrease savings with respect to labor productivity, but interpretations of the model
remain the same unless parents stop saving.
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Parents maximize their utility by choosing E2 and L2c subject to the budget constraints
(3.4) and (3.5) with respect to C1, C2, and E2 given w1, w2, γ, ∆, X and T2.9 The
Marshallian demand functions, which depend on the relative prices and the available
income I2(w1, w2, γ,∆, u), are written:
C1 = C1(w1,∆, I1(w1,∆, u);X) = C1(w1,∆, w1(1−∆)L1a, u);X)
(3.7)
E2 = E2(w2, γ,∆, I2(w1, w2, γ,∆, u);X) = E2(w2, γ,∆,∆w1L1a + w2(γT2 + L2a);X)
(3.8)
C2 = C2(w2, γ,∆, I2(w1, w2, γ,∆, u);X) = C2(w2, γ,∆,∆w1L1a + w2(γT2 + L2a);X)
(3.9)
The corresponding Hicksian demand functions that minimize the total expenditure to
maintain a fixed level of utility u are expressed:
C1 = C∗1(w1,∆, u;X) (3.10)
E2 = E∗2(w2, γ,∆, u;X) (3.11)
C2 = C∗2(w2, γ,∆, u;X) (3.12)
Based on this basic framework, I analyze how early life and current productivity shocks
affect the demand for education and the schooling performance.
9I assume that, in the short-run, children’s education does not change children’s productivity.
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3.2.1 The effect of shocks which occur during schooling
To estimate the effect of productivity shocks which occur during schooling, I compute the
partial derivatives of the Marshallian demand (3.8) and (3.9) with respect to w2:
∂E2(w2, γ,∆, I2(w1, w2, γ,∆))
∂w2
= ∂E2(w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂w2
+ ∂E2(w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂I2
∂I2(w1, w2, γ,∆)
∂w2
(3.13)
∂C2(w2, γ,∆, I2(w1, w2, γ,∆))
∂w2
= ∂C2(w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂w2
+ ∂C2(w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂I2
∂I2(w1, w2, γ,∆)
∂w2
(3.14)
From equations (3.11) and (3.12), and the Shepherd’s lemmma, I obtain the Slutsky
equations that allow to decompose the effects of w2:
∂E2(w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂w2
= ∂E
∗
2(w2, γ,∆)
∂w2
− ∂E2(w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂I2
γE2 (3.15)
∂C2(w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂w2
= ∂C
∗
2(w2, γ,∆)
∂w2
− ∂C2(w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂I2
γE2 (3.16)
Then, I substitute (3.15) and (3.16) into (3.13) and (3.14) respectively, to express the
total effect of w2 on the current demand for education and consumption:
∂E2(w2, γ,∆, I2(w1, w2, γ,∆))
∂w2
= ∂E
∗
2(w2, γ,∆)
∂w2
+ ∂E2(w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂I2
(γL2c + L2a) (3.17)
∂C2(w2, γ,∆, I2(w1, w2, γ,∆))
∂w2
= ∂C
∗
2(w2, γ,∆)
∂w2
+ ∂C2(w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂I2
(γL2c + L2a) (3.18)
The first terms of the RHS stand for the substitution effects arising from the change
of the relative prices between C2 and E2 when the purchasing power remains the same.
The quasi-concavity of U entails that this first term is negative in (3.17) and positive in
(3.18): when the labor productivity w2 gets larger, education demand decreases, while
consumption becomes relatively cheaper.
The particularity of this framework is that a change in the labor productivity w2
generates two income effects. The first income effect is induced by the increase of
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the opportunity cost of education (∂E2(w2,γ,∆,I2)
∂I2
E2 and
∂C2(w2,γ,∆,I2)
∂I2
E2), and the second
income effect is induced by the endowment reevaluation (∂E2(w2,γ,∆,I2)
∂I2
(γT2c + L2a) and
∂C2(w2,γ,∆,I2)
∂I2
(γT2c + L2a)). On one hand, education becomes more expensive and reduces
the available income and on the other hand, children and adults working in the fields
become more productive and increase the available income. The second terms of the RHS
denotes the sum of these two income effects. As a result, the total effect of a change in w2
has an ambiguous effect on the education demand E2, but has a positive effect on current
consumption C2.
Using (3.2), I can also deduce the effect of productivity shocks on cognitive skills:
∂A(w1, w2, γ,∆, I2(w1, w2, γ,∆))
∂w2
= ∂A(w1, w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂C2
∂C2(w2, γ,∆, I2(w1, w2, γ,∆))
∂w2
+
∂A(w1, w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂E2
∂E2(w2, γ,∆, I2((w1, w2, γ,∆))
∂w2
= ∂A(w1, w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂C2
(
∂C∗2(w2, γ,∆)
∂w2
+ ∂C2(w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂I2
(γL2c + L2a)
)
+
∂A(w1, w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂E2
(
∂E∗2(w2, γ,∆)
∂w2
+ ∂E2(w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂I2
(γL2c + L2a)
)
(3.19)
Productivity shocks have a direct positive effect on A through C2 and an indeterminate
indirect effect on A through E2. The relative weight of the effects hinges on the form
of the cognitive skills production function. In conclusion, variation in contemporaneous
productivity has an indeterminate effect on education and on children’s cognitive skills.
It depends on the relative size of the substitution effects and the income effects, that are
likely to vary with access to markets.
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3.2.2 The effect of shocks which occur in early life
An increase in the labor productivity w1 has a clear positive effect on the available income
in t1:
∂C1(w1,∆, I1(w1,∆))
∂w1
= (1−∆)L1a
Thus, the saving should increase the available income in t2 and encourage parents to send
their children to school:
∂E2(w2, γ,∆, I2(w1, w2, γ,∆))
∂w1
= ∂E2(w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂I2
∂I2(w1, w2, γ,∆)
∂w1
= ∂E2
∂I2
∆L1a (3.20)
Based on this last expression and the functional form of A, I express the effect of early-life
shocks on cognitive skills as follows:
∂A(w1, w2, γ,∆, I2(w1, w2, γ,∆))
∂w1
= ∂A(w1, w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂C1
∂C1(w1,∆, I1(w1,∆))
∂w1
+
∂A(w1, w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂E2
∂E2(w2, γ,∆, I2(w1, w2, γ,∆))
∂w1
= ∂A(w1, w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂C1
(L1a(1−∆)) + ∂A(w1, w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂E2
∂E2(w2, γ,∆, I2)
∂I2
∆L1a
(3.21)
I deduce from this equation that early-life shocks support the educational achievement
through two channels. The first channel stems from the nutrition-learning nexus: when
labor productivity increases in early-life, children benefit from a better nutrition, which
eases the development of cognitive skills in the long run. The second channel stems from
the fact that positive productivity shocks increase the available income for education
through larger transfers.
Thus, in early-life, the effect of positive productivity shocks on education outcomes is
clear and is not counter-balanced by any substitution effect.
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3.2.3 Heterogeneity of the effect of shocks
In this sub-section, I point out potential sources of heterogeneity that can be empirically
tested.
3.2.3.1 By access to markets
To analyze the impacts of shocks, the first dimension to account for is the access to formal
insurance markets (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997b). When insurance markets are perfect,
households are able to perfectly smooth their consumption over time. Thus, shocks do
not affect resources for education and no income effect arises from them. In contrast,
a substitution effect may still stem from productivity shocks when labor markets are
imperfect. Credit and savings market also allow households to smooth their consumption,
but the life-cycle income still declines. Credit markets should protect education against
negative productivity shocks which reduce the available income, while labor markets
protect education should protect against positive productivity shocks which increase the
labor productivity and the opportunity cost of education. In most developing countries,
including Tanzania (?), access to labor and credit markets remains limited and households
are not able to fully protect themselves against productivity shocks.
3.2.3.2 By households characteristics
Household income can also explain variations in the effect of productivity shocks, but
the effect is ambiguous. On one hand, the substitution effect should be larger for poor
households,10 but on the other hand, the income effect is larger for rich households who
own more lands and assets. Thus, it is not clear whether rich households react more
strongly to productivity shocks than poor households.
To analyze the effect of shocks in t2 on education, I focus on children aged 7 to 16
years old. To go one step further and check whether children react differently by age,
10If the utility is a strictly positive concave function of C1 and C2, poor households have a higher
marginal utility of consumption and have larger incentive to drop their children out of school when
education becomes more expensive.
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I split school-aged children in two sub-groups, primary-aged children, and secondary-
aged children. To determine whether there is heterogeneity in the effects between these
groups, it is necessary to highlight their differences. Firstly, older children should be more
productive and have a larger work capacity. If so, the substitution effect will be larger
for the older age-group. Second, primary school is free, while tuition fees are charged
in secondary schools.11 According to UNESCO (2013), secondary education fees were
between 30,000 and 40,000 TSH in 2009, which amounts to half of the average Tanzanian
monthly wage. This indicates that households sending their children to secondary schools
are likely to be richer. Finally, contrary to primary education, secondary education
is not mandatory. Therefore, parents keeping their children in secondary schools may
have stronger preferences for education and be less reactive to productivity shocks. In
conclusion, it is not clear whether the substitution effect will be larger for the older cohort
but this discrepancy can be empirically tested.
3.2.3.3 By shock characteristics
Turning to the effect of shocks, I also investigate whether the effect of shocks depends
on their frequency and their length. To test this assumption, I examine the effect of the
recurrence and the length of shocks that occur since the beginning of children’s schooling.
Indeed, if cognitive skills are the result of a cumulative learning process, they should not
strictly depend on current shocks, but also on past shocks.
3.3 Data
I bring together geo-referenced data from different sources to analyze the relationship
between income shocks and education. In this section, I present the data sources and
describe the construction of the main variables.
11The secondary fees were later removed in November 2015 with the implementation of the Education
and Training Policy.
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3.3.1 Education and child labor data
I exploit two sources of data to measure education outcomes and child labor. The first
dataset is the Tanzanian LSMS-ISA (LSMS-Integrated Surveys on Agriculture) panel
data, which consist of three rounds (2008-2009, 2010-2011 and 2012-2013). The survey
was designed to be nationally representative and covers the entire country. The precise
location of households is given by GPS coordinates. Due to the high split-off and the
low attrition rate, 3,265 households were interviewed in 2008, 3924 in 2010 and 5,015
in 2012. These data are relevant for this analysis because they gather information on
children’s activities at the individual level. To examine the effect of productivity shocks
on child labor, I look at two variables: whether children have ever worked in the 12 months
preceeding the survey and the number of days of labor performaed in the fields over this
period. To understand time allocation decisions, I also consider the number of hours by
activity over the last week. Figure A3.1 shows that children mostly work in agriculture
and that labor intensity increases with age. Girls work slightly less in agriculture but this
is largely compensated by their higher involvement in domestic activities.
The LSMS datasets also provide appropriate information on current education
decisions (enrollment and dropping out) and on education outcomes resulting from
successive education decisions (grade achievement, whether the child is overage, whether
the child has ever been enrolled). Figures A3.2 displays enrollment rate by age. It reaches
a maximum at age 11 and decreases afterward. In order to capture education outputs, I
also look at the ability of children to read and write. However, this subjective variable
is reported by the household head and has to be interpreted with caution. Table A3.1
presents more descriptive statistics on education and child labor from 2008 to 2012.
To better understand the relationship between productivity shocks and cognitive skills,
I rely on the Uwezo dataset. The survey is a repeated cross section from 2010 to 2014
and is representative at the district level.12
12I do not include the first round in the analysis because it was a pilot program which covered less
than one third of the Tanzanian districts.
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The Uwezo program launched by the Twaweza organization seeks to collect test scores
for children aged 7 to 16. By including about 100,000 children from more than 50,000
households spread over 4000 villages at each round, these data constitute a national
assessment of learning. They have the strong advantage of providing test scores not only
for enrolled children but also for children that have never been to school or have dropped
out of school. This is not the case for most of the existing data on learning outcomes,
which are available only for enrolled children. The questionnaire gathers basic information
on children, households and tests scores (Table A3.2 presents some descriptive statistics).
These tests scores are constructed following the Pratham model13 and are divided into
two modules, the literacy test and the numeracy test.14 All children take the same tests
that assess competencies of Standard 2 (Grade 2), a level by which children should have
acquired basic reading and numeracy skills. Figure A3.4 shows that, in practice, very few
children of standard 2 age validate these skills, instead most children learn them when
they grow older. For each test, several competencies of gradual difficulties are assessed and
the computed score corresponds to the highest validated competency. The competencies
in literacy are 1) letter recognition, 2) word recognition, 3) ability to read a sentence,
4) ability to read a paragraph and 5) text comprehension, while the competencies tested
in numeracy are 1) counting, 2) number recognition, 3) ability to rank two numbers, 4)
addition, 5) subtraction and 6) multiplication. At each round, these scores are missing
for about 2% of children. Since the percentage of missing scores remains negligible, I drop
these observations.15 Thereafter, I standardize the tests16 and use them as a proxy for
cognitive skills. Figure A3.5 depicts inequalities of test scores across districts in Tanzania
in 2011.
13The Pratham model, developed by an Indian NGO, establishes a methodology to evaluate learning
outcomes of young children.
14Swahili is the official language at school. However, to be able to compare the literacy test across
countries where the survey was conducted (Uganda and Kenya), children also take an English test.
15I may encounter a selection bias if missing scores are not random. To address this issue, I impute a
score and I find that results are not sensitive to the inclusion of children with imputed test scores. Results
are available upon request.
16I compute the deviation from the mean at each wave.
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3.3.2 Climate data
Tanzania is an agriculture-based country where 80 % of the population lives in rural
areas and where agriculture consitutes to half of the GDP. This dependency makes
Tanzania vulnerable to many production shocks. Among these shocks, climate shocks
constitute one of the main risks that farmers face. The Center for Global Development
classifies countries according to their climate change vulnerability, and ranks Tanzania
at the 20th most vulnerable in the world out of 55 countries (Wheeler, 2011). The
low diffusion of irrigation systems (FAO, 2009) makes households even more sensitive
to weather variations over time. Basalirwa et al. (1999) delineated 15 homogenous groups
in Tanzania based on climatic conditions and topographic features. With this high number
of agro-ecological areas, the magnitude and type of climate shocks are also expected to
vary across geographical areas.
To investigate the impact of climate shocks, I complement the dataset with monthly
data from the Standardized Precipitation Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI), gridded by
longitude and latitude lines with a degree of precision of 0.5.17 In the literature, most
authors focus on the Standardized Precipitation index (SPI) (Rosenzweig and Udry, 2014;
Jensen, 2000). This indicator, based only on precipitation data, assumes that droughts are
particularly sensitive to temporal precipitation variations and that other climate variables
are stationary. As a consequence, the SPI neglects the effects of global warming on
production even though temperature has severe consequences on the drought intensity.
As Vicente-Serrano et al. (2012) underlined, it implies that rainfall data are not necessarily
suitable to predict crop yield. Indeed, the growing cycle of a plant does not depend only
on the rainfall quantity but, most importantly, on the evapotranspiration of water.18 This
evapotranspiration varies with the temperature and explains why the same quantity of
rainfall can have a different impact on the severity of droughts.
Crop seasons and climatic shocks
17These data have been developed by Vicente-Serrano et al. (2010).
18The evapotranspiration occurs through two mechanisms : the evaporation of water from the soil and
the transpiration of crops.
140
I compute climate indicators for the time period that matters the most for the plants’
growing cycle (Harari and La Ferrara, 2014). According to Kubik and Maurel (2016),
weather conditions from March to May constitute the most relevant period at explaining
Tanzanian crop production.19 An alternative is to use the average value of SPEI from
January to June.20 To capture different types of droughts, I construct several SPEI
variables from March to May: 6-month SPEI6mm and 12-month SPEI12mm (see appendix
3.7 for more details). As a robustness check, I also exploit the traditional rainfall data
from NOAA.21 To examine the non-linearity of climatic conditions, I also define positive
and negative climate shocks. I consider that there is a drought when the SPEI is lower
than 0.5 standard deviations, and that there is a positive rainfall shock when the SPEI is
larger than 0.5 standard deviations.22 This construction implies that positive values of the
SPEI stand for better productivity conditions.23 This hypothesis is empirically confirmed
(see Table 3.7).
3.3.3 Price data
Incomes from agricultural activities should also be responsive to international price
variations. From the Arusha Declaration in 1967 to 1980, prices were centrally controlled
by the government (Msambichaka et al., 1983). But from 1980 onwards, the market
was liberalized and deregulated (Msambichaka L and O, 2006). The objective of this
policy was to ensure a competitive, efficient and equitable market. Today, this food
market deregulation implies that international price volatilities influence prices at which
farmers sell their commodities on the local market. Notwithstanding, most crops are
19This period, called “Masika”, corresponds to the long rainy season in bimodal areas and to the rainy
months in unimodal areas.
20Results are very similar and are available upon request.
21http://iridl.ldeo.columbia.edu/SOURCES/.NOAA/.NCEP/.CPC/.FEWS/.Africa/.DAILY/
.ARC2/.daily/.est_prcp/datafiles.html
22By taking these thresholds, about 20 % of the LSMS and Uwezo household samples are affected by
droughts and about 20 % are affected by positive rainfall shocks.
23Since the SPEI is standardized with respect to local historical trends, positive values do not mean
that there is an excess of water but only that rainfalls are larger than the historical trends.
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still exclusively produced for self-consumption.24 Consequently, the transmission channel
between international prices and producers should exist only for producers of cash-crop
commodities. Thus, I consider only price variations of the main cash-crops produced in
Tanzania (cotton, coffee, coconut, tobacco, tea, sugar and palm-oil). Since Tanzania holds
a small share of the market for these crops, international prices should be exogenous and
independent of the Tanzania’s production.
To measure volatility in international prices, I exploit the data from the World Bank
Commodities Price Data and I use annual prices expressed in 2010 US $ per kg.25 Graph
A3.8a pictures standardized price variations from 1980 to 2014. Prices of cash-crops have
parallel trends and follow a U-shaped trend. To remove long-run changes in prices, I
adopt the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. This filter allows one to separate the price pc,y of
commodity c at time y into two components, the trend component Tc,t, and the cyclical
component. Graph A3.8b depicts the cyclical components of cash-crop commodities. To
obtain an aggregate price index, the FAO computes a weighted value of food prices. In
order to come up with a price index which is representative of the Tanzanian market, I
adopt the same strategy and construct a price index Pjy based on the main Tanzanian
cash-crop commodities. Since geographical areas do not produce the same commodities
and are not similarly affected by price variations (Dube and Vargas, 2013; Imbert et al.,
2016), I weight price variations by the hectares of land allocated to cash-crop c in location
j in 2000 Sc,j,2000:
Pj,y =
n∑
c=1
(pc,y − Tc,y)
Tc,y
∗ Sc,j,2000
(pc,t−Tc,t)
Tc,t
is the deviation from the trend in percentage. The agricultural intensity, Sc,j,2000,
is computed from the geo-coded EarthStat data that combine satellite land cover data
and agricultural census. These data provide the size of lands allocated to each crop with
a 10km by 10 km resolution.26 As a result, the price index varies over time and across
24For instance, 95 % of Sorghum and Millet are consumed by producers and trade is often limited to
local exchanges (Rohrbach and Kiriwaggulu, 2007).
25The FAO provides the real prices of food and the IMF has indices of nominal prices, but they only
go back to 1990.
262000 is the most recent year for which these data are available with this level of precision.
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locations.27 To test the non-linearity in prices, I define negative and positive price shocks
by referring to the first and the last quintiles, respectively.
3.4 Estimation strategy and results
In this section, I present the estimation strategies that identify the impact of productivity
shocks on education outcomes. I deduce from these reduced forms whether the
substitution effect or the income effect empirically prevails.
3.4.1 Effect of current productivity shocks
The effect of current shocks on education outcomes can be estimated with the following
specification:
Eijty = β0 + β1Pj,y−1 + β2SPEIj,y−1 + γXijy + δj + µt + νy + ijty (3.22)
where i denotes the child of age t living in location j during the survey year y.
Since households geo-coordinates are available only in the LSMS data, j designates the
geographical units (50km* 50km) where the household lives in the LSMS estimations,
while j designates the district of residence in the Uwezo estimations. The parameters δ, µ
and ν are location, age and year fixed-effects, respectively. The error term ijty is clustered
by location j, and Xijy is a set of household controls such as the number of adults and
children in the household, the number of boys among siblings, and age and education of
the household head. Eijty is a large set of education outcomes that measures education
decisions and educational achievement. I regress current education outcomes Eijty on the
lagged climate variable SPEIj,y−1 and on the lagged aggregated price index Pj,y−1.
By adding region and year fixed effects, this estimation strategy compares children
from the same location in different rounds of the survey. It captures the causal effect
27This index can be constructed at the household level. However, the area allocated to each crop may
be endogenous at the household level, while at a larger scale (community or district level) Sc,j,2000 is
representative of the geographical conditions suitable for different crop’s cultivations.
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of productivity shocks on education outcomes if several assumptions are satisfied. First,
SPEIj,y−1 and Pj,y−1 should change the labor productivity (see sub-section 3.4.4). Second,
the shocks should be purely exogenous (see sub-section 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 for further
discussion) and finally, they should not be correlated with unobserved variables that
would explain education outcomes. This question will be addressed later in section 3.5.
To estimate the effect of productivity variations on children’s education and activities
(whether the child works, whether the child is enrolled in school, whether the child has
dropped out of school and what is the highest grade achieved), I use the LSMS data and I
restrict the sample to school aged children. In Table A3.17, I observe that continuous price
and climate variables have no significant impact on either education or work decisions.
Table 3.1: Effect of positive shocks on children’s activities
Work Enrolled Dropout Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Positive Price Shockt−1 0.058* -0.035** 0.004 -0.063
(0.033) (0.017) (0.011) (0.082)
Positive Rainfall Shockt−1 0.084** 0.001 0.014* -0.124***
(0.033) (0.014) (0.008) (0.045)
Negative Price Shockt−1 -0.013 -0.004 -0.006 0.006
(0.025) (0.014) (0.009) (0.074)
Negative Rainfall Shockt−1 0.006 0.009 -0.004 -0.034
(0.028) (0.017) (0.008) (0.045)
R-squared 0.167 0.154 0.084 0.297
Observations 12,677 11,625 11,230 10,588
Localities F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Note: Standard errors, clustered
by geographical units (0.5°×0.5° of precision), are reported in parentheses.
Controls are survey month dummies, the number of adults and the number
of children in the household, age dummies, the gender and the birth order of
the child, the number of boys among siblings, the age and the education of the
household head. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly
different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Moving to the non-linearity of productivity shocks, I observe that positive rainfall
shocks increase the probability of working, increase the probability of droping out of
school, and lowers the grade achievement by 0.11 years (see Table 3.1). Although
all coefficients are not significant, these results go in the same direction and suggest
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that contemporaneous productivity shocks have a counter-cyclical impact on education
decisions (∂E(w2,γ,∆,I2(w1,w2γ,∆))
∂w2
< 0). In contrast, negative productivity shocks have no
significant impact on education decisions. According to the model’s predictions, these
results indicate that the substitution effect dominates the income effect and that children
are encouraged to work more and to decrease their demand for education when they
become more productive.
Based on the theoretical framework, these effects are also expected to vary with
households’ wealth. To explore this heterogeneity, I compute the household consumption
following the guideline of Deaton and Zaidi (2002).28 Table A3.9 shows that results are
very similar for rich and poor households. Most coefficients are not signficantly different,
and suggest that positive productivity shocks are detrimental to education decisions at
all wealth levels.
I can also examine whether the effects are heterogeneous across children’s age and
across gender. Table A3.10 shows that the effects of positive shocks on labor and education
decisions are very close for boys and girls and are not statistically different. To consider
heterogeneity by age, I define the 7-13 years old group as children of primary education age
and the 14-16 years old group as children of lower secondary age. As pointed out in section
3.2, it is unclear whether the effects of productivity shocks will be more pronounced for the
younger cohort or the older cohort. I see from Table A3.11, that older children are more
likely to work and less likely to pursue their education, meaning that the the counter-
cyclical relationship between productivity shocks and education decisions is strengthened
when children get older. This result is consistent since the substitution effect should be
larger when children become more productive.
Thus, the LSMS results suggest that positive productivity shocks increase child labor
and are unfavorable to education achievement. If these shocks provoke erratic attendance,
they should also decrease children’s cognitive skills. To test this hypothesis, I use the
28This consumption variable is composed of four sub-aggregates, food items, non-food items, housing
consumption and consumer durables. In order to create a consumption variable independent from current
shocks, I exclude all current consumption items such as food consumption and current non-food items
that could have been affected by productivity shocks.
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Uwezo data and I regress test scores on price and climate shocks.
Table 3.2: Effect of Contemporaneous Shocks on Test Scores
Swahili Maths Swahili Maths
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Positive Price Shockt−1 -0.007 -0.012 -0.015 -0.020
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020)
Positive Rainfall Shockt−1 -0.029* -0.036* -0.023 -0.032
(0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.022)
Negative Price Shockt−1 -0.022 0.019 -0.020 0.010
(0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.021)
Droughtt−1 -0.001 0.003 0.006 0.010
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015)
R-squared 0.321 0.293 0.321 0.287
Observations 328,948 328,948 286,250 286,250
District F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Attend school × ×
Sources: Uwezo data from 2011 to 2014. Note: Standard errors are clustered at
the district level and are reported in parentheses. Controls are years dummies,
the number of adults and the number of children in the household, age dummies,
the gender and the birth order of the child
”
the age and the education of the
household head. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly
different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table 3.2 presents the results and shows that only positive rainfall shocks decrease
Swahili and maths scores, and they do so by 0.03 standard deviations. These effects are
no longer significant when I restrict the sample to enrolled children, probably because
children who stay at school during positive shocks are positively selected.
In conclusion, households take advantage of a labor productivity increase by calling
on child labor. This decision interacts with education enrollment and achievement but
has very little effect on schooling performance.
3.4.2 Effect of the length and frequency of school-aged
To study whether positive productivity shocks are more detrimental to education when
they become more frequent and when their length extends, I compute for each child the
length of shocks (the maximum number of consecutive shocks) and the total number of
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positive productivity shocks from the beginning of primary education (at 7 years old) to
the year of the survey:
Eijty = β0 + β1
y∑
i=7
Rj,i + β2
y∑
i=7
PPj,y + γXijy + δj + µt + νy + ijty (3.23)
∑y
i=7Rj,i and
∑y
i=7 PPj,y depict the number (or length) of positive rainfall shocks and the
number (or length) of positive price shocks from age 7 to the year of the survey. The
specification is similar than equation (3.22) except that I am interested in the repetition
of shocks. Since negative current shocks have no impact of education outcomes, I focus
the following analysis on positive shocks.29 Then, I consider education outcomes that
explain current decisions as well as prior decisions (whether the child is overage, whether
the child can read and write and the grade achievement).
Table 3.3: Effect of shocks during schooling on education decisions.
Work Overage Grade Read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number Positive Price Shocks 0.015 0.016* -0.037 -0.025**
(0.016) (0.009) (0.037) (0.012)
Number Positive Rainfall Shocks 0.045*** 0.019 -0.057 0.014
(0.012) (0.012) (0.042) (0.013)
R-squared 0.166 0.247 0.694 0.230
Length Positive Price Shocks 0.023 0.019* -0.059 -0.019*
(0.019) (0.011) (0.045) (0.011)
Length Positive Rainfall Shocks 0.056*** 0.000 -0.002 -0.020
(0.015) (0.015) (0.049) (0.017)
R-squared 0.166 0.247 0.694 0.230
Observations 10,322 8,717 8,717 6,748
Localities F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Note: Standard errors, clustered by
geographical units (0.5*0.5° of precision), are reported in parentheses. Controls are survey
month dummies, the number of adults and the number of children in the household, age
dummies, the gender and the birth order of the child, the number of boys in the sibling, the
age and the education of the household head. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients
are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table 3.3 reports the main results and suggests that an increase of the number or
29The effect of cumulative negative shocks has been tested and no significant effect has been found.
Results are available upon request.
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length of positive rainfall shocks raises the probability of working by 5%. In addition,
the length and the number of positive price shocks increase the probability of being
overage and reduce the probability of being able to read and write. Taken together,
these estimates support the hypothesis that positive productivity shocks are prejucial to
education achievement.
To go further in the analysis, I look at the effect of shocks by household consumption
and I notice that as current shocks, the frequency of shocks affects child labor and
education decisions of both poor and rich households. However, the grade progression
is slowed down for poor households only (see Table A3.12). Moving to the heterogeneity
across age, I compare the effect of the number of shocks that occurred in primary
and in secondary education.30 Results presented in Table A3.13 show that positive
productivity shocks increase the probability to work and reduce educational achievement
of both age cohorts.31 In contrast, the comparison of the effect by gender suggests
that positive productivity shocks are detrimental for education of boys only (see Table
A3.14). Although households may have preferences for boys’ education rather than girls’
education, boys are more likely to drop out of school if they are more productive (Andre
et al., 2017).32
To better understand the effect of shocks on cognitive skills, I turn to the effect on test
scores. Results presented in Table 3.4 give evidence that positive climatic and price shocks
during school age reduce cognitive skills in maths and Swahili. The total number of shocks
and the maximum number of consecutive shocks have the same effects. This test scores
decline does not seem to be driven by a change in enrollment because the effects remain
significant for children enrolled in school (columns 3 to 4). Thus, the results advocate
that educational achievement is probably reduced due to lower time investment in school
30To construct the number of shocks during the two schooling cycles, I sum the number of shocks from
the beginning of each cycle (7 year old for primary education and 14 year old for secondary education).
31One additional positive productivity shock decreases the probability that young children read and
write and decreases the grade achievement of the older cohort. It is worth underlying that most children
aged 14 to 16 can read and write which may explain why the effect on the probability of being able to
read becomes insignificant for the older cohort.
32If they are more productive, the substitution effect will be larger.
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or in doing homework.33 This emphasizes the need for data that gather test scores and
detailed information on children’s time allocation.
Table 3.4: Effect of Shocks during schooling on Test Scores
Swahili Maths Swahili Maths
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number Positive Price Shocks -0.026*** -0.032*** -0.027*** -0.030***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Number Positive Rainfall Shocks -0.027*** -0.019 -0.031*** -0.019
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
R-squared 0.323 0.295 0.322 0.289
Lenght Pos. Price Shocks -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.024*** -0.025***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Lenght Pos. Rainfall Shocks -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.040*** -0.034***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
R-squared 0.323 0.295 0.322 0.289
Observations 328,948 328,948 294,521 294,521
District F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Attend School × ×
Sources: Uwezo data from 2011 to 2014. Note: Standard errors are clustered at
the district level and are reported in parentheses. Controls are years dummies, the
number of adults and the number of children in the household, age dummies, the
gender and the birth order of the child, the age and the education of the household
head. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from
0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Whether I consider heterogeneity across age groups or gender, I find that positive
shocks decrease test scores of each group and that the coefficients are not statistically
different between groups. To insure that differences between the younger and the older
cohorts are not explained by the construction of the test scores,34 I standardize the tests
with respect to age. Table A3.21 discredits this hypothesis by showing that, even with
age-standardization, productivity shocks affect the test scores of both age groups.
Three main conclusions can be drawn from this sub-section. First, the number of
schocks which occur during schooling clearly increase child labor. Although they affect
education decisions in a small extent, they have a substantial adverse effect on schooling
performance (∂A(w1,w2,γ,∆,I2(w1,w2,γ,∆))
∂w2
< 0).
33This last channel cannot be tested since the time spent at school is not available in the datasets.
34Test scores evaluate skills of the Standard 2 level, the second year of school.
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3.4.3 Effect of early shocks
In order to shed light on early life shocks’ consequences, I estimate the following equation:
Eijty = β0+β1SPEIj,utero+...+β7SPEIj,age6+β8Pj,utero+...+β14Pj,age6+γXijt+δj+µt+νy+ijty
(3.24)
I look at the effect of price and climate variations from in utero until 6 years old to identify
the critical period in early life. In this purpose, I check whether early life shocks have
long-lasting consequences on education of children that are currently of school age.35
As the conceptual framework asserts, shocks in early childhood affect education
through two possible channels. The first channel is the nutrition-learning nexus, which
suggests that positive productivity shocks are likely to improve children’s nutrition in early
life, stimulate children’s growth, and have long-lasting impact on children’s cognitive skills.
Second, a better labor productivity allows parents to transfer larger savings in absolute
value, which can be used to protect education against current income shocks.
To investigate the channel between productivity shocks and children’s health, I
construct a z-score of height for age based on the 2006 WHO child growth standards
(Leroy, 2011). This index measures the prevalence of stunting among children from 0 to
5. Table A3.8 shows that, consistently with the model’s expectations, children appear
in better health when the labor productivity is improved: at birth, an increase of the
climate variable by one standard deviation raises the Z-score of height for age by 0.4
point. Similarly, at one year old, an increase of the climate and the price variable by one
standard deviation raises the Z-score by 0.2 and 0.05, respectively. When children are
older than 2 year old, these effects become insignificant.
Turning to the effect of early-life shocks on education decisions, it is worthwhile
highlighting that early productivity shocks change the attractiveness of location and can
generate selective migration. If the household characteristics that drive migration also
35Since test scores of children aged 0 to 6 are not available, short-run effects of early life shocks cannot
be estimated. This being so, long-run effects constitute a lower bound of short-run effects if early-life
effects fade over time.
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influence education decisions, estimations will be biased. To test whether self-migration
significantly biases the results, I compare results of equation (3.24) by including and
excluding migrant households.36 Table 3.5 presents the main results and shows that labor
productivity variation in early ages have little effect on current education status (have ever
been enrolled, being overage, grade achievement). Yet, children who experienced larger
rainfalls in utero to age one benefit from a higher education progression,37 and prices at
6 years old raises the grade achievement by 0.5 year.
36Migration information are available in the LSMS data only.
37Larger rainfalls in utero have a positive impact on the grade achievement, while they decrease the
probability of being overage. In the same vein, larger rainfalls at birth increase the probability of being
ever enrolled in school.
151
Table 3.5: Effect of Early Life Shocks on children’s activities(beta
coefficients)
Ever edu Grade Overage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SPEI-6 March-Mayage vitro -0.000 -0.003 0.044* 0.063 -0.013* -0.020**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.023) (0.029) (0.007) (0.008)
SPEI-6 March-Mayage birth 0.009** 0.007 0.027 0.020 -0.007 -0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.024) (0.029) (0.007) (0.008)
SPEI-6 March-Mayage 1 0.006 0.008 0.050* 0.062* -0.008 -0.014
(0.006) (0.007) (0.026) (0.037) (0.007) (0.010)
SPEI-6 March-Mayage 2 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.000
(0.006) (0.008) (0.033) (0.042) (0.008) (0.010)
SPEI-6 March-Mayage 3 -0.004 0.000 0.020 0.027 -0.012 -0.015
(0.006) (0.007) (0.036) (0.049) (0.009) (0.012)
SPEI-6 March-Mayage 4 -0.005 -0.004 0.018 -0.003 0.012 0.017
(0.006) (0.007) (0.040) (0.040) (0.010) (0.011)
SPEI-6 March-Mayage 5 0.001 0.003 -0.020 0.000 -0.010 -0.017
(0.006) (0.006) (0.041) (0.047) (0.010) (0.011)
SPEI-6 March-Mayage 6 -0.002 -0.004 -0.032 -0.024 0.004 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.029) (0.034) (0.010) (0.011)
Pj,age vitro 0.012 -0.005 -0.079 -0.144 0.047 0.079
(0.026) (0.027) (0.193) (0.216) (0.051) (0.060)
Pj,age birth -0.016 -0.003 0.203 0.248 -0.057 -0.085
(0.024) (0.026) (0.177) (0.201) (0.048) (0.057)
Pj,age 1 0.027 0.006 -0.266 -0.319 0.072 0.104
(0.030) (0.032) (0.208) (0.237) (0.060) (0.072)
Pj,age 2 -0.036 -0.001 0.333 0.429 -0.091 -0.133
(0.045) (0.049) (0.313) (0.360) (0.091) (0.106)
Pj,age 3 0.062 0.007 -0.482 -0.642 0.121 0.207
(0.082) (0.087) (0.566) (0.641) (0.159) (0.184)
Pj,age 4 -0.084 -0.027 0.603 0.738 -0.095 -0.186
(0.092) (0.097) (0.646) (0.728) (0.178) (0.204)
Pj,age 5 0.072 0.029 -0.720 -0.824 0.125 0.210
(0.082) (0.083) (0.580) (0.649) (0.156) (0.178)
Pj,age 6 -0.026 -0.018 0.473* 0.485 -0.055 -0.089
(0.037) (0.037) (0.272) (0.297) (0.070) (0.077)
R-squared 0.063 0.074 0.610 0.604 0.198 0.206
Observations 9,697 7,756 8,267 6,612 8,267 6,612
District F.E × × × × × ×
Year F.E × × × × × ×
With migrant HH × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Note: Standard errors, clustered by geographical
units (0.5*0.5° of precision), are reported in parentheses. Controls are survey month dummies, the
number of adults and the number of children in the household, age dummies, the gender and the birth
order of the child, the number of boys in the sibling, the age and the education of the household head.
***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5%
and 10%.
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I argue that the first effects are explained by nutrition-education nexus, while the
effect at 6 year old probably involves other mechanisms. Indeed, positive shocks at 6 year
old may either encourage parents to send their children to school earlier, or allow parents
to save more money in order to protect children’s education against future income shocks.
In addition, I observe that excluding migrant households do not plague the results, which
implies that the selection migration bias is negligible.
Consistently with these last results, Table 3.6 shows that early productivity shocks
from birth to four years old are pro-cyclical and have positive significant impacts on Swahili
and math scores (∂A(w1,w2,γ,∆,I2(w1,w2,γ,∆))
∂w1
> 0). An improvement in climate conditions by
one standard deviation increases test scores between 1.4% and 2.6%. In contrast, prices
have very little effect on test scores except at 4 and 6 years old. Surprisingly, I also find
that an increase in prices in utero has a significant negative effect.38
In conclusion, these results are consistent with the literature (Almond and Currie,
2011; Currie and Vogl, 2013) which finds that positive early life shocks have long-
lasting consequences on schooling performance. Following in Shah and Steinberg (2017)’s
footstep, I show that productivity shocks matter for cognitive skills, especially when they
occur before 4 year old.
38These results have no theoretical ground, but might be driven by a lack of accuracy on birth dates.
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Table 3.6: Effect of Early Life Shocks on Schooling Outcomes (beta
coefficients)
Swahili Math Swahili Math
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SPEI-6 March-Mayage in utero 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
SPEI-6 March-Mayage birth 0.006 0.014* 0.010 0.015**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
SPEI-6 March-Mayage 1 0.008 0.022** 0.011 0.023***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
SPEI-6 March-Mayage 2 0.014 0.024** 0.018* 0.026***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
SPEI-6 March-Mayage 3 0.012 0.026*** 0.013 0.026***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
SPEI-6 March-Mayage 4 0.006 0.020* 0.005 0.018*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
SPEI-6 March-Mayage 5 0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)
SPEI-6 March-Mayage 6 0.005 -0.002 0.007 0.000
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Pj,in utero -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.011**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Pj,birth 0.013 0.004 0.012 -0.001
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
Pj,age 1 0.000 0.006 -0.001 0.011
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Pj,age 2 0.010 0.010 0.015 0.004
(0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017)
Pj,age 3 -0.004 -0.014 -0.004 -0.004
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Pj,age 4 0.021 0.032* 0.022 0.025
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021)
Pj,age 5 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.005
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Pj,age 6 0.013* 0.011 0.011 0.010
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
R-squared 0.274 0.247 0.282 0.251
Observations 279,855 279,855 252,471 252,471
District F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Attend school × ×
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the ward level and are reported in parentheses.
***,**,* means respectively that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the level
of 1%, 5% and 10%.
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3.4.4 Mechanisms
To understand how households take their education decisions when they are exposed
to climate and price shocks, I study the underlying channels at play with the following
specification:
Yhjy = β0 + β1Pj,y + β2SPEIj,y + γXhjy + δj + νy + hjy (3.25)
Where the subscript h depicts the household, j the location, and y the year of the survey.
To test whether climate and price shocks translate into productivity shocks, I examine
the effect of shocks on two outcomes Yhjy, household production and household labor
decisions.
Table 3.7: Effects of productivity shocks on
the log of Household Production (beta
coefficients).
(1) (2) (3)
SPEI-6 months March-May 0.266*** 0.327***
(0.094) (0.099)
Pjy−1 0.114** 0.154***
(0.049) (0.049)
Pjy−1 ∗ cash− crop prod. 0.146 0.134
(0.434) (0.432)
R-squared 0.174 0.174 0.177
Observations 12,180 12,183 12,180
Localities and Times F.E × × ×
Households F.E × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Note: Production
and Consumption are computed in Tanzanian shillings (TZS).
Standard errors, clustered by geographical units (0.5*0.5° of
precision), are reported in parentheses. Controls are survey month
dummies, cultivated lands, the number of days of labor in the field
and the age of the household head. ***,**,* mean respectively that
the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%,
5% and 10%.
Table 3.7 presents the beta coefficients and shows that both climate and price variables
significantly raise the household production. When rainfalls increase by one standard
deviation, household production is raised by 33%, and when prices increase by one
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standard deviation, the value of the production is raised by 15 % for the non cash-crop
producers and by 28 % for the cash-crop producers.39 At first glance, it is surprising
to see non cash-crop producers affected by cash-crop prices, but this result is probably
explained by the high correlation between international prices. Indeed, figure A3.8b and
A3.9 show that subsistence and cash-crop price deviations have parallel trends : they are
negative from 2002 to 2011 and positive afterwhile. As a result, cash-crop price index
may confound the effect of cash-crop prices, and the effect of other agricultural prices.
To analyze the effect of climate and price shocks on production, it is necessary to
remind a substantial difference: climate shocks probably increase the quantity of harvested
crops, while prices raise the value of the production without necessarily changing the
quantity produced.40
Table 3.8: Effect of climate and aggregate price variables on days of labor in the field (beta
coefficients).
Hired labor Adult labor Child labor Hired labor Adult labor Child labor
SPEI-6 months March-May 6.414* 27.95*** 35.38*** 6.299* 28.00*** 35.09***
(3.607) (10.09) (10.44) (3.544) (9.960) (10.37)
Pjy−1 -0.551 2.388 7.503*
(0.843) (5.185) (4.204)
Pjy−1 ∗ cash− crop prod. 2.835 1.391 33.65
(5.269) (23.88) (21.89)
Pjy−1 S.R. -0.619 2.995 7.504*
(0.812) (5.349) (4.266)
Pjy−1S.R. ∗ S.R cash− crop prod. 0.924 -2.303 33.62
(5.085) (24.38) (22.21)
Within R-squared 0.091 0.099 0.100 0.090 0.098 0.100
Observations 3,365 7,394 5,256 3,365 7,394 5,256
Localities and Time F.E × × × × × ×
Household F.E × × × × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the household level, are reported in parentheses.
Controls are survey month dummies, cultivated lands, the number of adults and the number of children in the household and the age of the
household head. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
To take opportunity of a labor productivity increase, parents may be encouraged to
increase child labor. Table 3.8 presents the effect of price and climate variations on the
yearly household labor supply. I find that, when rainfalls and cash-crop prices are raised
39Table A3.3 compares the effects of the traditional SPI with the SPEI-6 months and SPEI-12 months.
I observe that all climatic variables have a positive impact on production but that the effect of the SPEI-6
months is larger. This is why, SPEI-6 months is the reference in this analysis.
40The quantity of harvested cash-crops increases only if households decide to allocate more labor.
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by one standard deviation, children perform 35 days and 7.5 days more, respectively.
Several reasons can explain why the price effect is five times lower than the climate effect.
First, Table 3.7 shows that prices have lower effect on production than rainfalls. Second,
households probably take more time to perceive and react to price variations than climate
variations. Finally, households who produce cash-crops with longer cycles (coffee, coconut,
tea, palm oil and sugar) are not able to change the size of cultivated lands in the short-
run and have little room to adapt their labor allocation.41 When I look at the effect of
price variations on subsistence crops (see Table A3.4), I find no effect on labor, which
is consistent. Indeed, when subsistence crops become more expensive, the value of the
households production increase but this does not translate in an opportunity loss since
products are self-consumed. To go one step further, I compare the effect of productivity
shocks by children’s age (see Table A3.5), but I find no significant difference. I also exploit
the LSMS data on the weekly allocation of labor and I find that consistently, rainfalls and
prices increase the time spent in agricultural activities (see Table A3.7).
Thus, these results lead to think that rainfall and cash-crop prices constitute
productivity shocks.
41In the LSMS data, this problem should be limited because only 0.26% of agricultural households
produce these goods in the sample. This explains why I find that the effect of cash crops and the effect
of short-run cash-crops are not statistically different.
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3.5 Discussion
In this analysis, climate and price shocks affect education decisions and schooling
performance by changing households resources and the opportunity cost of children’s
time. However, the causal impact is identified only if the shocks do not influence education
through other channels. In this section, I discuss potential sources of bias.
First, shocks should not influence the perceived returns to education which enter the
education decisions. This kind of general equilibrium effect may happen when the shocks
persist over time. Since this analysis focuses on shocks that persist only for relatively
short periods of time, it is very unlikely that the shock of interest, current and school-age
shocks, change the returns to education.
Another concern that has been discussed in section 3.4 is selective migration. If
households who move towards prosperous locations have on average higher skills, children
in districts which experienced positive productivity shocks are positively selected. In other
words, when estimating the effect of positive productivity shock, the migration selection
may induce an upward bias, which misleads the interpretations. To investigate whether it
is an empirical issue, I regress the probability that a child aged 7 to 16 migrates in another
district on lagged productivity shocks.42 Results presented in Table A3.22 suggest that
this selection bias is negligible and that productivity conditions do not significantly drive
children’s migration.
As Shah and Steinberg (2017) emphasize, mortality in early childhood also represents a
potential source of bias. Indeed, exposure to negative productivity shocks such as drought
may increase mortality in early life and change the composition of sampled children.
Surviving children, who are more resistant, are likely to be positively selected and to
better perform at school. Consequently, the results confound the direct effect of shocks
on education and the effect from selection mortality. To address this concern, I use the
LSMS data that provide the number of individuals, including infants, who died over the
past two years. Then, I test whether mortality in early childhood (between 0 and 3 years
42Internal migration concerns 6 % of children from this age group.
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old) depends on productivity shocks over the two last years. Table A3.22 reports no
significant effect suggesting that mortality does not bias the results.
Last, but not least, results are biased if productivity shocks affect the quality of
education. Heavy rains for instance, may make roads impassable, damage access to
school and increase teachers’ and children’s absenteeism. By changing the attractiveness
of agricultural activities, productivity shocks are expected to select teachers, but is unclear
whether positive productivity shocks especially attract skilled or unskilled teachers.
Although climate and price levels have no significant effect on the percentage of absent
teachers, an increase of the price index by one standard deviation decreases the percentage
of qualified teachers by 1 % (see Table A3.23). However, this effect is not robust when I
consider the non-linearity in climate and prices.
Finally, to check whether the construction of price and climate variables is efficient
at capturing productivity shocks, I test whether future shocks affect education decisions.
Although future continuous price and climate variables have no impact on education and
work decisions (see Table A3.19), three out out twelve coefficients become significant
when I examine the non-linearity in prices (see Table A3.20). For instance, negative and
positive price shocks significantly affect the enrollment decision. This anachronic result
has no theoretical ground, but can be explained by the nature of price shocks. As Figure
A3.9 and A3.8b depict, price variations last longer. Thus, adding prices of different periods
may lead to collinearity issues43
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the effect of labor productivity on the demand for education and on
schooling performance in Tanzania. To capture exogenous variations in labor productivity,
I use a combination of geo-coded data to identify variations in climate conditions and in
cash-crop prices over time and across location.
43The correlation between Pj,y−1 and Pjy+1 is 0,92 while the correlation between Rjy−1 and Rjy+1 is
0,05.
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The core of this analysis is to investigate the effect of productivity shocks on children’s
education by considering two particular aspects, the age at which shocks occur, and the
length of shocks.
The first findings support the idea that early life productivity shocks (from birth
to 4 years old) are favorable to the development of future cognitive skills. Based on
the theoretical model, this relationship is explained by two channels. Higher labor
productivity in early-life improves children’s nutrition and allows parents to save money
to finance education later in life. Since labor productivity has negligible effect on
education enrollment, I argue that this relationship between early-life shocks and schooling
performance is mainly explained by the nutrition-learning nexus assumption44 (Almond
and Currie, 2011; Currie and Vogl, 2013; De Vreyer et al., 2014).
In contrast, when children are of school age, the relationship between positive
productivity shocks and education becomes counter-cyclical. This result, close to Shah
and Steinberg (2017) findings, suggests that the substitution effect outweighs the income
effect. When children are of school age and can work, positive productivity shocks
increase the available income for education, but also increase the labor productivity which
encourage households to call on child labor.
Interestingly, households adopt different coping mechanisms depending on the length
of shocks. In response to current shocks, households increase child labor and put their
children out of school. Schooling performance which results from a cumulative process,
does not decrease yet. When shocks become recurrent, the conclusion is slightly different.
Households still increase child labor, but do not change their education decisions. Despite
this, schooling performance significantly drops. In other words, productivity shocks are
detrimental to schooling performance even when children stay enrolled in school. This
emphasizes that limiting the analysis to education enrollment is not satisfactory. To test
whether the results are due to erratic attendance, detailed data on children’s schedule are
needed.
44Children who were exposed to positive productivity shocks in early life benefit from a better nutrition,
which is necessary for the cognitive development.
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In terms of public policies, these results imply that it is necessary to alleviate tuition
fees, but also to account for the opportunity costs of children’s time. In this regard, it
would be interesting to test whether access to labor market allows households to cope with
positive shocks. This research question, which requires rich data on the labor market, is
left for future research.
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Appendix 3
3.7 Construction of the Standard Precipitation
Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI)
To account for several climatic parameters, the SPEI provides a simple drought measure
defined by the difference D between the original SPI and the Potential Evapotranspiration
(PET). The PET corresponds to the evapotranspiration that would occur if the surface
was sufficiently watered to be green and to have an active growth. Naturally, this PET
varies between locations and depends on climate conditions and on the nature of the soil.
This index is not observed and has to be modelled. The most wide-known computation
used in the SPEI data is the Penman-Monthei equation.45 Therefore, D represents the
monthly water surplus or water deficit.
Similarly to the SPI, the SPEI accounts for different time scales that determine the
nature of droughts. Short time scales represent soil water content and discharge in
headwaters, while medium time scales refer to storage of water sources and long-time scales
illustrate variations in groundwater. The various time scales are computed difference D
by aggregating various time periods. For instance, the 6-month SPEI index is measured
by adding the D values of the last 5 months before the current month.46
Then, to obtain comparable SPEI values in time and in space, the SPEI index is
standardized using the Log-Logistic distribution. By construction, the historical mean is
0 for each geographical cell and the SPEI index is expressed in units of standard deviation
45According to the FAO manual on crop evapotranspiration (?), the FAO-56 Penman-Monteith
equation estimates a reference evapotranspiration Et0 and is the most efficient method to approximate
the PET:
Et0 =
0.408(Rn −G) + γ 900T+273u2(es − ea)
∆ + γ(1 + 0.34u2)
Where Rn is the net radiation of the crop surface, G, the soil heat flux density, T the mean daily air
temperature at 2 m height, u2 is the wind speed at 2 m height, es is the saturation vapour pressure, ea
is the actual vapour pressure , ∆ is the slope vapour pressure curve and γ is the psychrometric constant.
46To give a decreasing weight of the data from the past, Vicente-Serrano et al. (2010) adopt a Gaussian
kernel function.
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from the historical average.
3.8 Descriptive statistics
Table A3.1: Descriptive statistics from the LSMS-ISA data
Year 2008 2010 2012
Composition of samples
Number of districts 126 128 131
Number of wards 87 103 108
Number of HH 3265 3921 5004
Number of children 4512 5239 6236
Household characteristics
Number of adults 3.208 3.425 3.511
Number of children 3.315 3.321 3.305
Household production (TSH) 246957.4 372482.4 708005.2
cultivated area (acres) 4.822 4.548 5.759
Children characteristics
Child’s age 11.407 11.370 11.335
Child is female 0.507 0.503 0.507
Child is enrolled in school 0.815 0.883 0.858
Number of completed grade 4.295 4.388 4.324
Child dropout school this year 0.043 0.050 0.061
Child has repeated a grade this year 0.123 0.117 0.129
Child reads and writes . 0.733 0.720
Child works last week 0.114 0.422 0.262
Child works last year 0.116 0.444 0.382
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Table A3.2: Descriptive statistics from the Tanzanian Uwezo survey.
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Composition of samples
Number of districts 42 131 124 129 45
Number of villages 1077 3825 3752 3844 1313
Number of HH 18098 57945 56106 52808 16013
Number of children 35540 110435 105352 104162 32694
Household and children characteristics
Size of households 7.156 7.284 7.016 6.672 7.040
Household is poor 0.815 0.816 0.781 0.775 0.593
Household is ultra poor 0.320 0.335 0.306 0.301 0.162
Number of children 5.474 2.797 2.761 3.197 3.523
Child’s age 11.354 11.187 11.167 11.162 11.062
Child is female 0.507 0.502 0.497 0.496 0.495
Child is enrolled in school 0.897 0.886 0.884 0.880 0.796
Number of completed grade 4.184 4.018 3.950 4.101 3.091
Child drops out school this year 0.053 0.056 0.061 0.066 0.037
Child never enrolled 0.050 0.059 0.056 0.054 0.167
Child attends government school 0.804 0.974 0.969 0.970 0.715
Children test scores
Child reads words 0.698 0.642 0.643 0.759 0.747
Child does basic maths 0.893 0.834 0.858 0.767 0.766
Child reads words and does basic maths 0.682 0.628 0.634 0.704 0.694
Chid passes math test 0.364 0.487 0.538 0.389 0.361
Chid passes language test 0.490 0.433 0.419 0.510 0.493
Chid passes math and language test 0.196 0.202 0.217 0.229 0.194
Child has an imputed score 0.028 0.039 0.027 0.167 0.146
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Figure A3.1: Children activities by age in rural areas.
(a) Girls (b) Boys
Sources: LSMS pooled data (2008, 2010, 2012).
Figure A3.2: Percentage of
enrolled children by age cohort.
Figure A3.3: Percentage of dropout
children by age cohort.
Sources: LSMS pooled data (2008, 2010, 2012).
165
Figure A3.4: Percentage of children who passed the exam by age
cohort.
(a) Unenrolled children (b) Enrolled children
Sources: Uwezo data (20011, 2012, 2013, 2014).
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Figure A3.5: Distribution of children who passed the tests
(a) Maths test, 9-13 years of
age.
(b) Swahili test, 9-13 years of
age.
(c) English test, 9-13 years of
age.
Sources: Uwezo 2011 data.
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Figure A3.6: Distribution of SPEI by district
(a) In 2008
(b) In 2010
(c) In 2012
Sources: SPEI data provided by Vicente-Serrano et al. (2010). Note: These three maps represent the
SPEI SPEIj,y capturing the water balance of the last 6 months. Negative values mean that climate
conditions are below the historical trend.
168
Figure A3.7: Percentage of land allocated to coffee plantation in
Tanzania.
(a) Cells of 10km*10km. (b) Average by district.
Sources: Earth Stat data (2000).
Figure A3.8: Standardized price deviations for the main cash-crop
commodities in Tanzania.
(a) Deviations from the mean. (b) Deviations from the HP trend.
Sources: World Bank Commodities Price Data.
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Figure A3.9: Standardized price deviations for the main subsistence
commodities in Tanzania (deviations from HP trend).
Sources: World Bank Commodities Price Data.
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3.9 Estimations of the mechanisms
3.9.1 Effect of shocks on production
Table A3.3: Effect of Climatic Shocks on Household
Production.
Climatic variable log(Production) log(Production)
Rainfall January-December 0.055 0.084
(0.087) (0.092)
Temperature -0.047*** 0.003
(0.007) (0.022)
Within R-squared 0.42 0.18
Rainfall March-May 0.171* 0.219**
(0.097) (0.110)
Temperature -0.047*** 0.002
(0.007) (0.022)
Within R-square 0.42 0.18
SPEI-6 months March-May 0.409*** 0.326***
(0.090) (0.099)
Within R-squared 0.404 0.177
SPEI-12 months March-May 0.383*** 0.260***
(0.084) (0.094)
Within R-squared 0.404 0.176
Localities and Times F.E × ×
Households F.E ×
Observations 12,181 12,181
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Note: Production and
Consumption are computed in Tanzanian shillings. Standard errors, clustered by
geographical units (0.5*0.5° of precision), are reported in parentheses. Controls
are survey month dummies, cultivated lands
”
the number of days of labor in the
field and the age of the household head. ***,**,* mean respectively that the
coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
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3.9.2 Effect of shocks on labor allocation decisions
Table A3.4: Effect of aggregate subsistence price
variable on days of labor in the field (beta
coefficients).
Hired labor Adult labor Child labor
Pjy−1 subsistence crops -51.72 121.9 -136.3
(48.40) (216.2) (86.82)
Within R-squared 0.061 0.083 0.026
Observations 6,540 6,282 4,387
Localities and Time F.E × × ×
Household F.E × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Notes: Standard errors, clustered
at the household level, are reported in parentheses. Controls are survey month
dummies, cultivated lands, the number of adults and the number of children in
the household and the age of the household head. ***,**,* mean respectively
that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and
10%.
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Table A3.5: Effects of productivity shocks on days of labor in the
fields by age groups (beta coefficients).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
7-13 14-16 7-13 14-16
SPEI-6 months March-May 25.09*** 27.38*** 24.84*** 27.39***
(7.948) (7.848) (7.891) (7.807)
Pjy−1 5.575* 8.839*
(2.979) (4.729)
Pjy−1 ∗ cash− crop producer 31.34 20.78**
(19.11) (9.961)
Pjy−1 S.R. 5.572* 8.860*
(3.016) (4.784)
Pjy−1 S.R. ∗ S.R. cash− crop producer 30.19 19.59**
(19.29) (8.982)
Within R-squared 0.104 0.125 0.104 0.126
Observations 4,678 2,758 4,678 2,758
Localities and Times F.E × × × ×
Households F.E × × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Notes: Standard errors, clustered by geographical
units (0.5*0.5° of precision), are reported in parentheses. Controls are survey month dummies,
cultivated lands, the number of days of labor in the field and the age of the household head. ***,**,*
mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and
10%.
Table A3.6: Effects of productivity shocks on the probability of
working the week prior the survey.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Work Paid Unpaid Agriculture Domestic
SPEI-6 months March-May 0.071*** 0.010*** -0.022** 0.022* 0.009
(0.018) (0.004) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
Pjy−1 0.006 0.004* 0.004 0.001 0.012**
(0.010) (0.002) (0.005) (0.012) (0.006)
Within R-squared 0.113 0.036 0.557 0.080 0.086
Observations 12,674 12,788 12,788 12,788 12,788
Times F.E × × × × ×
Households F.E × × × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Notes: standard errors, clustered by geographical units
(0.5*0.5° of precision), are reported in parentheses. Controls are survey month dummies, cultivated
lands, the number of days of labor in the field and the age of the household head. ***,**,* mean
respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Table A3.7: Effects of productivity shocks on the labor
intensity by activity (hours over last week).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Paid Unpaid Agriculture Domestic
SPEI-6 months March-May -0.970 -0.274 1.535* 0.278
(0.750) (0.473) (0.920) (0.455)
Pjy−1 0.513 0.101 0.515** 0.106
(0.358) (0.151) (0.207) (0.143)
Within R-squared 0.064 0.475 0.159 0.081
Observations 3,094 3,094 3,094 3,094
Times F.E × × × ×
Households F.E × × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Notes: standard errors, clustered by
geographical units (0.5*0.5° of precision), are reported in parentheses. Controls are
survey month dummies, cultivated lands, the number of days of labor in the field and
the age of the household head. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are
significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table A3.8: Effect of climate and price variations on Z-score of height
for age (beta coefficients).
Age 0 1 2 3 4 5
Pjy 0.004 0.046* -0.094 0.009 -0.039 0.039
(0.040) (0.026) (0.093) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034)
SPEI-6 months March-Mayy 0.387*** 0.178** -0.074 -0.077 0.053 0.098
(0.146) (0.082) (0.074) (0.070) (0.090) (0.083)
Within R-squared R-squared 0.086 0.032 0.062 0.030 0.089 0.048
Observations 1,294 1,304 1,406 1,304 1,360 1,278
Localities and Times F.E × × × × × ×
Households F.E × × × × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Notes: standard errors, clustered by geographical
units (0.5°×0.5° of precision), are reported in parentheses. Controls are survey month dummies, age
dummies and years of the survey. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly
different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
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3.10 Hetereogeneous effects
3.10.1 Current shocks
Table A3.9: Effect of positive and negative shocks on children’s
activities according to household consumption
Work Enrolled Dropout Grade
Below the median consumption
Positive Price Shocky−1 0.059* -0.056*** 0.017 -0.065
(0.033) (0.021) (0.013) (0.083)
Positive Rainfall Shocky−1 0.088** 0.003 0.012 -0.107**
(0.035) (0.014) (0.009) (0.054)
Negative Price Shocky−1 -0.008 -0.020 0.003 0.014
(0.027) (0.016) (0.010) (0.076)
Droughty−1 -0.009 0.026 -0.014 0.015
(0.027) (0.018) (0.008) (0.058)
Above the median consumption
Positive Price Shocky−1 0.059 -0.022 -0.005 -0.085
(0.039) (0.017) (0.014) (0.085)
Positive Rainfall Shocky−1 0.073* -0.004 0.019* -0.143*
(0.041) (0.018) (0.011) (0.073)
Negative Price Shocky−1 -0.027 0.029* -0.024* -0.038
(0.033) (0.017) (0.015) ) (0.084)
Droughty−1 0.030 -0.012 0.008 -0.073
(0.037) (0.017) (0.011) (0.066)
R-squared 0.17 0.16 0.0856 0.70
Observations 12,677 11,625 11,230 10,588
Localities F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Notes: standard errors, clustered
by geographical units (0.5°×0.5° of precision), are reported in parentheses.
Controls are survey month dummies, the number of adults and the number
of children in the household, age dummies, the gender and the birth order of
the child, the number of boys among siblings, the age and the education of the
household head. Coefficients are computed with the delta method. ***,**,*
mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the
level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Table A3.10: Effect of positive and negative shocks on children’s
activities by gender.
Work Enrolled Dropout Grade
Girls
Positive Price Shocky−1 0.058* -0.044** 0.005 -0.061
(0.035) (0.019) (0.012) (0.084)
Positive Rainfall Shocky−1 0.071** -0.003 0.013 -0.113**
(0.035) (0.016) (0.011) (0.054)
Negative Price Shocky−1 0.005 -0.022 0.001 -0.059
(0.028) (0.016) (0.011) (0.087)
Negative Rainfall Shocky−1 0.004 0.010 -0.008 -0.032
(0.032) (0.017) (0.009) (0.047)
Boys
Positive Price Shocky−1 0.059* -0.025 0.004 -0.062
(0.034) (0.019) (0.013) (0.095)
Positive Rainfall Shocky−1 0.097*** 0.005 0.016 -0.131**
(0.033) (0.017) (0.010) (0.062)
Negative Price Shocky−1 -0.033 0.015 -0.013 0.074
(0.025) (0.016) (0.011) (0.083) )
Negative Rainfall Shocky−1 0.009 0.009 -0.001 -0.028
(0.027) (0.020) (0.009) (0.059)
R-squared 0.17 0.09 0.315 0.67
Observations 12,677 11,625 11,230 10,588
Localities F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Notes: standard errors, clustered
by geographical units (0.5*0.5° of precision), are reported in parentheses. Controls
are survey month dummies, the number of adults and the number of children in
the household, age dummies, the gender and the birth order of the child, the
number of boys among siblings, the age and the education of the household head.
***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from 0
at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Table A3.11: Effect of positive and negative shocks on children’s
activities across age-group.
Work Enrolled Dropout Grade
7-13 age group
Positive Price Shockt−1 0.021 0.003 0.002 -0.089
(0.031) (0.017) (0.012) (0.086)
Positive Rainfall Shockt−1 0.073** 0.042*** 0.004 -0.086*
(0.033) (0.014) (0.008) (0.045)
Negative Price Shockt−1 -0.011 -0.002 -0.008 0.055
(0.027) (0.016) (0.011) (0.075)
Droughtt−1 0.005 0.008 -0.003 -0.002
(0.027) (0.015) (0.008) (0.048)
14-16 age group
Positive Price Shockt−1 0.154*** -0.127*** 0.011 0.017
(0.043) (0.034) (0.024) (0.119)
Positive Rainfall Shockt−1 0.113*** -0.096*** 0.039** -0.214*
(0.037) (0.027) (0.019) (0.110)
Negative Price Shockt−1 -0.020 -0.010 -0.001 -0.113
(0.030) (0.026) (0.021) (0.119)
Droughtt−1 0.007 0.010 -0.007 -0.111
(0.035) (0.030) (0.021) (0.091)
R-squared 0.171 0.162 0.0852 0.694
Observations 12,677 11,625 11,230 10,588
Localities F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Notes: Read and Write variable
is only available for 2010 and 2012. Standard errors, clustered by geographical
units (0.5°×0.5° of precision), are reported in parentheses. Controls are survey
month dummies, the number of adults and the number of children in the
household, age dummies, the birth order of the child, the number of boys
among siblings, the age and the education of the household head. Coefficients
are computed with the delta method. ***,**,* mean respectively that the
coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
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3.10.2 Cumulative shocks
Table A3.12: Effect of the number of shocks according to household
consumption.
Work Overage Grade Read and write
Below the median consumption
Number Positive Price Shocks 0.013 0.007 -0.046 -0.029*
(0.019) (0.012) (0.053) (0.016)
Number Positive Rainfall Shocks 0.052*** 0.041*** -0.134*** 0.019
(0.013) (0.013) (0.047) (0.014)
Above the median consumption
Number Positive Price Shocks 0.019 0.031** -0.056 -0.022*
(0.020) (0.014) (0.050) (0.012)
Number Positive Rainfall Shockst 0.030** -0.020 0.074 0.002
(0.014) (0.013) (0.047) (0.014)
R-squared 0.167 0.259 0.700 0.236
Observations 12,677 10,588 10,588 9,100
Localities F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Notes: Read and Write variable is only available
for 2010 and 2012. Standard errors, clustered by geographical units (0.5°×0.5° of precision), are
reported in parentheses. Controls are survey month dummies, the number of adults and the
number of children in the household, age dummies, the birth order of the child, the number of
boys among siblings, the age and the education of the household head. Coefficients are computed
with the delta method. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different
from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Table A3.13: Effect of the number of shocks across age-groups.
Work Overage Grade Read and write
7-13 years old
Number Positive Price Shocks 0.000 -0.004 -0.035 -0.030**
(0.018) (0.005) (0.042) (0.014)
Number Positive Rainfall Shocks 0.051*** -0.005 -0.008 -0.001
(0.014) (0.004) (0.035) (0.013)
14-16 years old
Number Positive Price Shocks 0.041** -0.006 -0.045 -0.015
(0.019) (0.011) (0.061) (0.016)
Number Positive Rainfall Shocks 0.042*** 0.008 -0.102* 0.022
(0.013) (0.009) (0.058) (0.014)
R-squared 0.167 0.0845 0.694 0.230
Observations 12,677 11,230 10,588 9,100
Localities F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Notes: Read and Write variable is only
available for 2010 and 2012. Standard errors, clustered by geographical units (0.5°×0.5° of
precision), are reported in parentheses. Controls are survey month dummies, the number
of adults and the number of children in the household, age dummies, the birth order of
the child, the number of boys among siblings, the age and the education of the household
head. Coefficients are computed with the delta method. ***,**,* mean respectively that the
coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table A3.14: Effect of the number of shocks across gender.
Work Overage Grade Read and write
Girls
Number Positive Price Shocks 0.042*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.011
(0.013) (0.012) (0.043) (0.015)
Number Positive Rainfall Shocks 0.054*** 0.016 -0.045 0.014
(0.014) (0.015) (0.056) (0.015)
Boys
Number Positive Price Shocks 0.023 -0.017 -0.003 -0.017
(0.022) (0.046) (0.016) (0.015)
Number Positive Rainfall Shocks 0.054*** 0.022* -0.101** 0.010
(0.013) (0.012) (0.044) (0.013)
R-squared 0.191 0.249 0.743 0.258
Observations 12,677 10,588 10,588 9,100
Localities F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Note: Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Note: Standard errors, clustered by
geographical units (0.5°×0.5° of precision), are reported in parentheses. Controls are survey
month dummies, the number of adults and the number of children in the household, age
dummies, the birth order of the child, the number of boys in the sibling, the age and the
education of the household head. Coefficients are computed with the delta method. ***,**,*
mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5%
and 10%.
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Table A3.15: Effect of shocks during school age on Test Scores by age
groups
Swahili Maths Swahili Maths
Primary age children
Number Positive Price Shocks -0.022*** -0.035*** -0.017** -0.028***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009)
Number Positive Rainfall Shocks -0.014 -0.021 -0.020** -0.023*
(0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012)
Secondary age children
Number Positive Price Shocks -0.026*** -0.0314*** -0.029*** -0.0315***
(0.007) (0.00717) (0.007) (0.00715)
Number Positive Rainfall Shocks -0.032*** -0.019 -0.0330** -0.018
(0.012) (0.013) (0.0129) (0.013)
R-squared 0.323 0.295 0.323 0.289
Observations 328,948 328,948 294,521 294,521
District F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Attend School × ×
Sources: Uwezo data from 2011 to 2014. Note: Standard errors are clustered at
the district level and are reported in parentheses. Controls are years dummies, the
percentage of lands allocated to crop production by district ,the number of adults and
the number of children in the household, age dummies, the gender and the birth order of
the child, the age and the education of the household head. Coefficients are computed
with the delta method. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly
different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table A3.16: Effect of shocks during school age on test scores by
gender
Swahili Maths Swahili Maths
Girls
Number Positive Price Shocks -0.028*** -0.0318*** -0.027*** -0.0283***
(0.007) (0.00787) (0.007) (0.00726)
Number Positive Rainfall Shocks -0.028*** -0.025* -0.0341*** -0.027**
(0.010) (0.013) (0.0110) (0.013)
Boys
Number Positive Price Shocks -0.025*** -0.033*** -0.027*** -0.033***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Number Positive Rainfall Shocks -0.026** -0.013 -0.027** -0.011
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
R-squared 0.325 0.295 0.324 0.289
Observations 328,948 328,948 294,521 294,521
District F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Attend School × ×
Sources: Uwezo data from 2011 to 2014. Note: Standard errors are clustered at the
district level and are reported in parentheses. Controls are years dummies, the percentage
of lands allocated to crop production by district ,the number of adults and the number
of children in the household, age dummies, the gender and the birth order of the child,
the age and the education of the household head. Coefficients are computed with the
delta method. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different
from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
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3.11 Robustness checks
Table A3.17: Effect of continuous climate and price
variables on children’s activities (beta coefficients).
Work Enrolled Dropout Grade
Pjy−1 -0.009 0.001 0.013 0.011
(0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.031)
SPEI-6 months March-Mayy−1 0.040 0.018 0.003 -0.003
(0.025) (0.014) (0.011) (0.046)
R-squared 0.138 0.181 0.083 0.667
Observations 3,653 3,010 3,245 3,052
Localities F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Note: Standard errors, clustered
by geographical units (0.5°×0.5° of precision), are reported in parentheses. Controls
are survey month dummies, the number of adults and the number of children in the
household, age dummies, the gender and the birth order of the child, the number of
boys in the sibling, the age and the education of the household head. ***,**,* mean
respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%,
5% and 10%.
Table A3.18: Effect of continuous climate and price variables on test
scores (beta coefficients).
Swahili Maths Swahili Maths
Pjy−1 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.001
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
SPEI-6 months March-Mayy−1 -0.032** -0.018 -0.033** -0.023
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
R-squared 0.320 0.292 0.321 0.287
Observations 321,900 321,900 287,856 287,856
District F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Attend school × ×
Sources: Uwezo data from 2011 to 2014. Note: Standard errors are clustered at the
district level and are reported in parentheses. Controls are years dummies, the number
of adults and the number of children in the household, age dummies, the gender and
the birth order of the child
”
the age and the education of the household head. ***,**,*
mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of
1%, 5% and 10%.
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Table A3.19: Effect of future price and rainfalls on education
decisions.(beta coefficients).
Work Enrolled Dropout Grade
Pjy−1 0.003 -0.006 0.010* 0.005
(0.015) (0.009) (0.006) (0.020)
Pjy+1 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SPEI-6 months March-Mayy−1 0.061** 0.001 0.010* 0.021
(0.028) (0.012) (0.006) (0.014)
SPEI-6 months March-Mayy+1 0.029 -0.007 -0.000 0.012
(0.024) (0.011) (0.005) (0.013)
R-squared 0.167 0.154 0.085 0.230
Observations 12,677 11,625 11,230 9,100
Localities F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Notes: Standard errors, clustered
by geographical units (0.5°×0.5° of precision), are reported in parentheses. Controls
are survey month dummies, the number of adults and the number of children in the
household, age dummies, the gender and the birth order of the child, the number of
boys among siblings, the age and the education of the household head. Coefficients are
computed with the delta method. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are
significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Table A3.20: Effect of future shocks on education decisions.
Work Enrolled Dropout Grade
Positive Price Shocky−1 0.017 -0.079*** 0.026 0.021
(0.054) (0.025) (0.018) (0.108)
Positive Price Shocky+1 0.043 0.052** -0.023 -0.078
(0.048) (0.024) (0.018) (0.092)
Positive Rainfall Shocky−1 0.082** -0.004 0.018* -0.084
(0.036) (0.017) (0.010) (0.052)
Positive Rainfall Shocky+1 0.011 -0.026 0.010 0.082
(0.025) (0.025) (0.010) (0.058)
Negative Price Shocky−1 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006
(0.025) (0.013) (0.009) (0.074)
Negative Price Shocky+1 -0.094** 0.055** 0.003 0.084
(0.039) (0.023) (0.012) (0.088)
Droughty−1 0.003 0.014 -0.010 -0.048
(0.026) (0.015) (0.009) (0.058)
Droughty+1 -0.033 0.008 -0.005 0.058
(0.027) (0.014) (0.008) (0.053)
R-squared 0.170 0.156 0.085 0.694
Observations 12,677 11,625 11,230 10,588
Localities F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Note: Standard errors, clustered
by geographical units (0.5°×0.5° of precision), are reported in parentheses. Controls
are survey month dummies, the number of adults and the number of children in the
household, age dummies, the gender and the birth order of the child, the number of
boys among siblings, the age and the education of the household head. Coefficients
are computed with the delta method. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients
are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Table A3.21: Effect of shocks during school age on test scores
standardized by age.
Swahili Maths Swahili Maths
Primary age children
Number Positive Price Shocks -0.017* -0.044*** -0.013 -0.033**
(0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013)
Number Positive Rainfall Shocks -0.020* -0.027* -0.032*** -0.034***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013)
R-squared 0.306 0.276 0.295 0.257
Observations 249,186 249,186 226,020 226,020
Secondary age children
Number Positive Price Shocks -0.036 -0.064** -0.030 -0.058**
(0.024) (0.028) (0.021) (0.024)
Number Positive Rainfall Shocks -0.038 -0.030 -0.041 -0.037
(0.027) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
R-squared 0.060 0.072 0.051 0.077
Observations 48,072 48,072 40,279 40,279
District F.E × × × ×
Year F.E × × × ×
Attend School × ×
Sources: Uwezo data from 2011 to 2014. Note: Standard errors are clustered at
the district level and are reported in parentheses. Controls are years dummies, the
percentage of lands allocated to crop production by district ,the number of adults
and the number of children in the household, age dummies, the gender and the birth
order of the child, the age and the education of the household head. Coefficients are
computed with the delta method. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients
are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Table A3.22: Effect of continuous climate and price variables on sample
selection (beta coefficients).
Mortality Migration
Pjy−1 0.013 -0.018
(0.015) (0.019)
Pjy−2 -0.009 0.021
(0.014) (0.019)
SPEI-6 months March-Mayy−1 0.002 -0.007
(0.010) (0.009)
SPEI-6 months March-Mayy−2 -0.005 -0.007
(0.012) (0.010)
R-squared 0.066 0.103
Observations 4,784 2,618
Localities F.E × ×
Households F.E × ×
Sample Agricultural HH Children aged 7-16
Sources: LSMS-ISA from 2008, 2010 and 2012. Notes: Standard errors, clustered
by geographical units (0.5°×0.5° of precision), are reported in parentheses.
Controls are survey month dummies, the number of adults and the number
of children in the household, age dummies, the gender and the birth order of
the child, the number of boys among siblings, the age and the education of the
household head. ***,**,* mean respectively that the coefficients are significantly
different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Table A3.23: Effect of climate and prices on quality of
education
(1) (2)
Attend teachers Qualified teachers
Continuous variables
SPEI-6months March-Mayjy 0.006 0.009
(0.007) (0.013)
Pjy 0.001 -0.013***
(0.005) (0.004)
Within R-squared 0.029 0.013
Shocks
Positive Rainfall Shockjy -0.000 0.014
(0.010) (0.036)
Positive Price Shockjy 0.015 -0.009
(0.012) (0.017)
Negative Rainfall Shockjy 0.007 0.017
(0.009) (0.021)
Negative Price Shockjy -0.009 0.096
(0.013) (0.069)
Within R-squared 0.03 0.016
Observations 9,356 9,356
Localities F.E × ×
Month and Year F.E × ×
Sources: Uwezo data from 2011 to 2014. Notes: Standard errors are clustered at
the district level and are reported in parentheses. In columns (2) and (3), I control
by the number of recorded actual teachers. ***,**,* mean respectively that the
coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Trois essais sur l’e´ducation en Tanzanie rurale
Si de nombreux efforts ont e´te´ de´ploye´s pour ame´liorer l’acce`s a` l’e´ducation en Afrique
subsaharienne, la proportion d’enfants qui interrompent leur scolarite´ avant la fin du cycle
primaire reste encore tre`s e´leve´e. Pour tenter de re´pondre a` ce de´fi majeur, cette the`se se
propose d’examiner les de´terminants de la demande d’e´ducation dans un environnement
rural expose´ a` de nombreux risques. Le premier chapitre s’inte´resse a` la place essentielle,
et pourtant peu e´tudie´e, que tiennent les couˆts d’opportunite´ du temps des enfants dans
les choix e´ducatifs. Il s’ave`re dans ce cas ne´cessaire d’estimer la productivite´ du travail des
enfants afin d’identifier les couˆts susceptibles de compromettre leur scolarisation. Afin de
mieux appre´hender les choix en matie`re d’e´ducation, le deuxie`me chapitre dresse quant a`
lui une estimation des be´ne´fices de l’e´ducation dans un contexte agricole qui se distingue a`
la fois par un acce`s limite´ aux nouvelles technologies et par la pre´dominance d’exploitations
familiales de petites tailles. Enfin, le troisie`me chapitre interroge les effets des chocs de
productivite´ sur les de´cisions de scolarisation et sur les performances scolaires des enfants.
Deux crite`res retiennent notre attention, l’aˆge auquel les enfants sont confronte´s a` ces
chocs et leur intensite´. Ce sujet nous semble d’autant plus pertinent que la fre´quence
de ces chocs ne cesse aujourd’hui d’augmenter. A` travers ces trois chapitres centre´s sur
la Tanzanie, cette the`se offre ainsi un aperc¸u du roˆle des politiques publiques dans la
protection et le de´veloppement de l’e´ducation.
Three essays on education in rural Tanzania
Despite numerous investments that have been made to increase access to education in
sub-Saharan Africa, a noteworthy share of children drop out of school prior to completing
primary education. To address this issue, this thesis examines the factors that drive
education decisions in a rural risky environment. The first chapter focuses on one of the
core determinant of education investment that has been under-explored, the opportunity
costs of education. To identify these costs that can significantly hinder education, we
determine children’s productivity on the farm and provide an estimate range of the value
of one day of child labor. In order to better understand education decisions in rural
sub-Saharan Africa, the second chapter assesses the different benefits of education in
rural Tanzania, where family farm is the dominant structure in agriculture and where the
technology level is low. Finally, the third chapter investigates whether productivity shocks
are detrimental to educational achievement and children’s cognitive skills by considering
two particular aspects, the age at which shocks occur, and the length of shocks. This
subject is all the more relevant today when the number of productivity shocks is growing.
Throughout these three chapters which focus on rural Tanzania, this thesis provides some
insight into the role of public policies in protecting and promoting education.
